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Abstract 
In this thesis, by employing an autoethnographic methodology, I am exploring why 
certain understandings, or assemblages, of political engagement come to have greater meaning in 
my life and why other assemblages may be more hidden and thus fail to contribute substantially 
to the meaning of political in my life. Using immanent, Marxist and post-Marxist theories, as 
well as a zombie narrative, the study will contextualize the movement of assemblages in my life 
within late-stage capitalism which is juxtaposed with the zombie apocalypse. The placement and 
displacement of certain understandings of the political within my life will be theorized within the 
crisis of constituent power that is revealed in an immanent fram~ork. Furthermore, the crisis ~f 
the constituent in late-stage capitalism creates new forms of radical alienation which will also be 
examined. By exploring my own struggles in becoming political I will theorize why political 
disengagement in emerging adulthood appears to be increasing, as well as possibilities for new 
forms of political engagement in a late-stage capitalist context. 
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Preface 
Emerging adulthood 1 is a time of life that might be seen as a a space full of possibility, 
self-discovery, enrichment and joy. On the other hand, it simultaneously has the potential to be a 
space full of much confusion, crisis and alienation; a space of arrested adulthood2. This is a space 
in which the dependency of childhood and adolescence is left behind as "legal" adult status is 
attained; however, "lived" adulthood still seems out of reach. Emerging adulthood is therefore a 
unique space in which one has access to adult autonomy without adult commitments and 
responsibilities, but also without full adult privileges. 
Without the protection of adult privilege, the actions ofy:~ung people, no matter what they 
may be, can often be interpreted and organized to fit the antagonistic role of the zombie. On the 
one hand, mainstream discourse often depicts young people as apathetic: mindless zombies, 
doing nothing but living lives of hedonism, individualism and over-consumption. On the other 
hand, when young people are engaged in radically political activities they can also be deemed 
zombies: monstrous, destructive, irresponsible and uncivilized. However, when young people are 
"appropriately" politically engaged, for instance active in governmental and community 
activities, they can be seen as no more than zombies either, merely conforming to the 
expectations of civic society. 
From such a stance, the meaning of the political appears to be dead, or at least undead. As 
an emerging adult, I often find myself constructing the meaning of the political in my life based 
on the above antagonistic terms. It seems like no matter what I do or don't do, I remain alienated 
and feel like a zombie in all its various forms. 
1 Emergent adulthood is generally defined as the delay in transition to adulthood independence of people who are 
under 30 years of age, particularly in late-stage capitalist countries (Arnett, 2000; Cote & Allahar, 2006). It is 
argued that emerging adults take on characteristics or behaviours that are usually attributed to "adolescence". 
2 The apparent contradiction between 'emerging' and 'arrested' adulthood will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
one. 
6 
This thesis is about my journey in overcoming this alienation. Or more accurately, it is 
about facing this alienation and transforming it into something more bearable and more livable by 
finding the joy and life that is already buried deep within it. It is about finding the life, and the 
political, in the zombie. 
Zombie movies: A tool for analysis 
Historically, the figure of the zombie is indeed fraught with many political implications. 
The zombie's origins can be traced back to Haitian voodoo superstitions about corpses that have 
been brought back from the dead by a sorcerer in order to serve himlher. The fear associated with 
this zombie is not of being hurt by one, but of becoming one. T~ can be seen to reflect the 
Haitian population's post-colonial fears of eternal servitude (Twohy, 2008). 
The movie genre, and the popular culture version of the zombie took off in 1968 with the 
release of George Romero's "Night of the Living Dead" (Twohy, 2008). The movie is seen to 
mark the beginning ofthe horror genre, as well as the genre's affinity for political social 
commentary. Subsequent releases by Romero can be seen to provide commentary on capitalism, 
consumerism and class struggle (Bishop, 2010; Twohy, 2008). Romero's popularized version of 
the zombie is often seen to represent the excessive consumerism of America (Bishop, 2010; 
Towhy, 2008). In a way, Romero's zombie still re~ains some of its Haitian roots, its servitude 
being to capital, as opposed to a master sorcerer. 
Although the genre is largely rooted in Romero's version of the zombie, in the last forty 
years the genre and the zombie have proliferated in many different directions. In my thesis, I will 
examine several different movies from the genre in order to extract diverse and rich visuals and 
metaphors through which the experience of my own political dis/engagement can be reflected. It 
should be noted that the purpose here is not to analyze the genre, but to use the genre as a tool for 
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analysis3. I am not looking to reveal anything about the genre, but will rather use the genre as an 
object ofreflection4 in order to reveal something about my experiences of dis/engagement and 
alienation, and to structure my thoughts and writing. 
Assemblages 
This thesis is an assemblage: an assemblage made out of assemblages, and an assemblage 
about assemblages. To begin clarifying the term 'assemblage' I will use the example of a book. A 
book is made up of words and sentences that create meaning; each word and sentence is different, 
but together the words and sentences form one entity, a book. The more words and sentences you 
add, the more the meaning of the book changes and expands, bu,ttstill remains that one book. In 
this sense, a book (or a thesis, if you will) is an assemblage of immaterial bodies. This example 
can also apply to an assemblage made up of material bodies, as it illustrates the structure, or 
composition, of an assemblage. Although an assemblage has a structure andlor composition to it, 
this structure is not organized through a hierarchical form. Just like no one word or sentence in a 
book is more important; all its parts work together to create the whole of its meaning. 
What is significant is that material and immaterial bodies can form assemblages together. 
So to continue with the example of a book, the book itself is composed of material bodies: a 
cover, pages, ink, paper, pulp, molecules and so ~~. The language and ideas in a book, however, 
can be seen as immaterial bodies: words, meanings and discourses. The immaterial words, 
meanings and discourses are transmitted materially through the book, which can then enter into 
an assemblage with hands, eyes, and a mind. Immaterial meanings can enter into assemblage with 
a material human body (itself an assemblage of bodies), and possibly these ideas may enter an 
3 I realize there is a wide literature in film theory pertaining to the zombie. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, 
however, I have chosen not to engage with this literature and leave my work on zombies largely anecdotal in this 
particular project. 
4 Objects of reflection will be more fully explained in the upcoming section on autoethnography. 
assemblage with actions, which can further enter into assemblage with ideas, and so on and so 
forth. In fact, differentiating between the material and immaterial can become impossible, as the 
two often meld into each other. 
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To further elaborate, an assemblage can be described as a rhizomatic formation of 
openings and closings. Let's take a simple example of a Mr. Potato Head. This toy consists of a 
plastic 'potato' head with holes in it, into which different appendages can be inserted and 
removed, placed and replaced. Some parts of Mr. Potato head do not have holes and so in these 
spots no insertions can be made. In its own way the Mr. Potato Head forms a simple assemblage. 
What I am referring to is, of course, somewhat more complex. I;.b.e openings and closings of an 
assemblage are infinite, and attach to infinities of other assemblages. And what's more, these 
openings and closing are never in the same spot twice. They are always shifting, moving, 
opening, closing, opening, closing. In fact the Mr. Potato Head itself can be seen as an insertion 
into many assemblages: plastic pieces entering into assemblage with factory machinery in China; 
a packaged toy inserted into an advertisement read by a parent; an insertion into the hand of a 
child and further, simultaneously an insertion into discourses of childhood play and creativity. 
There are, also, what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) term as 'dark assemblages,' which put 
an order or hierarchy to what assemblages can do.,- establishing which insertions can be made and 
which ones cannot. The dark assemblage appears to be made of more closings than openings. It is 
precisely these dark assemblages that this thesis will seek to explore: the assemblages that come 
to create my alienated understanding of the political that is full of closures. At the same time, 
this thesis will attempt to dismantle these dark assemblages in order to find the hidden openings 
while attempting to remain an open assemblage itself. The methodology of auto ethnography will 
be used as a tool to dismantle and open up these assemblages. 
Autoethnography 
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I 
Autoethnographers shift back and forth, here and there, through several layers of 
consciousness: "first through an ethnographic wide-angle lens, focusing outward on social and 
cultural aspects of their personal experience; then, they look inward, exposing a vulnerable self 
that is moved by and may move through, refract and resist cultural interpretations" (Ellis & 
Bochner, 2000, p. 739). This constant shifting is often aided by several 'objects of reflection' to 
expose different aspects of consciousness. These objects are often artifacts from the researcher's 
life that act as a mirror of themselves and their surrounding culture. Such artifacts can be almost 
anything: a journal, a picture, a piece of clothing, a memory, a movie (or as in this case a movie 
genre) - anything that stirs a deep and meaningful emotion in th~researcher. Any piece of writing 
can easily be used as an object of reflection, and thus, theory itself can serve as a formidable 
object of reflection. 
Autoethnography is a postmodem research and writing method that falls into the 
autobiographical genre (Ellis & Bochner, 2000, p. 739). As Richardson (2000) further comments, 
autoethnographies are "highly personalized, revealing texts in which authors tell stories about 
their own lived experiences, relating the personal to the cultural" (Richardson, 2000, p. 11). 
Autoethnography attempts to embrace the inherent bias of research and place the researcher at the 
centre as the subject of the research itself. As wa~ mentioned earlier, this research stems from my 
own struggles with political dis/engagement, meaning that my own experience is central to the 
topic being explored by the current study. An auto ethnography can be likened to a case-study. 
The study is detailed and about one particular phenomenon (the researcher), but its findings have 
a depth and richness that may inform future studies in significant ways. 
The word 'autoethnography' can be broken down into three parts: 'auto' which means 
'self', 'ethnos' which refers to culture, and 'graphy' which refers to the research process (Ellis & 
Bochner, 2000, p.740). Autoethnographies may place more emphasis on certain aspects over 
others: more emphasis may be placed on the self, culture or research process, or a combmation, 
depending on the researcher. This creates a large continuum of the different types of 
auto ethnographies which are possible. 
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In order to give a brief and general overview of the types of auto ethnography, I will focus 
on three broad examples; they are labelled as: reflexive ethnography, complete member research 
and evocative personal narrative (Ellis & Bochner, 2000). 
In reflexive ethnography, the primary focus is often on culture or subculture (Ellis & 
Bochner, 2000, p. 740). This type of ethnography is mediated from the researcher's personal 
experience and point of view during the research. The researcher.,uses the self to learn about the 
'other'. This comes from the notion that how we talk: and write about others illuminates more 
about ourselves and how we organize the world than how they organize theirs (Ellis and Bochner, 
2000, p. 753). 
In complete-member research, the researcher studies a setting that she is already a 
member of or becoming a member of (Ellis & Bochner, 2000, p. 741). The researcher gives an 
'insider's' view on the group she is studying. The focus here shifts to an almost equal division of 
focus between culture and self, whereas reflexive ethnography has a deeper focus on culture. 
Evocative personal narratives, on the othe~ hand, start from where the researcher already 
is. The primary focus here is the self, with culture and research process being more secondary. 
Here the researcher goes beyond their academic self and incorporates her personal life. "Their 
primary purpose is to understand a self or some aspect of a life lived in a cultural context" (Ellis 
& Bochner, 2000, p. 742). One ofthe main purposes of personal narratives is to evoke a response 
from the readers that prompts them to reflect upon their own lives with a new understanding. 
By reviewing the above examples, one might begin to see the wide scope that 
methodology in auto ethnography covers. Within these three categories, the structure, aesthetic, 
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and primary focal points of each 'individual auto ethnographic text vary, creating a rich diversity 
of the texts that are possible. 
For my autoethnography, I will be roughly focusing on a method of evocative personal 
narrative. I say 'roughly' because the objectives of this methodology appear to become somewhat 
complicated when combined with my thesis' theoretical underpinnings of immanence. It was 
explained that evocative personal narratives primarily focus on the self, with culture and research 
process being more secondary interests. Although the self is undoubtedly the central starting 
point of my autoethnography, the self in immanent terms is complex and immediately implicates 
culture and the research process as being part of that self5• In thi~way, I hope to show that my 
thesis is indeed somewhat more balanced than it would fIrst appear. 
A personal narrative is always in motion and flux as different readers come across the 
text, fInding connections to their own lives; putting themselves into conversation with the text 
and the human researcher at its centre (Ellis & Bochner, 2000). Evocative stories "long to be used 
rather than analyzed" (Ellis & Bochner, 2000, p. 744). "What are the consequences my story 
produces? What kind of person does it shape me into? What new possibilities does it introduce 
for living my life?" (Ellis & Bochner, 2000, p. 746). These are the issues that are of importance 
in evocative personal narratives. By exploring ou:,selves, we inevitably explore the 'others' we 
have come into collision with and so, "with understanding yourself comes understanding others" 
(Ellis & Bochner, 2000, p. 738). 
Parallel Recursive Analysis 
In her Master's thesis, Korrinne Weima (2008) creates the term 'parallel recursive analysis' 
to describe the writing methodology that she employs throughout her study. She likens the 
5 This might be comprehended in more detail by referring to the beginning of chapter two, where immanence is 
more clearly explicated, and chapter six, where the complex self is discussed. 
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methodology to a long braid of hair: 
following one fragment of hair with your eyes, notice how it weaves in and out -
appearing recursively - yet remains parallel to the others. Similarly, I pull fragments of 
writing forward, and push others back, allowing them to appear and retract recursively, 
but always remaining parallel to the others. In other words, no fragment is ever forgotten, 
nor does it ever appear in exactly the same way. Instead, fragments are recursively 
brought forward - imploded into the next - to produce continually thickening parallel 
analysis (Weima, 2008, p.26). 
This thesis will employ a writing methodology very similar to aparallel recursive analysis, 
weaving several textured threads together to form the analysis. The threads can be seen as my 
objects of reflection, with my reflection, or analysis itself, also being a thread running throughout 
the thesis. The first thread, or recursion, will serve as the structural foundation of the writing. As 
discussed above, I will be using the figure of the zombie as a metaphor to frame the discussion of 
political engagement and disengagement. Specifically, this will be done by using common plot 
and character devices that can be found throughout several zombie movies in order to anchor the 
thesis. This will be done in order to mimic the plot line of a zombie movie and thus provide this 
thesis with a central linear thread, or narrative. 1'v!.ore abstract, nonlinear reflective pieces will be 
interwoven around the central linear piece. These pieces of writing will be integrated yet distinct, 
through the use of font and page formatting. The reason for having a linear plot line to anchor the 
thesis is to facilitate a deeper understanding for myself, and perhaps for the reader as well. The 
immanent theory and literature at the center of my study is notoriously difficult, complex and 
confusing. Many readers (including myself) need a linear progression in order to understand the 
implications and may feel lost otherwise; thus, by structuring this thesis around a linear thread of 
a plot line I hope to foster understanding and effective communication, as well as shape the 
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auto ethnography as a narrative. 
The second thread, or recursion, will focus on immanent, Marxist and post-Marxist 
theory. This recursion will also serve as another object of reflection. It will be woven, in and out, 
and through the zombie plot line and through the other two recursions. The crisis between 
constituent and constituted power, and the assemblages that come to form political engagement 
and disengagement will be revealed, juxtaposed, exploded and imploded through the 
interweaving of all the recursions. 
A third recursion in the proposed study will be composed of personal reflections, 
memories and commentaries pertaining to my struggle in becom:ing politicaL Some of these 
pieces come from a blog I've been keeping throughout this process as a personal journaL Others 
come from notes that I've been taking throughout this process. There are others yet that have been 
constructed from memories, or are a combination of all the above. As was mentioned earlier, 
these pieces of writing may be more abstract and nonlinear. This recursion will not only reflect 
upon the other recursions, but also on the process of writing an autoethnography itself. 
The final thread will focus on reflecting on the space of 'emerging adulthood' as well as 
some of the literature on youth dis/engagement. This thread will attempt to situate my personal 
experiences and struggles in relation to a broader ~ontext. The intent here is not to generalize my 
experiences to a broader population, but to examine how my experiences might be a part of and 
interact with this culturally constructed space. 
As noted above, the threads and recursions will at times meld together, just like a braid of 
hair: sometimes it is difficult to tell where one strand ends and another one begins, the braid 
seamlessly incorporating more and more hair, or threads as it were, along the way. In this sense, 
parallel recursive analysis can be compared to an assemblage with constantly shifting openings 
and closings. 
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Contextualizing the writing of this study within an autoethnography may be in of itself a 
means to overcome the alienation found in the dark assemblage and dismantle it. This 
personalized writing and research style connects to the reader of the text intellectually and 
emotionally, thereby possibly reaching multiple audiences, academic and non-academic alike. 
Autoethnography reconnects the research process to our humanity by writing "from an ethic of 
care and concern" (Ellis & Bochner, p.742). Furthermore, I would argue that autoethnography is 
a process in which the method is "tool-and-result," a term coined by Vygotsky to describe Marx's 
method of historical materialism (Newman & Holzman, 1993). In his preface to A Contribution 
to the Critique o/Political Economy, Marx explains how the mope of production, or material 
forces, in a society conditions its social, political and intellectual life, and that "at a certain stage 
of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing 
relations of production [ ... ]. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations 
tum into their fetters" (Marx & Engels, 1978, p. 4). The mode of production, or the material 
conditions, can be seen as the 'tool' which in its very expression creates its own limitations and 
thereby the 'result'. Marx continues: 
No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it 
have developed; and new, higher relations _of production never appear before the material 
conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself. Therefore 
mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since, looking at the matter 
more closely, it will always be found that the task itself arises only when the material 
conditions for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation. (Marx 
& Engels, 1978, p. 5) 
One can see Marx's view of history as its very own methodology, at once a tool-and-result as 
material conditions themselves create the conditions for a new mode of production, transforming 
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themselves. Similarly, I would posit that auto ethnography is a method of simultaneous theory and 
praxis because the auto ethnographer's living selfis at the center as the object of study. And thus 
theory and experience cannot help but meld together as each learning moment shapes one's 
experience and each experience shapes one's learning. In other words, autoethnography may 
bring the social and political together. 
{ 
1. The Outbreak 
"The scene can be best described as mayhem. " 
- Night of the Living Dead (Romero, 1968) 
Although George A. Romero's (1968) Night of the Living Dead is often hailed as 
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originating the zombie movie genre, the word 'zombie' is never mentioned throughout the entirety 
of the movie. In fact, the characters and audience of the Night of the Living Dead are given no 
information about what is going on for the first half hour of the film - approximately a third of 
the entire movie. And even when information is finally given on the radio and television, it is still 
unclear what 'those things' are and where they come from. 
RADIO NEWS ANNOUNCER:,( 
There is an epidemic of mass murder being committed by a virtual 
army of unidentified assassins. The murders are taking place in 
villages, cities, rural homes, and suburbs with no apparent 
pattern or reason for the slayings. It seems to be a sudden 
general explosion of mass homicide. We have some descriptions of 
the assassins. Eyewitness accounts described the assassins as 
ordinary-looking people, misshapen monsters, people who look like 
they're in a trance, and creatures that look like people but act 
like animals. (Romero, 1968) 
Many zombie movies begin in chaos and confusion. Whether the movie starts in at the 
peak of the zombie outbreak, or just at its onset, it often is unclear what is happening and what 
exactly caused the outbreak. Often, it takes an actual, personal attack for the protagonistls to even 
know that there is a problem. Only surviving an attack do characters begin to seek information 
about what is happening. And this is never made easy. Radios break, phone lines are down or 
cellphones die, cars crash into trees, and of course the room with the TV in it is always 
surrounded by zombies. When some sort of information is attained, it is seldom comforting or 
reassuring. In many cases what the main characters find out is that no one else really knows 
what's going on either. There is mass confusion about what is happening, the causes, and why 
seemingly ordinary looking people are viciously attacking other people. It's just another ordinary 
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day. But the world has changed. The people have changed. 
Or have they? 
In Wright's (2004) romantic-horror-comedy Shaun of the Dead, the protagonist, Shaun, is 
actually given information about what is happening in many different forms and has several 
encounters with zombies, but humorously fails to notice that there is anything wrong for quite 
some time. We see Shaun look at newspapers with huge headlines reading "HAVOC", 
"MUTILATED REMAINS" and "NEW SUPER-FLU SCARES PUBLIC"; however, Shaun is 
not really engaging with what those papers say. Shaun works in an electronics store selling 
televisions with news bulletins constantly playing in the backgrq;und, but does not notice what is 
on the screen. Constantly, Shaun, as well as the audience are bombarded with both subtle and 
obvious information about what is happening. But Shaun is too distracted by his own personal 
life to really notice. His engagement with his personal life is also fairly limited, depicting Shaun 
as a sort of zombie not only to the world around him, but to his own life. As the movie progresses 
Shaun's lack of awareness becomes funnier as it becomes more and more absurd; however, the 
beginning of the movie is quite believable - an audience member not paying attention might not 
pick up on all the clues either. The chaos that is just beginning to ensue at the beginning of the 
movie often looks like the ordinary hustle and bu~tle of living in a busy and overstimulated 
culture. At times in the movie, it is unclear if one is looking at an actual zombie or just a regular 
person, mindlessly in the throes of everyday life. 
On the one hand, what we see in some zombie movies is chaos resulting in panic and 
hysteria. On the other hand, in movies like Shaun of the Dead, we see chaos as daily life, which 
results in characters retreating into numbness. We often see the camera zoom in on Shaun with a 
dazed and empty look over his face. 
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. What is the political? 
I dunno ... but it sure ain't me. 
When I consider the word 'political' and what it means to me, the first thing that pops into my 
head is the word 'government. ' In fact, I would say the words 'political' and 'government' are 
conflated in my mind. Even though in my time at university I have heard the term 'political' used 
in very different ways, I can never seem to remember the alternate meanings offered to me. 
Something about power relations ... There is always a fuzziness surrounding this mysterious word 
I seem to recall there's something MORE to it. But I don't know what that 'more' might be. 
And so, no matter how hard I try to separate those two words - 'political' and 'government' - they 
seem to just fling back together. Nothing seems to be able to come between them. 
When I consider the word 'political' I cannot help but feel confused I feel like there is supposed 
to be power somewhere in that word But I can never seem to find it. I lose patience. I don't want 
to be political! I am too lazy and when it comes down to it I don't really understand anything 
about it anyways. I don't want to have anything to do with the gqvernment. I don't get what the 
point of the government is and how Ifit in it; how I have any part of it. I don'tfeel that my vote 
counts. The media always hypes the election in terms of prime ministers, but when you show up at 
the ballot box, none of the names look familiar. No one ever really taught me anything about how 
all this 'political' stuff works. I seem to recall a civics class in high school ... but nothing really 
stands out about it. And I try to learn about it. But it's so fucking boring. I don't get how anyone 
can sincerely care about it. I don't feel like knowing more about the government is going to make 
it more official or real to me - the government does not represent me. It has nothing to do with 
me. I'm too busy anyways. Why on earth would I want to spend my extra free time on learning 
about the government when I could spend that time with my boyfriend, or my friends, or family? 
I'd rather take my dog for a walk. 
In Shaun of the Dead (Wright, 2004) people appear to be utterly unengaged in their lives. 
This depiction reflects a popular view that today's generation of young people6 are apathetic and 
-
not only politically disengaged, but socially disengaged as well. Young people, in the popular 
media, are often depicted as becoming increasingly self-absorbed, and significantly lacking 
interest and involvement particularly in the political arena (Cushion, 2007). 
The majority of recent research on the topic, however, seems to reveal that the young 
people of today are not uninterested in politics per se, but rather are disillusioned by conventional 
6 For the purposes of this thesis, the term 'young people' here will generally refer to young adults, or what Arnett 
(2000) has deemed "emerging adults". Emerging adulthood can be also referred to as "arrested adulthood" or 
"youthhood" and may actually stretch into the 30s and beyond (Cote & Allahar, 2006). Emerging adulthood will 
be more fully discussed later in this chapter. 
politics which they deem as irrelevant to their lives (Keiser, 2000; Kimberlee, 2002; Henn, 
Weinstein, & Wring, 2002; Cushion, 2007). A common emerging theme in the literature is that 
young people do not like traditional politics, but have a dissatisfaction with their lack of 
involvement (Macintosh, Robson, Smith, & Whyte, 2003). A major limitation of conventional 
political science studies, media depictions and public discourse of political dis/engagement 
specifically related to youth, however, is that political engagement or participation is often too 
narrowly defined (White et aI., 2000; Henn et aI., 2002; O'Toole et aI., 2003; Weller, 2006). 
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Part of the narrowness of the definition of political engagement comes from the fact that 
voting is often seen as a key indicator of political engagement (I;lenn et aI., 2002). The image of 
low political engagement among young people is especially exacerbated by statistics that point to 
the decrease in percentage of young people that vote in elections. Several studies in the UK 
discuss this decline in voting by 18-35 year olds (Kimberlee, 2002; Henn et aI., 2002). Similar 
trends have been cited for the United States and Canada (Blais & Loewen, 2009). What is often 
left out, however, is that the overall voter turnout has declined as well (McNally, 2006; O'Toole 
et aI., 2003; Elections Canada, 2010). Although, rates of decline are often steeper for youth, it is 
important to note that this is not an isolated incident. In other words, it appears that adults are no 
more 'political' than young people are (Banaji, 2028; Arnett, 2007). 
One thing that may perpetuate the view of youth disengagement is some of the academic 
work done in this area itself. Previously, most of the work done on political dis/engagement has 
been conducted within the political sciences (Henn et aI., 2002; O'Toole et aI., 2003). Trends that 
are revealed in this literature, although they can be highly detailed and accurate, can sometimes 
limit the discussion of alternative views by confining the meaning of political engagement to 
governmental and electoral realms. Other literature, seems to point out that youth disengagement 
is an incomplete view of young people. Narrow definitions of political engagement often exclude 
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youth and generally other forms of political engagement (Weller, 2006). In discussing Bhavnani's 
(1994) research, Henn et aL (2002) reveal that "young people do take part in various types of 
'political' activity, although this action is often discounted from being 'political' by conventional 
political science and by young people themselves" (p. 168). 
This is further revealed in a study by White et aL (2000). Through interviews and focus 
groups with youth, ages 14-24, across the United Kingdom, White et aL (2000) found that many 
youth perceived 'political activity' only as activities that related directly to the government. 
Others had broader views of what constituted political activity; however, the overall efficacy of 
any particular method (whether directly relating to the governm~t or indirectly) was seen by 
most to be determined by whether or not the government listened and responded to the message 
being conveyed. It appears that for young people, politics get in the way of being political (Henn 
et aI., 2002; Berry, 2008). 
Based on previous research by Keiser (2000), Kimberlee (2002), Henn et aL (2002) and 
particularly White et aI., (2000), it would appear that many young people conceptualize political 
engagement based on an abstract ideal of hierarchical power - constituted power. As was 
discovered by White et aL (2000), youth view power to be enacted if the wanted results are 
achieved; if the government responds to the niess!lge conveyed. In other words, youth only have 
power if the government responds and lets them have power. Governments, which are typically 
supposed to be the means of politicization, are for youth seen as the barrier, thus creating an 
antagonism between young people and the government. Political action by youth is often viewed 
as an oppositional action (me or us vs. the government) as opposed to an inclusive action (we are 
working with the government). Thus, the way youth conceptualize power is contradictory to the 
way they experience it, as when it comes to the government they feel powerless. 
Where youth are feeling more powerful is in more participatory activities that they do not 
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deem as political because they may not be related directly to the government. Many young people 
in White et aL's (2000) study were volunteering and taking part in issues in their local 
communities, such as protesting the closing of a hospital or park, but did not consider this to be 
political engagement. Similar sentiments were pointed out in studies by Keiser (2000), Kimberlee 
(2002), and Weller (2006). In other words, as the literature points out, a too narrow definition of 
'political engagement' or action, may prevent many young people from being politically engaged 
and/or realizing that they are (Henn et aI., 2002). 
Although some literature surrounding the issue of political disengagement and 
engagement of young people addresses the limited definitions ofthe political, the literature in this 
area itself often does not expand the definition of political very drastically. Kimberlee (2002) 
outlines what he deems the 'alternative value' explanation for young people's non-participation in 
governmental politics. This explanation suggests that young people have turned away from 
governmental politics and instead turned their attention to other forms of politics, often referred 
to as 'New Politics' or New Social Movements (NSM) (Kimberlee, 2002). NSM theories suggest 
that the structure and interests of social movements have changed as a result of the shift to a 
postindustrial economy. It is proposed that young people born in the 1960s and onward have 
shifted their focus away from material needs and class relations 7, and focus more on immaterial 
(or post-material) needs and identity politics (Pichardo, 1997; Kimberlee, 2002). NSMs are often 
operating outside of governmental structures and the concerns of many NSMs are often single-
issue based and can include animal rights, environmentalism, anti-racist, feminist, and gay rights 
issues (Pichardo, 1997). 
7 It is argued that generations born in the 1960s and on are different than previous generations that were born in the 
great depression era were more focused on 'sustenance driven' needs, and the generations after that who were 
born in the immediate post-war years who were more concerned with 'status and consumption' needs (Kimberlee, 
2002). 
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Although literature on NSM points to an expansion of the political beyond governmental 
structures, literature focused on youth dis/engagement can nonetheless perpetuate the idea that 
politics should revolve around the state despite acknowledging NSMs. For instance, in the end, 
Kimberlee (2002) seems to conclude that no matter what the explanation about youth non-
participation, citizenship, not politics, is at the centre of the discussion. Similarly, Keiser (2000) 
points out that, "two-thirds of young people are active volunteers is an under-publicized aspect of 
the new politics that is emerging. Young people are using direct service as a substitute for voting. 
They want to make the world a better place but do not think that politics is the way to do it" (p. 
i 
36). However, after laying out this alternative Keiser (2000) ar~s that, "it is up to the I 
organizations that are mobilizing young people to serve their communities to encourage them to 
become involved in civics." (p. 36). Keiser (2002) suggests that direct service is in many ways 
effective but would be more so if linked with engagement with public policy. There is certainly 
much validity to this statement; however, it seems that any potential alternative form of political 
engagement seems to lack legitimacy unless it is connected to the civic, or in essence, 'good 
citizenship' . 
Banaji (2008) points out that the political and civic are not always compatible. Sometimes 
the civic is indeed framed around being a responsible citizen: loyal and obedient. This sort of 
view, however, can erase the politics of democracy, which is often being encouraged along side 
civic engagement - even though such a view dulls the kind of critical thought and engagement 
required in a democracy (Banaji. 2008). It appears that much of the politics that are recognized 
are not the politics of democracy, but rather politics that encourage responsible citizenship, or put 
in another way, responsible adulthood. This focus on responsible adult citizenship is illustrated to 
some extent by a study done by Cushion (2007) who examined depictions of young anti-Iraq war 
protestors in the UK press. Cushion (2007) found that depictions of youth protests were framed in 
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more positive terms when young people were part of large protests that included adults, 
particularly in pre-war coverage. News coverage of protests that included people of all ages, 
tended to comment on how young people's "comments were relatively 'sensible' and meaningful 
contributions to debates about the merits of going to war" (Cushion, 2007, p. 426). In contrast, 
once the war had started, public opinions polls revealed a shift of opinions (of the adult 
population) in favour of the war, and young protestors were no longer as frequently depicted as 
engaged citizens, but instead as truants. 
In other words, young people are considered an interruption to everyday life (a disrupting 
force to normal, consumer-related activity) rather than as,,Nalued citizens, in the same way 
(older) protestors had been reported on just a month previously (to far greater 
encouragement). (Cushion, 2007, p.427) 
Such an example suggests that if it is adulthood that legitimizes the conventional meaning of the 
political, youth-hood itself may seem to become a prerequisite for apathy, disengagement and 
political 'failure to launch'. 
I wish I contributed more to society 
It's not really the voting thing that bugs me. Voting is really quite simple. I've voted before. It 
didn't make mefeel any more 'political' than usual though. I stillfelt like I didn't contribute much 
because it's the idea of being an informed voter that really gets to me. 
It feels like to be a good citizen I need to be informed and vote. But being informed takes work. I 
don't want to do this work. But because I don't do this work, I feel like I'm lazy. I feel like I really 
SHOULD do this work - I choose not to do it (or I try to but give up because I get bored)- and 
that makes me feel like I'm a lazy and bad citizen. I'd rather hang out with my friends, or watch a 
movie. 
Sometimes even writing my thesis ties into being a good citizen. On the one hand, I love school 
and there isn't anything I'd rather be doing instead; I do it because I enjoy it and not because I 
see it as a means to an end On the other hand, writing my thesis IS work - and sometimes, even 
though I enjoy it I can get caught up in the pressure of it and suddenly can start to view it as a 
means to an end (ie, getting into grad school and eventually having a job - the better my work is 
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the better chance I have of being successful, etc.}. My thesis itself can be about being a good 
citizen - I become someone who is informed, and someone who might eventually have a 'real 'job. 
Someone who contributes .... sometimes if I'm not working on my thesis I can I feel like I'm a lazy 
bum who does not contribute to society. 
A lot of my struggles with the political can be summed up to wanting to be a good person who 
contributes to society, like the heroes you see in the movies fighting the zombies. I don't want to 
be one who does not contribute, a bum, a hobo, a sponge, someone taking advantage of the 
system - living and reaping the benefits of society while not contributing - a zombie who only 
consumes. 
In a sense my identity seems to be teetering between a binary: I want to be a good citizen, 
but feel that I fail to do what it takes to be one. On the other hand, I do not want to be a 
consuming zombie, but feel that I often am one. The writing of tlris auto ethnography clearly 
complicates this binary. Much like some of the youth cited in MacIntosh et al.'s (200) study, I am 
not completely ignorant of politics, but I do feel a dissatisfaction with conventional politics, and 
my lack of participation. It seems like I am somewhere in the middle of these two desires of 
being: the hero, the good citizen and, the bad, consuming zombie. I would like to situate this 
struggle and confusion, at least in part, to the stage of life I am currently experiencing and 
occupymg. 
I will start by lightly positioning myself within emerging adulthood. Emerging adulthood 
has been proposed by Jeffrey Arnett as an additioQal developmental stage in the life-course-
following adolescence, and preceding adulthood - to account for the delay in transition to 
adulthood independence of people who are under 30 years of age, particularly in late-stage 
capitalist countries (Arnett, 2000, 2007; Arnett & Tanner, 2009; Cote & Allahar, 2006). 
Traditional markers of adulthood, such as marriage, child-rearing and financial independence, 
appear to be happening later than in the past. With the postponement of adult commitments and 
responsibilities and longer stays in education, the new stage proposed as emerging adulthood is 
"characterized by identity exploration, instability, self-focus, a feeling of 'being in-between', and 
25 
the perception of a range of possibilities" (Hendry & Kloep, 2010, p. 169). 
I would like to note that emergent adulthood here is being used as way of positioning 
myself in relation to other young people, but that I do not necessarily adhere to Arnett's 
developmental model completely. Arnett's theory of emerging adulthood has come under much 
scrutiny; in particular, it has been criticized for being inadequately theorized as a developmental 
stage, lacking any evidence of universality, and failing to account for social-economic differences 
in any substantial wal (Bynner, 2005; Cote & Bynner, 2008; Hendry & Kloep, 2010). 
Furthermore, Cote and Bynner (2008) argue that Arnett's theory relies too heavily on a 
psychological free-choice model, and "mistakes the coping mec1;\anisms of many young people 
for freely chosen options to delay their entry into adulthood" (p. 251). However, it has also been 
acknowledged that emerging adulthood is a useful construct that reflects a reality for many young 
people in recent cohorts (Cote & Allahar, 2006; Cote & Bynner, 2008). Alternatively, Cote and 
Bynner (2008) propose that the emerging adulthood would be better explained as a social 
condition that has arisen from "changing economic conditions leading to a lowering of the social 
status of the young that is contributing to increasingly precarious trajectories, and in terms of the 
decline in the social markers of adulthood associated with the individualization process" (p. 251). 
It is in this sense that I would like to apply_emerging adulthood, as a social condition, 
rather than a developmental period. Furthermore, based on Cote and Bynner's interpretation of 
the situation, the term 'arrested adulthood,9 might be more useful in terms of my struggle in 
situating myself as a political subject. Emerging adulthood can be seen as a space arising from 
8 Although just how inadequately theorized Arnett's model of emerging adulthood is is certainly debatable. Some 
of Arnett's earliest work already clearly situated emerging adulthood within cultural and economic conditions, 
and never claimed universality (Arnett, 2000). Furthermore, in more recent literature, Arnett (2007) challenges 
conventional views of developmental theory and suggests a more fluid conceptualization of development situated 
within constantly shifting historical, economical and cultural conditions, acknowledging that "eventually, the 
theory of emerging adulthood may be displaced by other theories as cultures and economies change in ways we 
cannot imagine today" (p. 81). 
9 I will use terms 'emerging adulthood' and 'arrested adulthood' rather interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
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economic conditions, particularly unfavourable economic conditions (Arnett, 2000, Cote & 
Allahar, 2006; Cote and Bynner, 2008). There is some evidence to support that whether one 
identifies as an adult or not has a lot to do with one's sense of financial independence (Hendry & 
Kloep, 2010). However, the need for youth labour has decreased, except for in the more exploited 
areas of the labour market. Emerging adults are expected to take on adulthood, yet the financial 
means to take on adulthood responsibly are often difficult to attain for this age group (Cote & 
Allahar, 2006; Cote and Bynner, 2008). 
If the legitimacy of the political lays in adult citizenship where does that leave those who 
have not or cannot attain adulthood? As passive and apathetic s~pjects? This question has to 
some degree been addressed by research in the new sociology of childhood and literature on 
agency, pointing to children and youth as active subjects10(Prout & James, 1990; James, 2004; 
Cote & Allahar, 2006). Further, several strands of theories have highlighted alternative forms of 
the political that engage with the everyday lives of the subjects in question, and move beyond the 
political framed solely within capital, and hence beyond the adult bourgeois citizen. Subculture 
theory, feminist theories, as well as neo-tribal theories (among others) can point to more 
expansive conceptualizations ofthe political where 'everyday politics' are considered and the 
personal is seen as politicaL Subculture theory f?,cuses on neo-Marxist theories of class 
resistance. Subcultures are seen as a form of resistance expressed through style on a symbolic 
leveL By taking symbols from the dominant middle-class, working class youth used them in new 
ways and thus subverted dominant meanings and reasserted working class values. Among its 
many critiques is that subculture theory largely ignores race and gender relations in its political 
conceptualizations (Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995). Feminist political theory can be then seen to 
fill the gap here in some ways and expand the political beyond class relations and the public 
10 Due to the limited scope ofthis project, agency, although relevant in some ways, will not be discussed here. 
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domain. Feminism posits the private domain as political where the lives and experiences of 
women and youth (as well as men to some degree) have been largely situated and often dismissed 
from the political arena (Jagger, 1983). Subculture and feminist theory both share an element of 
conciousness raising and agendas for social change. Alternatively, neo-tribal theories offer "a 
politics of survival rather than resistance" (Riley, Griffin & Morey, 2010, p. 348). Here 
disengagement from dominant institutions of power can be seen not as apathy but instead as an 
engagement in the creation of spaces in which communal hedonism and pleasure is experienced. 
Cultural leisure and consumption practices of youth are framed here as 'everyday politics' in 
which young people take part in more local and informal types qf participation (eg., raving, 
clubbing) in order to "gain a sense of sovereignty over one's own existence; if only at a 
temporary or local level" (Riley et aI., 2010, p. 347). 
What the above areas of research have in common is that they often focus on young 
people's lives as the primary sites for alternative forms of political engagement. Although not 
without their inadequacies, these theories are less frequently framed within the context of adult 
citizenship and are often dismissed by conventional political sciences and certainly the popular 
media. 
What is interesting is that the above section reviewing alternate views of the political was 
put in at a later stage ofthe writing. I didn't have that part at the beginning. My own 
understanding of the political is so entrenched in a conventional definition of political 
dis/engagement that my initial literature review did not go much further than that definition. I, 
myself, dismissed alternative forms of political engagement, despite having an awareness of them 
before the writing of this project. 
Furthermore, it is significant that it wasn't research or reading that prompted me to add 
that part, but rather a person on my thesis committee suggesting that I do so. This illustrates that 
28 
the personal can indeed be extraordinarily political and yet so often I find that the personal is 
trivialized in my life.' The political is not out there somewhere in the 'public' sphere, it appears in 
my everyday interactions. 
And so, the remainder of this thesis will be dedicated to exploring the question, why are 
certain views of the political more dominant than others in my life? This question immediately 
spawns other questions that I will keep in mind in the writing of this thesis. Why have I heard of 
some definitions of the political and not heard of others? Why do I see certain depictions and not 
others? How has dominant discourse influenced my views ofthe political? How are certain views 
of the political hidden from me? Why am I influenced by certai~tViews more than others? Why 
do I consistently ignore or forget certain views? What does my understanding of the political 
reflect about me? What do my understandings reflect about the culture in which I am situated? 
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2. UnlIdentifying the Enemy 
"We don't know that! We've got to operate on what we DO know!" 
Dawn of the Dead (Romero, 1978) 
A pathway that may lead to possible answers to the questions asked above might begin to 
appear when a framework of immanence is applied. The term 'immanence' refers to 'remaining 
or existing within' and opposes what we know as 'transcendence'. In other words, all that exists 
is in unity, there is nothing outside of everything. Derived from Baruch Spinoza's Ethics (2000), 
the theoretical framework of immanence postulates that all life, everything at its finest and most 
molecular level, is created of the same, one Substance (Spinoza, 2000, I, Prop. 14). The material 
conditions referred to in the work of Karl Marx correspond to S1?jnoza's Substance; whereas post-
Marxist theorists, such as Antonio Negri, and Deleuze and Guattari, often refer to Substance as 
the plane of immanence. 
Substance, or the plane of immanence, is composed of bodies that are differentiated from 
one another only by movement and intensity. The body, in Spinozist terms, does not exclusively 
refer to the human body. It refers to all bodies. In other words, not only is the human body a 
body, but so is an organ, a cell, a molecule, an atom, each part of the atom, and so on up to the 
indiscernible infinite (Spinoza, 2000, II, Postulates). Similarly, human bodies can come together 
and form multiplicities of people. And so it is with all other bodies, from simplest to most 
compositell . In other words, the plane of immanence is an infinite assemblage as described 
earlier. 
Within the theory of immanence, all bodies are on an equal plane and all bodies are equal 
in importance. Any difference in importance or value given to bodies' differing characteristics are 
11 To further clarify, a body need not be specifically part ofthe human body. We can have a body of water for 
example. This too, however, is a simplification. An ecosystem, for example, illustrates a more complex and 
composite body. It should also be noted that there is "a unity to the plane of nature, which applies equally to the 
inanimate and animate, the artificial and the natural" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 254). 
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seen as socially constructed. In immanent reality all bodies are basically 'flattened' onto the plane 
of immanence, with only their movements differing. In an immanent framework, it is the 
movements that are most important. The movement of the body, and the intensity of its 
movements is what gives a body its degree of power; its actual capacity to act, to affect and be 
affected (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983). The capacity of affects or modes of the body (what it can 
do) can either be increased or decreased through interactions with other bodies (Spinoza, 2000, II, 
Postulates). In this sense, immanence focuses on the micropolitics in everyday life; the personal 
as political. Thus we see that power within the immanent framework goes far beyond the notions 
of individual empowerment found in late-stage capitalist societi~, creating major implications 
for the way the political can be enacted within the daily lives of young people, and people in 
Furthermore, immanence, in its all encompassing nature, provides a possible 
contextualization for my research questions, and may provide at least a partial explanation for 
why and how certain views of the political are hidden from myself as well as others. In his book 
Insurgencies, Antonio Negri (1999) talks about how the political is often inadequately theorized-
which is both true and untrue, depending on what context we find our definition of the political 
in. In my life, thus far, it seems that Negri's statement is often true. Like other young people 
discussed in some of the studies reviewed earlier, my own understanding of the political seems to 
be narrowly confined to governmental politics. And even as my understanding of the political 
becomes more complex, feelings of guilt and inadequacy reveal that these new understandings do 
not erase or displace my view of politics as linked to government and citizenship. In hopes of 
gaining more understanding of this struggle in my life and hopefully illuminating any struggles 
12 In fact, immanence may point to a politics that goes beyond humanity, as all bodies are implicated in power. For 
the purposes of this thesis, however, I will mostly discuss a politics concerning human bodies. 
the reader may be experiencing as well, I will explore and theorize my understanding of the 
political through the crisis of power that is revealed in the immanent framework. 
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Constituent power and constituted power both exist simultaneously in society. These two 
powers are always in crisis with each other because although they fundamentally contradict each 
other, they are often conflated with one another. Thinking back to the plane of immanence, or 
Spinoza's Substance, what Negri (1999) calls constituent power can be seen as the endless and 
unstoppable force of life itself that keeps movement flowing through the bodies along the plane. 
Constituent power is the power of pure existence - reality (Spinoza, 2000). Just as the plane of 
immanence can be seen as horizontal and infinite, so is the consrj,tuent force along it. Constituent 
power is a force that is always open, moving, producing, reproducing - it has no end nor 
beginning (Negri, 1999). Within the immanent framework, the constituent is seen as the political. 
Constituted power is a force of closure; it is rigid and immovable. In particular, 
constituted power can be seen as a traditional, modernist view of power that is organized in a 
'top-down' configuration, stacking and harnessing power into one place as opposed to allowing it 
to be infinite and free-moving. The constituted is, in other words, seen as the social. 
The constituent is the driving force of revolutionary power and absolute democracy, 
whereas the constituted is most recognizable in th_e centralized power of the State. In 
Insurgencies, Negri (1999) traces the conflict that arises between constituent and constituted 
power throughout several revolutions. The central issue in the book is the crisis of constituent 
power that this conflict induces, the crisis being that each revolution possess within it the seeds of 
its own demise. In a cruel irony, the realization of each revolution is its end. In an attempt to 
secure the freedom of the constituent, freedom is constituted and thus terminated. Thus, Negri 
poses the question: how can we have a revolution that never ends? Or, in other words, what 
would it take for the constituent force to remain perpetually open and not close down into the 
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constituted? 
Applying this crisis to my own struggle, the question becomes how might I construct an 
understanding of the political that can remain perpetually open and not close down into a narrow 
and constituted definition of the political? In other words, the point of this thesis is not to define 
and pinpoint the political, but rather to open it up. To do this, however, requires that the closures 
be explored. In other words, I need to explore the constituted, or dark assemblages of the 
political, which seem to hold such power over my understanding. In this sense, I will use this 
thesis as a tool-and-result, as my limitations (closures in my understanding of the political) may 
become my result as I explore them. 
At a fundamental level, the crisis between constituent and constituted power boils down to 
the age old debate of liberty versus security, and how both are ultimately needed for the other to 
exist to its fullest. The plane of immanence is pure, free flowing liberty - constituent power. It 
exists and is propelled by the pure desire to simply exist. Within the plane of immanence, desire 
is what produces the constituent. The constituted, in contrast, cannot produce anything, but can 
only maintain what already has been produced by the constituent (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983). 
The constituted is security and claims to protect life by containing it and caging it in (Negri, 
1999). These two opposing notions of power ofte~ get conflated and confused with one another. 
In Marx's method of historical analysis, the material conditions always precede and shape the 
mode of production and thus the social (Marx & Engels, 1978). Here we see that Marx's method 
is deeply rooted in Spinoza's Substance, or the plane of immanence, as the plane is pure 
materiality. The plane of immanence, having no beginning or end, has always existed as the 
bodies on the plane include all forms of existence, whereas the constituted comes into existence 
through the social, along with the development of human consciousness (Marx & Engels, 1978). 
What is most significant to note here is that the constituted can only be born of the constituent, 
"I 
I 
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meaning that the two opposing powers are intricately connected, making their conflation with one 
another almost impossible to avoid. 
It is not that a perpetually open understanding of the political has no closings, but rather a 
perpetually open understanding of the political has no permanent closings. Closings are 
unavoidable; and so, exploring the closures of the political in my life should inevitably lead to 
exploring the openings, as the openings can be found beneath the surface of those very closings. 
The crisis of power, however, does not make this an easy task. Conflation and confusion 
make the openings and closings look the same, and sometimes they even are the same! Under 
such circumstances an enemy becomes difficult to identify, if no~impossible. 
Amidst the chaos and mayhem that we find in a zombie movie, there is an even deeper 
and more troubling confusion bubbling underneath. Who are the zombies? They? Or Us? They 
are us? We are them? Who's who? 
ANA(20's) staggers forward. She hears: 
KENNETH 
Back up. 
ANA turns to see KENNETH ROBESON (30's), a black man in a police 
uniform, aiming a Bennelli12 gauge shot gun at her. ANA raises 
her arms, starting to break down. 
KENNETH 
Say something! 
ANA 
(begging for her life, but can only say:) 
Please. 
He considers this, and decides she passed the test. He lowers the 
gun, turns around, leaving her on the ground, and without a word, 
he walks away from her, into the woods. ANA gets up, following 
him, not calling after him, just following him, twenty feet 
behind. She might be able to catch up, but she keeps this 
distance. He's a cop. You have to follow a cop. 
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Suddenly, bullets explode around them. KENNETH turns, aiming his 
shot gun at RANDALL BRYANT (20's), holding a 9mm pistol, steps 
out of the forest, followed by two others. KENNETH has his gun 
pointed back at him. A brief stand-off. One of the others with 
RANDALL, MICHAEL SHAUNESY (40's) steps forward. 
MICHAEL 
Alright, okay. Put the guns down. (To RANDALL)What are you 
doing? Come on. He's a cop. Put your gun down. 
RANDALL lowers his gun. KENNETH doesn't. 
RANDALL 
(to KENNETH) 
I thought you were one of them. 
No. 
He lowers his gun. 
( Gunn , 2003 ) 
KENNETH 
Much like in the crisis of power where both powers get conflated and confused with each 
other, distinguishing the zombies from the people becomes difficult because zombies are people. 
Well ... reanimated dead people, but the human resemblance remains strong. One minute your 
loved one is human, the next they are trying to eat you. If you can't trust those closest to you, who 
can you trust? When the zombie apocalypse hits, the rough looking stranger that you wouldn't 
dare talk to on a normal day might be your best chance of survival. In this situation, a binary 
''us'' versus "them" mentality can cost you your life, and often does, as this binary is 
simultaneously being reinforced. 
The precarious issue of trust in zombie movies illuminates the importance of how context 
is crucial in order to have adequate knowledge. Without proper context we can only have a very 
inadequate idea of the causes of things. Spinoza (2000) argues that we confuse and don't 
understand the causes of things. When we don't understand the proper causes of things, we 
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attribute causes that are inaccurate - or as Spinoza calls it - causes based on inadequate ideas. If 
you don't know that there is a zombie epidemic happening, when your loved one is attacked you 
are going to run to them to see if they are okay, and will likely join them as part of the undead 
very soon. If you do know what is happening, you know that your loved one has been infected 
and is gone and that what remains of them needs to be destroyed. 
The crisis of power can be framed as an issue of inadequate contextualization and 
knowledge. For some reason I seem to trust a narrow and binary definition of the political. Even 
though I don't think it's fair or agree with it, I still feel like there are things that I "should" be 
doing, and other things that I feel are frivolous and a waste of tin;te - things that make me feel 
that I am apathetic and unengaged politically. I obviously am missing some information here ... 
but if information is unavailable you are limited to operating on what you do know. 
If an "us" vs "them" binary is all I've ever known, it's difficult not to organize everything I 
know into binaries. Even when something doesn't fit, I want to make it fit. We see characters in 
zombie movie who want to make it fit, when humans who are not zombies are mistakenly killed. 
For example, in Night of the Living Dead (Romero, 1968) at the end of the movie the protagonist, 
Ben, is assumed to be a zombie and shot without hesitation. Within the confusion and crisis of the 
non-binary relationship between humans and zombies the Other is blurred, and yet 
simultaneously intensified. 
Am lone of them? 
I have a home page when I log onto the internet on which I have a news reel set up and sometimes 
I'll skim through it. Sometimes. Sometimes I'll even click on an article and read it. And 
sometimes it'll even be an article about some issue of importance -like what Obama s up to or 
progress on the oil spill. But most of the time when I skim through the news reel the articles I 
click on are about celebrity news. 
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When it comes down to it, I'd rather read about Lindsay Lohan s latest stint in rehab instead of 
wars on the other side of the world. I'd take Entertainment Tonight over regular news any day. 
Why? 
I mean I don't really care that much about what Linsday Lohan is up to. She s just some rich, 
spoiled brat. Generally, I think that conflicts around the world are way more important. But not 
important enough to be informed about them ... 
I think what it comes down to is that I feel absolutely helpless when watching the news. For one 
thing, the news is biased. That's not to say there's no truth in it, but which truth should I trust? 
And even if the news was completely "true" and reliable, there's so many issues. Too many 
issues. How can you justifY picking one over the other? What good is any of this information if I 
don't feel like there s anything I can do about it? Watching the news makes me feel powerless. I 
definitely do notfeel political in anyway. Ifeel confused and helpless. And am reminded of how 
insignificant I am and how little I really know anything about anything. It s so boring and 
complicated. And it always feels like to understand one little thing, I need to understand the 
history of EVERYTHING in order to have an intelligent and critical opinion. This is just too much 
work. Work that I just don't care enough about. Watching the news reminds me that the zombie 
apocalypse is here all around - but I'm not a good guy like in the movies ... I'm one of the 
zombies. 
And so as a zombie, I'd rather not think about how I'm not contributing towards humanity. I'll 
change the channel and gorge myself on the flesh and beauty of the celebrities. I will join the 
hordes and although remain insignificant, at least here I don't need to be informed. My own 
opinion is good enough when it comes to hating on and devouring the rich and famous. I feel at 
ease consuming celebrity news. 
Sometimes I am a zombie and all I can do is eat to feed my hunger, because Ijust don't know 
what else to do. It's either eat, or do nothing. 
It's interesting that in the previous chapter} talked about how I wanted to contribute and 
be more informed, but here it seems that sometimes it's just easier to give up, and give into 
apathy. To me, the news seems to point to a sense of adulthood, It is important to be aware of 
what's going on in the world, but I feel there's more to it than that. In this sort of awareness lies 
responsibility. Celebrity news, in contrast, implies to me very little awareness or responsibility. 
So am I trying to evade a sense· of responsibility? Or is it that 1 simply don't know how - or 
cannot - take on any responsibility? Does the news really offer a tangible sense of 
responsibility? Is it really that different from celebrity news, if I cannot identify what is 
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true/accurate and warrants my action and responsibility? Is the news really a way to become the 
good guy, or is it just another type of zombie? 
Different zombie movies portray different types of zombies. In the most recent Dawn of 
the Dead (Snyder, 2004) we see zombies who consume violently - fast zombies, overcome with a 
hungry rage. The original Dawn of the Dead (Romero, 1978) explicitly points to the over-
consumption of America by setting the action in a mall. The movie 28 Days Later (Boyle, 2002) 
also depicts fast zombies, infected by a virus called 'rage'. 
We also see zombies as slow and brain-dead. In Night of the Living Dead (1968), the fIrst 
Dawn of the Dead (Romero, 1978), and Shaun of the Dead (Wri,ght, 2004) to name a few, the 
zombies mostly remain in a dumb sort of trance and if there's no flesh to feed on they just wobble 
around staring off into space not doing much at alL In fact, in Shaun of the Dead, the zombies 
aren't always even that consumed with consuming: at one point we see the characters sneak by 
the zombies by pretending to be zombies - and it works. They are utterly stupid and unaware. 
In the end, does my idea of adult responsibility really align with the good guys of the 
zombie apocalypse? Are there actually any good guys? Or are these just zombies in disguise? 
Within the crisis of power and its identification, we might also be able to locate a similar crisis in 
emerging adulthood. If I'm not an adolescent, but neither an adult, what am I? This lack of clarity 
frustrates me! 
My positioning as an emerging adult, doesn't seem to offer me any clarity or comfort. 
Arnett's theory of emerging adulthood has been criticized for at times offering too benign an 
interpretation of young people's delay of the transition to adulthood (Bynner, 2005; Cote & 
Bynner, 2008). Arnett (2000) argues that emerging adulthood offers a stage oflife with more 
choices and possibilities than ever, since adult commitments are postponed. Cote and Allahar 
(2006) argue, however, that options for many young people have actually decreased while the 
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illusion of possibility and choice has increased. On the one hand, economic conditions in late-
stage capitalist countries have left young people 'floundering', a term used to describe going from 
one job to another, without progression (Cote & Bynner, 2008). In Canada, for instance, the 
proportion of young people to older people has decreased, putting youth into competition with 
older workers for jobs that pay a living wage. Furthermore, older workers are now encouraged to 
stay in the workforce as the lengthening of the life-span has led to the relinquishing of mandatory 
retirement ages. Young people are now stalled in less stable jobs, as the more stable workforce is 
taking longer to replenish itself13. The average income of a single young person in her 20s is in 
between $12,000 and $18,000 per annum, which is midway betw,.een rural and urban poverty 
lines (Cote & Bynner, 2008). Due to the lack of opportunity in the job market, "it is plausible to 
argue that many youth have had little choice but to seek post-secondary educational credentials in 
hope of gaining an advantage in access to better paying jobs" (Cote & Bynner, 2008, p.260). On 
the other hand, typical social markers of adulthood (e.g., leaving the parental home, financial 
independence, marriage, parenthood) have been eroding with such social norms diminishing. In 
this sense it appears that young people have more possibilities in defining adulthood on their own 
terms. However, it seems likely that young people are not taking on adult responsibilities out of 
necessity, not choice, hence the use of Cote's term, 'arrested adulthood'. If I am indeed 
experiencing 'arrested adulthood' is a zombie all that I can ever be? It certainly seems that way. 
Maybe the only question left now is which kind of zombie am I? 
It would seem appropriate, writing an auto ethnography, for the writer to position herself 
more concretely early on in the writing. Thus far, I have positioned myself loosely as an emerging 
adult, and in some ways as an apathetic zombie ... but who amI exactly? Where am I from? What 
13 For a more thorough and complex explanation of the precarious position of young people in the economy please 
refer to Cote and Bynner (2008) and/or Cote and Allahar (2006). 
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is it exactly that brought me to this position in relation to the political, and to the questions I am 
asking? These questions I will address to some degree later14. Truth be told, I don't really know 
how I got here . 
. I feel like I am stumbling along like a zombie who is void of most prior identifications. I 
don't know what kind of zombie I am, or what kind of human I was before. I will certainly drop 
clues here and there, I cannot help it, my history in many ways still drives me, just as zombies 
seem to retain certain human reflexes15• But at this time, I propose we meet much like characters 
do in the midst of the zombie apocalypse. Unidentified. 
Unidentification is certainly problematic, as this chapter .~s revealed. There is a desire for 
clear cut definitions and positionings; without which may lead to confusion and fear. This 
confusion and fear, however, is a part of reality that is unavoidable. Instead of grasping for 
answers that may not be available at the time, perhaps it is more useful to look at what we do 
when certainty is not an option. 
Doing Nothing 
I've recently decided to do nothing. 
There s just nothing that I want to do. And I keep thinking that this is very bad. There s all these 
things around me in my life that I could get more Lnvolved in. But I just don i feel like it. 
There s church. Meh. Not feeling it. Or Food Not Bombs - I've been meaning to get involved in 
that, but just never could bring myself to go. There s campus ministries. Didn i feel like going to 
that either. Normally, I volunteer somewhere. Maybe I should go back and volunteer at the art 
gallery - that was fun ... Nah. Maybe I could volunteer at some new place. Something different, 
something I haven 't done before. But I really don 't feel like it. There IS nothing I can think of that I 
want to do. Is there nothing that will please me!? 
14 I will begin to address these questions in Chapter 9: The escape. 
15 Often zombies seem to retain some basic human reflexes - we can see them sometimes throwing things or 
opening doors, and mimicking other actions from their former existence. In Dawn of the Dead (Romero, 1978) it 
is pointed out that the zombies were drawn to the mall because of a subconscious memory; "they somehow know 
they were once happy in such a place" (Bishop, 2010, p. 237). 
No, there isn t 
And then I thought - maybe I'm thinking about this all wrong. Maybe I should just go with this 
whole "I don't feel like doing anything" vibe and just, well, do nothing. Maybe I don't feel like 
doing anythingfor a reason. Maybe I need to do nothing. 
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And by doing nothing, I don't mean literally doing nothing at all. I'll work on school and my 
thesis and all the responsibilities that come with that - but other than that - I want to do nothing. 
And by nothing, I mean I don't want join any clubs, I don't want to volunteer, I don't want to 
commit to any sort of planned organized activity. 
So really, I don't mean I want to do nothing. If friends call me, I'll have time to see them. If things 
come up that I want to do, I'll do them. But I will not consciously pursue any extra-curriculars. 
Oh no! But what will I put on my CV??? 
Nothing. f 
That's right, I've decided to do nothing. How's thatfor a zombie? 
And, yet, here I am - a zombie - writing about the political. 
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3. The Search 
Interestingly enough, my frustrations with not knowing what the political is seems to have 
led me to an opening within the crisis of power. So while I have seemingly given up on an adult 
citizenship focused version of the political and decided to do "nothing" and interpreted this as 
apathy, it may in fact be the opposite. I am not actually doing nothing. Just nothing that I don't 
want to sincerely do - mainly, organized activities. Among the things left in my life that I do want 
to do are my thesis and my relationships, leaving me open to quite a large amount of collisions 
with bodies. Furthermore, there are no major expectations or limitations to these encounters ("if 
things come up that I want to do, I'll do them."), perhaps openin~ up the space for expansive 
political experiences. In a way, perhaps Arnett's positive interpretation of emerging adulthood has 
some validity: a space for exploration can open up without the constraints of adulthood. This 
space may also be wrought with closings within it; nevertheless, the possibility for expansive 
openings lays here. 
In Insurgencies, Negri (1999) examines several conceptions of constituent power in order 
to draw out its most significant features. An important feature of the constituent as was discussed 
briefly in the previous chapter is its perpetual openings. The absolute openings of constituent 
power are most clearly defined in the work of Foucault (Foucault, 1978; Negri, 1999). Whereas a 
traditional, modernist view of power can be seen as rigid and 'top-down' (i.e., representative, and 
always ending in a constituted form), Foucault's view is that power is a force that is fluid and 
horizontal. Power is available to all bodies because it is not something to be possessed but a force 
to be used. This force is localized and at work at all times in all places (Foucault, 1978). Thus, 
constituent power is decentralized and infinitely productive. In other words, even closings can be 
productive. 
And so unbeknownst to myself, ironically, my narrow and constituted understanding of 
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the political made me flee from it, into the unknown of the constituent. Here, we see the 
movement of the constituent dismantling the closed assemblage of the political in my life, finding 
an opening in what seems to be a closing (doing nothing). Although at times my understanding of 
the political is captured by the constituted, it is somehow revived and brought back to life. The 
constituent always finds a way. 
Another feature of constituent power that Negri elaborates is its function as 
'counterpower'. Foucault's conceptualization of resistance is useful here. Unlike in a traditional 
monarchical view of power, resistance is not a reaction to lack of power, but an equally powerful 
exertion of force that always accompanies the exertion of domi~~ting force, or power (Foucault, 
1978). However, where Negri's 'counterpower' diverges from Foucault's conception of resistance 
is that the constituent as counterpower does not come with constituted, or dominating, power 
simultaneously, but rather before it (Skott-Myhre, 2008). In other words, constituent power 
produces enough force that even when the dominating force of the constituted tries to harness it 
there is still constituent force left over. Constituted power will harness some of the constituent, 
but in the meantime the constituent has already produced more, creating a surplus that amounts to 
what can be seen as resistance. Foucault's resistance can thus be seen as the residue and 
continuation of constituent force that was already_there in the beginning. Here we see, as argued 
by Negri (1999)16, that the constituent always comes before not after the oppressive power of the 
constituted; so counterpower is always seen as undominated power, or as the 'creative life force' 
(Skott-Myhre, 2008). 
Viewing the constituent as counterpower opens up new possibilities for the constituent 
and the crisis of its movement. Such a conceptualization reveals that the constituent never· 
actually does terminate itself, but rather becomes only latent in a particular time and space, and is 
16 See also Deleuze & Guattari (1987), Negri & Hardt (2004), and Skott-Myhre (2008). 
already moving instead towards a different opening within time and space to express itself 
(Negri, 1999). 
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In Night of the Living Dead (Romero, 1968), Barbara and her brother Johnny have 
driven up 5 hours out of town to visit their father's grave. The radio isn't working properly and 
just as it comes back, Johnny turns it off, missing the news bulletin about the crisis that is 
ensuing. As the scene progresses the two are attacked by a man in the graveyard. Johnny tries to 
fight the man off, but eventually is overpowered. The man turns his attention to Barbara; she 
flees. Stumbling, Barbara throws her shoes off and continues running towards the car and locks 
herself in. But Johnny has the keys. The man clumsily runs towa,¢s the car and starts grabbing at 
the window. Eventually he picks up a brick and hits the back window with it, breaking the glass. 
Now at a whole new level of terror, Barbara releases the emergency break and the car drifts down 
the hill. The man is still running behind the car. With her attention divided between the man and 
the road, Barbara loses control and the car hits a tree. The man is catching up. Barbara gets out of 
the car and runs into the forest. She does not know where she is going. She is just running away. 
As Barbara continues running she sees a farm house in the distance. She runs towards it. 
Barbara, like the characters at the beginning of most zombie movies, doesn't know exactly 
where she's going, but she keeps moving; searchi~g for something, anything that holds the 
possibility of life. 
Sometimes I forget what this thesis is even about, but I keep on writing and I keep on 
living. I am always moving. I don't know what to do, but I keep moving. Something will come 
up, something will have to come up. I don't know where I'm going or what I'm trying to find. 
But when I find it I'll know. 
Within the plane of immanence, desire is what produces the constituent (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1983). According to Spinoza (2000), every body desires to persist in its being to the 
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utmost degree; in other words, to have unrestricted movement, to act according to its nature. 
Spinoza terms this desire to persist as conatus. But this is never seen as an individual desire, but a 
collective one. Desire determines each body's capacities, which can only be discovered in 
collision with other bodies (Spinoza, 2000). 
In a slightly different articulation, Marx outlines three necessary premises of human 
existence which can be seen as different - yet intertwined - aspects of desire: basic survival, 
labour and relationships (Marx & Engels, 1978). We can see how this view of desire corresponds 
to Spinoza and his concept of conatus. A body desires to persist in its being to the utmost degree, 
thus to persist it must first and foremost live - survive. Then, it JY-ust act, do, produce: labour. 
And what the body can do can only be found out in collision with other bodies: relationships. 
From these material conditions arises consciousness (Marx & Engels, 1978). Or as Spinoza 
(2000) declares, "the human mind is the idea of the human body" (II, Prop. 19, Demo.). Mind and 
body are parallel on the plane of immanence, with the body always preceding the mind (not in 
importance, however). Thus, desire originates in the body, with the mind always interpreting the 
body and its desire, sometimes accurately, and other times falsely (Spinoza, 2000, II). The mind, 
when interpreting the body accurately, can lead to the fulfilment, or enactment of desire. 
There is some sort of desire in me searching for an understanding of the political. Despite 
obstacles and moments of discouragement I continue writing this thesis. Although the writing of 
this thesis is a conscious act; my body seems to always be way ahead of me, and so this search 
was happening even before I started writing about it. Even before I started writing this thesis I 
was feeling restless. I started doing nothing before I wrote about it, before I even realized that it 
was to be a huge turning point in this thesis. Although I may not articulate it or frame it as a 
search for the political, every time my body seeks and is met with a collision a political moment 
has occurred. Not every moment might be an opening, but each moment, whether it be a closing 
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or an opening, alerts me to my desires, pointing and redirecting me in new directions. 
Following my desire to "do nothing" has not led me to nothing, however; anything but. It 
has been a rich and productive time. My desire was not to do nothing; rather my desire was to not 
take part in what to me feel like constituted and closed assemblages. "Doing nothing" has 
opened up the space for constituent desire to flow freely without a direction in mind, leaving it 
more open to be fulfilled. The unknown allows for infinite possibilities. Emerging adulthood may 
be part of opening up such a space. This time can be looked at as a "moratorium" of identity that 
provides an opportunity for self-discovery. Some young people take advantage of this period of 
'arrested adulthood' and "experiment with roles, ideas, beliefs ~ lifestyles; this experimentation 
can set the individual on a life course that is rich and rewarding"l7 (Cote & Allahar, 2006, p. 64). 
Or in my case exploring my understanding of the political. l8 
Constituent power is always expanding. As was discussed earlier, within the plane of 
immanence, the movement of the body, and the intensity of its movements is what gives a body 
its degree of power, its actual capacity to act, to affect and be affected (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1983). The capacity of affects or modes of the body (what it can do) can either be increased or 
decreased through interactions with other bodies (Spinoza, 2000, II, Postulates). It is the greatest 
expansion of these capacities which the constituent force is made up of: all bodies functioning to 
their highest capacities in order to perform and create life. 
A constituted assemblage decreases the amount of movements and intensities possible for 
a body and thus the amount of interactions with other bodies, decreasing power. It is interesting 
that I framed myself in negative terms as "doing nothing." When what I really set out to do is 
17 From a sociological perspective, this might be viewed as "developmental individualization". This refers to one 
taking advantage of the normlessness of post-modem society and developing one's own life course through 
continual and deliberate growth (Schwartz, Cote & Arnett, 2005). 
18 For many, however, this time can lead to confusion, destruction and/or disengagment. This idea will be explored 
further in chapters 4 and 9. 
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decrease the organization of my time and body, escaping a constituted assemblage into a more 
freely moving constituent assemblage. I have left myself open to the unknown; I have put myself 
into the position of zombie apocalypse survivor - I have no plan, I'm just going to search for the 
next thing. What thing? I don't know. Something. The search is the political. The search can be 
scary and unpredictable, but also exciting when one happens to collide with other bodies with 
common desires. 
Although a zombie movie may start with a single protagonist, often he or she finds others 
to join them on the journey, others who are on the same journey into the unknown. There is 
safety, or at least some comfort, in numbers. In a cooperative ~9ment, we see characters each 
using their strengths to expand the survival of the whole group, not just individuals because it 
quickly becomes apparent that individual survival is meaningless if there's nothing or no one else 
left in the world. This moment of cooperation gives us a glimpse into the meaning of the 
multitude (Negri, 1999; Negri & Hardt, 2004). 
The multitude is an assemblage of time and space in which each body within it is reaching 
its highest capacity, in other words, an alignment of constituent desires all working towards the 
common purpose of expressing themselves. The multitude is, in fact, the realization of Spinoza's 
conatus, or Marx's fundamental human needs, or desires on a fully collective scale. 
Within the multitude each body does indeed persist in its being to the utmost degree; 
living and thriving; acting, doing, producing; and constantly discovering what it can do in 
collision with other bodies. Further, the consciousness of the multitude is founded on adequate 
ideas, as with each collision of bodies the common desires are consciously sought and 
discovered, while retaining their idiosyncratic affects and abilities. It is in the multitude that new, 
hidden spaces of political engagement can be found as the desires of each body are 
simultaneously fulfilled (Spinoza, 2000; Negri, 1999; Skott-Myhre, 2008). 
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The fulfilment ofthe body's desire is pleasure or joy (Casarino, 2003; Bignall, 2010). 
Such a fulfilment is what is called a constitutive force (Negri, 1999). The constitutive is a force in 
between the constituent and the constituted. It is constituent to the degree that is arises from 
constituent desire, but constituted in the sense that it is a moment that has happened and cannot 
be changed. Like the constituted, the constitutive is rigid and unchangeable; however, it is based 
on pure reality (as opposed to being based on transcendence). In the moment of its happening, 
which is always now, it is aligned with the constituent force. 
My Feelings (' 
My feelings are what link the political and social together. My feelings are the center - they are 
the middle of the collision between my perception (my body) and my environment (all the other 
bodies). They are always there in the moment of that collision telling me ifit was a positive 
collision or a negative collision. My feelings tell me if desire has been fulfilled because desire is 
always there. 
The problem is - and Spinoza addresses this - is that we often grossly misinterpret the causes of 
these feelings. Our interpretations are inadequate because we often only look at a few single 
bodies (individualism) and don't contextualize them within the infinity of other bodies that have 
also impacted them. Furthermore, we are basically taught to misinterpret our feelings (we are 
taught to 'manage'them). Feelings are the thing that are taboo in our society - they are 'private' 
and inappropriate. 
Our feelings are all we have in every moment. Feelings are our only reality, our only truth. But 
we are alienatedfrom them. Feelings are monstrous - we are afraid of them. They are monstrous 
- they are overwhelming because they are the most powerful thing we have - and they are the 
only thing that we really 'have'in any moment. 
Desire can be seen as the vehicle driving us across a vast and intricate territory. Feelings 
are our compass, pointing us in new directions, while joy is how we recognize our destination. 
However, this destination is not marked on the road map, it is only ever discovered when one has 
arrived there. 
The search for joy, or pleasure, however, can also be paralleled with, and mistaken for, the 
zombie's clumsy search for flesh. Zombies can be seen as the mutation ofthe constituent. But 
where does this mutation come from? 
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In many zombie movies the causes of the outbreak: are not revealed. When the causes are 
revealed, however, often the zombies, although it is unclear how exactly, are a result of human 
error. An accidental (or sometimes even intentional) release of a super-virus or a military bio-
weapon or a mutated strand of an already existing virus. There is a theme of science gone wrong, 
human's desire for security so great that they ironically lose all controL This is alluded to in 
several zombie movies, but exemplified in Resident Evil (Anderson, 2002). In this movie, the 
plotline is set in a top-secret genetics research facility that has a,~curity system which is solely 
run on artificial intelligence. If the system detects an infection, it seals the facility trapping 
everyone inside. Because the security system is run by artificial intelligence, not by humans, the 
survivors cannot escape as they cannot control the system, and must find a way to beat it. Like in 
this movie, it is often implied that if you play God, all hell will break loose. 
4. The Quarantine 
"When there's no more room in hell, the dead will walk the earth. " 
Dawn of the Dead (Romero, 1978) 
In zombie movies, there is often the idea that humans have gone too far with trying to 
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control life. In some movies, the return of a dead points to the judgement of God - like in Dawn 
of the Dead (1978), where we see a televangelists announce that this is the price of excessive sin: 
there's no more room in hell. In many movies, however, the mutation that occurs is not always 
attributed to all of humanity's greed for control, but rather a specific population of people. We see 
animosity towards "experts", scientists and doctors, and we also see the finger pointed at the 
state, capitalists and corporations19. 
The crisis between constituent and constituted power plays out constantly throughout 
history. However, this crisis becomes intensified with the advent of capital as capital exploits 
both powers to the utmost degree. Pierre Bourdieu (2001) suggests that capital and power are the 
same thing. However, to be more specific, I will argue here that capital creates an assemblage of 
powers, that is more focused on constituted power. 
Capital is defined as a type of value that self-expands (Vieta, 2007). A general formula for 
capital is M-C-M', where M stands for money or value, C denotes commodities and M' is more 
money or value, in other words, profit or surplus (Bottomore, 1991). From this formula, we can 
see how the value 'self-expands'. Of course it is critical to note that the formula hides what 
precisely causes the expansion of value. It is C that expands to C' which therefore causes M' to 
expand, because within C we have the means of production and most importantly labour power, 
the only type of commodity that "creates more value in its use than its cost" (Vieta, 2007). Thus, 
in actuality, it is not that capital is 'self-expanding'; rather it is always expanding at the hidden 
19 See Dawn of the Dead (Romero, 1978),28 Days Later (Boyle, 2002), Zombie Strippers (2008), and especially 
Resident Evil (Anderson, 2002). 
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expense of someone or something else. In other words, it is always a process of exploitation. 
More specifically, we can see that capital is always exploiting the constituent force and that it is 
the constituent that gives capital all its value. In other words, the constituent force refers to the 
living labour of the proletariat; without this labour there can be no value. Capital, as the 
constituted, seeks to control and contain the power of the constituent in order to produce as much 
value as possible. This is always done through a series of separations (eg., division of labour, 
division of labour within labour [fordism], division of time, etc.) as something always needs to be 
decreased in order to increase something else (in the case of capital, to decrease cost, but increase 
value and therefore profit). Specifically, what capital does is sep~ate the social from the political: 
the social relation of value is always separated from the labour that created it. In other words, 
capital separates the constituted from the constituent (Marx & Engels, 1978; Negri, 1999). 
This inequality and exploitation is reflected in the assemblage that constituent and 
constituted form within capitalism. Capital is an assemblage of powers that are constantly 
separated and opposed to each other. The constituted becomes intensified within capital, however, 
because capital is not the measure of concrete surplus, but surplus value (Negri, 1996). And value 
is purely a social relation. And what capital does is separate the constituted from the constituent, 
and place it above the constituent. Because capital in its simplest definition is a value that 
expands, it exists only to fulfill this function. It's function is to create surplus value- not just 
enough - but more than enough, which is by its nature an infinite measure. The equation M -C-M' 
continues ... C-M"-C-M'" ad infinitum. There is never a value at which the process of capital 
accumulation is meant to end. In a capitalist society, capital fulfilling its function becomes first 
and foremost important. Thus, we see the privileging of a social relation (the constituted) over the 
political ( or constituent) force. The separation of the social and political in capital, allows for the 
alienation of bodies from their constituent desires and instead recruits these desires for capital by 
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turning desire into lack so that capital can perpetually keep exploiting and continue on to serve its 
function (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983). 
When the social relation is placed above material conditions, it becomes transcendent and 
therefore abstracted. Only in the abstract can desire become lack. In other words, only in the 
abstract can you desire something you do not have (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983). Only in the 
abstract is negation possible, because in reality, negation literally does not exist (Spinoza, 2000). 
When the abstract is placed above the concrete, ideals are formed. An ideal basically creates a 
quarantine for the constituent. In essence, the abstract ideal creates imaginary walls or limits for 
the possibilities of life, or the constituent. The focus on attaining..an ideal means that other 
possibilities are ignored. When the ideal is not attained, a lack is created. Instead of examining 
what happened instead of the perceived ideal, the focus is on what did not happen: a negation, a 
lack, which only exists in our perceptions. 
With constituent desire being twisted into a desire of lack, within capital, the constitutive 
too becomes mutated. With a desire of lack, pleasure is put into infinite deferral and the 
constitutive is never fully realized (Skott-Myhre, 2008). Pleasure, or the constitutive, becomes 
constituted within capital and restricted to the realm of consumption (Casarino, 2003). And so 
capital never actually delivers the living, constitu~nt and constitutive pleasure it promises: the 
workings of capitalism suggest that it can, but it cannot. Instead it offers an empty placebo of 
pleasure, that only serves to renew desire as lack, and start the process anew. Now becomes a 
fleeting, empty moment with a new future pleasure to be attained as its focus (Casarino, 2003). 
Because of the intensity of the opposition that the constituent and constituted are 
assembled in within capital, coupled with the infinite deferral of the constitutive, capitalism is 
fraught with explosive violence and mutations. Because the desire of constituent bodies is purely 
productive, its containment and repression within capital often leads to death (Negri & Hardt, 
I 
I 
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2004), both literally and figuratively. Either the constituent force explodes in on itself within its 
containment - destruction its only escape - or it succumbs to the rigid order and command of 
capital, denying its desires, figuratively killing its own life source off, ironically, in order to 
survive. Furthermore, within such an assemblage, what we see is the political engagement of the 
constituent become mutated as welL Openings, like closings, can become a site of mutation in 
capital. Emerging adulthood might be seen as such a space of potential mutation. As was 
discussed earlier, emerging adulthood can offer up a space of exploration of life alternatives, or 
identity moratorium. However, many people can get lost and confused in this moratorium (Cote 
& Allahar, 2006). On the one hand, there is little guidance in thi~space taking place within 
postmodern society. The lack of guiding structures can leave people without a way to give 
meaning to their potential choices, and can result in in making uninformed, unrealistic and 
potentially destructive choices. Ideologies of free choice and individualism "can actually 
decrease their quality of life, and to some extent, diminish their life chances" (Cote & Allahar, 
2006, p. 29). On the other hand, people can instead take the "path of least resistance" and rely on 
"default options" offered up by the corporate-driven consumer culture (Cote & Allahar, 2006io. 
Moreover, such a space of infinite choice can cover up the social inequality that still exists in 
society. At its most extreme, youth dissent can tu~ to violence and self destruction, or in its 
disengagement to apathy and consumption. 
Within capital, under the reign of violence and death, the constituted always appears to 
have the upper hand. The coercive power of the constituted is always squeezing the constituent 
for its productive forces, because the constituted itself cannot produce. Ideally capital would want 
all of the constituent force dominated; however, because the constituted cannot produce on its 
20 In contrast to developmental individualization, this can be referred to as "default individualization" (Schwartz et 
aI.,2005). 
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own this is never possible, as some constituent force needs to be left open in order to move 
forward and produce something new to be exploited and dominated all over again (De leuze & 
Guattari, 1983). In other words, the constituted force of capital creates a quarantine for the 
constituent force, however, openings are necessary for the further production of both powers. 
The theme of containment is quite evident in most zombie movies. Either people want to 
barricade themselves somewhere and create a quarantine for themselves, or a quarantine for the 
zombies is created - or both. There is safety in containment - or as it is put in Andrew Currie's 
(2006) movie Fido, "a better life through containment". Ultimately, most quarantines or 
containments fail in some way. Either a zombie escapes the cont~inment it is in, or finds a way to 
break into the containment the humans have made. Or, as is most common, there is a zombie in 
the containment all along - someone who has been bitten or scratched by a zombie, who in a 
matter of time will become one too. A quarantine rarely provides the amount of safety that is 
desired, it merely buys time before danger has to be faced once again. 
But time is better than nothing. What needs to be remembered is that the constituted 
originated in our constituent desires. Meaning that we desire the constituted. 
But I NEED to knQ)V what it means! 
Even though I understand that an open understanding of the political- one that keeps moving 
and shifting - is more in line with constituent understanding, I still want to KNOW what the 
political is! I keep writing this· and thinking - I haven't really defined my main concept. I need 
and I want a clear cut definition. I want to close it and contain it! A closed definition is so much 
easier to deal with, it's easier to justify, it's ... just easier! 
And so a challenge for my understanding of the political is to not settle for any definition. I have 
to understand that I will never find one that is adequate. Because the moment I have found one, is 
the moment I have lost it. 
But I still want a clear definition anyways! 
Similarly, although I seemed to have settled for being a zombie (doing nothing) and have found a 
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sense of freedom and discovery in this, there is still a part of me that can't help but feel that I'm 
doing something wrong. I still want to be the good citizen, or hero, even as I denounce this as a 
space of closure. I still long for the security of adulthood - or at least the perceived security of it. 
I'm gonna keep looking. Maybe I CAN find something. I WILL find something, damn it! 
Even if momentary, the constituted provides a sense of comfort: we desire this comfort, 
we desire these closings. The closings themselves are not the problem. It is settling for and 
focusing on the closings that becomes the problem. Within capital, the closing is revered and so 
capitalism focuses on regulating everything to ensure the closing instead of the opening. The 
closing is placed above and overshadows the openings. The constituted itself is not the problem, 
{ 
rather the separation of it from the constituent and blind-sighted focus on the constituted is what 
intensifies the crisis within capital. The closing is fine. Even resting in the closing is fine. But 
staying in the closing is death. 
In Night of the Living Dead (Romero, 1968), Barbara, after escaping from the man who 
chased her out of the graveyard finds shelter in an old abandoned farmhouse. She is later joined 
by a man, Ben, who was on the run from the "things" as well. Ben finds tools and wood 
throughout the farmhouse and barricades the windows and doors to keep the ever growing herd of 
things out of the house. It is suddenly revealed that there have been people in the house all along 
-
taking shelter in the cellar. Harry, a hot-headed middle-aged man, has been taking shelter in the 
cellar with his wife, Helen, and their daughter Karen, as well as with a young couple, Tom and 
Judy. Ben and Harry immediately butt heads and an argument ensues about what is the safest 
place to stay: the house, or the cellar. 
HARRY 
NOW I SUGGEST WE ALL GO BACK DOWNSTAIRS BEFORE ANY OF THESE 
THINGS FIND OUT WE'RE IN HERE. 
BEN 
THEY CAN'T GET IN HERE. 
TOM 
YOU GOT THE WHOLE PLACE BOARDED UP? 
BEN 
(His attitude softer toward Tom) 
MOST OF IT. ALL BUT UPSTAIRS ... IT'S WEAK IN PLACES, BUT IT 
WON'T BE HARD TO FIX IT UP GOOD ... 
HARRY 
YOU'RE INSANE. ... THE CELLAR'S THE SAFEST PLACE IN THE HOUSE. 
BEN 
(Lashes out) 
I'M TELLIN' YOU THEY CAN'T GET IN HERE! 
HARRY 
AND I'M TELL IN YOU... THOSE THINGS TURNE'b OVER OUR CAR. WE 
WERE DAMNED LUCKY TO GET AWAY AT ALL. NOW YOU TELL ME THEY 
CAN'T GET THROUGH A PILE OF WOOD. 
TOM 
HIS WIFE AND KID'S DOWNSTAIRS. THE KID'S PRETTY BADLY TORE 
UP. 
BEN 
WELL, I THINK WE'RE BETTER OFF UP HERE. 
TOM 
(Glancing about at the barricades) 
WE COULD STRENGTHEN ALL THESE UP, MR. TINSDALE. 
BEN 
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MAN, WITH ALL US WORKIN' WE GOULD FIX THIS UP SO NOTHIN' CAN 
GET IN HERE. .. AND WE GOT FOOD.... THE FIRE... AND WE GOT THE 
RADIO. 
HARRY 
WE CAN BRING ALL THOSE THINGS DOWNSTAIRS WITH US. MAN, 
YOU'RE CRAZY YOU GOT A MILLION WINDOWS UP HERE. .. ALL THESE 
WINDOWS, YOU'RE GONNA MAKE STRONG ENOUGH TO KEEP THEM OUT? 
BEN 
THEM THINGS AIN'T GOT NO STRENGTH, MAN, I SMASHED THREE OF 
'EM PUSHED ANOTHER ONE OUT THE DOOR. 
HARRY 
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I'M TELLING YOU THEY TURNED OUR CAR ONTO IT'S ROOF. 
BEN 
OH, HELL, ANY GOOD FIVE MEN CAN DO THAT. 
HARRY 
THAT'S MY POINT! ... ONLY THERE'S NOT GOING TO BE FIVE. ... 
THERE'S NOT GOING TO BE TEN... TWENTY ... THIRTY ... A HUNDRED. 
MAYBE... YOU KNOW? ONCE THEY KNOW WE'RE IN HERE, THE PLACE' LL 
BE CRAWLIN' WITH 'EM. 
BEN 
WELL, IF THERE'S THAT MANY, THEY'RE GONNA GET US WHEREVER 
WE'RE AT. 
HARRY 
LOOK, IN THE CELLAR, THERE'S ONLY ONE DOOR, ALL RIGHT? ONLY 
(' 
ONE. THAT'S THE ONLY PLACE WE HAVE TO 'PROTECT. AND TOM AND 
I FIXED IT SO IT LOCKS AND BOARDS FROM THE INSIDE. BUT ALL 
THESE DOORS AND WINDOWS.... WHY, WE'D NEVER KNOW WHERE THEY 
WERE GOING TO HIT US NEXT. 
BEN 
YOU GOT A POINT, MR. TINSDALE, BUT DOWN IN THE CELLAR 
THERE'S NO PLACE TO RUN ... I MEAN, IF THEY DO GET IN, THERE'S 
NO BACK EXIT. WE'D BE DONE FOR. 
This stops HARRY for an instant. 
TOM 
WE COULD GET OUT OF HERE IF WE HAD TO ... AND WE CAN SEE WHAT'S 
GOIN' ON OUTSIDE. .. DOWN THERE, THERE AIN'T ANY WINDOWS .. IF A 
RESCUE PARTY DOES COME WE r D NEVER KNOW IT ... WINDOWS ... 
HARRY 
BUT THE CELLAR IS THE STRONGEST PLACE! 
Here we see how the quarantine, whether it be the upstairs of the house or the cellar, can 
easily turn into a death trap of its own. The cellar, however, is a space of absolute closure. It may 
be the safest place for now, but as is pointed out it may not hold any hope for escape if the 
situation needed it. Not seeing beyond the quarantine can cause death. Decontextualizing the 
quarantine and forgetting that there is freedom beyond it creates a closure. 
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While the quarantine might provide temporary relief,· not realizing that the quarantine is 
temporary safety, not searching for the opening while you have a chance may mean death. And so 
the closure of the constituted, when contextualized within its relationship with the constituent 
reveals a hope for life and freedom; movement. 
But how can one know when one is stuck in a closure with no openings? Within the crisis 
of power the closures and openings are conflated, and within capital closures specifically tend to 
look more desirable than openings. This crisis can be seen in emerging adulthood and my desire 
for adult citizenship. If adulthood is what it means to be political - then this is a limiting and 
inadequate understanding of the politicaL It is a constituted clos~e. But I desire this closure and 
the constituent zombie self that I have recently discovered seems inadequate. 
Our feelings should point the way in identifying between the openings and closures, but 
capital separates the social from the politicaL And so we are often alienated from ourselves and 
reality. My constituent zombie self that felt adequate for a while is now premised on lack, and I 
am quickly forgetting the joy that can be experienced in this space as I desire an abstract 
adulthood that does not seem to be available to me. Alienation becomes a key obstacle to telling 
the difference between the openings and closures. 
5. The Stupid One 
From rationality to reason21 
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"If we dealt with this phenomenon properly without emotion - without emotion - it wouldn't have 
come to this. " Dawn of the Dead (Romero, 1978) 
In many zombie movies, especially the older ones, there is a often a continuous talk about 
remaining calm and rational. But mostly what we hear, is just that, a lot of TALK about being 
rational. When it comes to people's actions, we are bombarded with irrational actions. In fact, a 
key device in zombie movies to create horror and suspense is depicting people as really stupid 
and ignorant of the reality around them. 
This is a very common device in Romero's (1978) Dawn of the Dead. For instance there is 
,{ 
a scene where the characters have stopped to refuel the helicopter they are using to flee the city. 
As they split off to find food and other resources, Roger is left on his own pumping fuel. The 
helicopter is still running, which means he can't hear anything. We see a zombie slowly inching 
towards him, but Roger is not paying attention, as ifhe's forgotten why he's fleeing in the first 
place. From afar, Fran has noticed the zombie coming towards Roger. She yells and moves 
around trying to get Roger's attention, but he still does not notice. We see several scenes like this 
in the movie, depicting similar ignorance in situations that are potentially dangerous given the 
circumstances. 
As I review the above examples, I am struck with a question: are these examples of 
stupidity actually examples of irrationality, or, is it precisely rationality that these examples 
depict? 
The form of rationality that underlies Western society can be rooted in the philosophy of 
Rene Descartes. In Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy (1901) he lays his foundation in 
21 In this chapter, I will use 'rationality' to refer to the type ofthought premised on the Descartes' mind-body split. I 
will use 'reason' to refer to Spinoza's conception of thought, which within it includes rationality, however, 
expands and goes beyond it in several ways. 
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the first two meditations. In the first meditation, Descartes rejects the senses because they have 
deceived him before and explains that "it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence' 
in that by which we have even once been deceived" (I, 3, p. 10). In the second meditation 
entitled, "Ofthe nature of the human mind; and that it is more easily known than the body" 
Descartes states that "I believe that body, figure, extension, motion, and place are merely fictions 
of my mind" (II, 2, p. 14) and then places the onus of his existence onto his mind: "I am, I exist, 
is necessarily true each time it is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind" (II, 3, p. 14). 
Essentially, it is here where we find the birth of the mind-body split. The separation of the mind 
and body can also be seen as underlying Marxist alienation andFPe separation of the social from 
the political, or the constituted from the constituent. 
In general, to be alienated means to be separated from something (Vieta, 2007). From a 
traditional Marxist perspective, alienation is used to describe the way labour is experienced 
within capitalism for the proletariat based on class conflict. The bourgeois own the means of 
production and the proletariat have no choice but to sell their labour in order to produce. 
Specifically, the majority of labour prior to late-stage capitalism was largely produced by the 
body. But not just any body - the disciplined body. With the rise of the industrial revolution many 
proletariat and peasants who were accustomed to working the land with their bodies were forced 
into the cities where factory workers were needed, their labour needed to drive the capitalist 
machine. Obedience, discipline and containment of the body become central for the factory 
worker, hence, alienating workers from their bodies. Under capitalist labour, workers are 
alienated from the products they produce, the processes of production, their humanness (or their 
humanity) and from other workers (Vieta, 2007). In other words, people are alienated from their 
constituent desires. Thus in capitalism we see the crisis between constituent and constituted 
power personified in the class struggle. 
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The class struggle that is theorized in traditional Marxism, however, takes the form of a 
dialectic. Although the aim of a dialectic is to render contradictions productive, the way that the 
traditional Marxist dialectic is often interpreted is premised on an unequal binary that creates 
lack, as it places one side of the binary above the other side. In other words, such a binary creates 
lines of separation that act as walls and thus closures of the constituent. 22 This binary then creates 
further alienation much like the placement of the mind above the body alienates one from the 
reality around her/him. I will explain below how this sort of Marxist interpretation can in fact 
produce further alienation and may be an inadequate interpretation to apply within a late-stage 
capital context where the closures and openings do not form binflries, but are rather conflated 
with one another. This conflation makes rationality impractical in many cases, and sole adherence 
to it can alienate one from their immediate reality. 
Might such an inadequacy ofbinarized views be reflected in the tension around stupidity 
in so many zombie movies; the tension alluding to the 'irrationality' of rationality? In the midst of 
a zombie apocalypse - where the seemingly impossible has occurred - rationality itself seems 
impossible. Rationality seems like a joke. All of a sudden it appears that being rational isn't going 
to save you. We see the consequences of rationality being an absurd alienation from reality. 
Without an awareness of our bodies within our immediate reality we cannot tell apart the closings 
from the openings; we cannot tell whether or not our constituent desires are being fulfilled. 
Negri (1996) and others of a post-Marxist persuasion claim that since 1968 there has been 
a new shift in the means of production in the developed world. This shift also dictates a shift in 
the form that alienation takes in late-stage capital society, which can be seen as an alienation from 
reality itself. 
22 It is in this sense that Negri (1999) speaks of how each revolution holds the seeds of its own demise. A dialectic 
can only ever create a revolution that terminates itself, replacing the old ruling class with a new one without 
actually altering the overarching power relations. 
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Factory manufacturing has given way to new technologies, displacing the mass worker 
(Negri, 1996; Deleuze, 1995; Negri & Hardt, 2004; Hardt, 1998). Industrial capitalism, the period 
of the mass worker, has shifted into the total subsumption of capital, in which the 'social worker' 
becomes hegemonic. The total subsumption of capital is the moment in which everything -
material or immaterial- becomes for sale (Skott-Myhre, 2008). The total subsumption of capital 
is put into motion with the deregularization of capital, and the opening up of the market to the 
entire world: in other words, the globalization of capital. As Negri (1996) describes: "the models 
of regulation are extended along multinational lines, and the regulation passes through monetary 
dimensions which cover the world market to a continually great~ extent" (p.156). Essentially, 
more space and time needs to be appropriated in order for late-stage capitalism to thrive. 
Because the globalization of capital displaces the Western mass worker to periphery 
spaces in which labour is cheaper, hegemonic labour in the most highly developed 
capitalist countries shifts to a different focus. The organization of labour becomes 
progressively more decentralized spatially. It is instead focused on the expropriation of 
social knowledges, on the capitalization of the social labouring networks: in short, it 
concentrates on the exploitation of a working figure which extends well beyond the 
bounds of the factory. We call this figure t!Ie sociaf3 worker. (Negri, 1996, p. 163). 
The social worker might be viewed as the new proletariat. The social worker's life is defined by 
abstraction and flexibility; everything is "short-term and rapidly shifting, but at the same time 
continuous and unbounded" (Deleuze, 1995, p. 181). Basically, capital in the Western world has 
moved beyond the exploitation of physical space, into the realm of immaterial time. Space can be 
quantitatively measured, and therefore is limited by its physical and constitutive nature. Time, 
23 It should be noted that the word 'social' here is being used not to represent the constituted, as was used previously. 
Here social is referring more simply to social interactions; the interactions between bodies. 
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however, which is socially produced is qualitative and therefore infInite, meaning capital can 
fulfIll its function even more effectively by exploiting the abstract (Negri, 1996). 
A brief discussion of Bourdieu's forms of capital might be useful here. Bourdieu (2001) 
outlines three forms capital: economic capital, cultural capital and social capital. Economic 
capital is essentially money, or property that can be immediately converted into money. Cultural 
capital occurs in three states: the embodied state, "in the form oflong-Iasting dispositions of the 
mind and body"; the objectifIed state, in the form of cultural goods; and the institutionalized 
state, largely in the form of educational qualifIcations (Bourdieu, 200 I, p. 98). Finally, social 
capital refers to ones network of relationships, or group member,sflips (family, school, class, etc.) 
which create a resource pool of the different forms of capital for one's disposal. The different 
forms of capital are interrelated and can be at certain moments converted into one anothey24 
(Bourdieu, 200 I). 
I would argue that cultural capital can be roughly aligned with Negri's (1996) idea of 
'social knowledges,25 and social capital with 'social labouring networks' - together these forms of 
capital come to form what is called identity capital (Cote and Allahar, 2006). The accumulation of 
identity capital (i.e., both social and cultural capital) are highly reliant on the amount offree time 
one has at their disposal (Bourdieu, 200 I). In othl?! words, the time one has outside 'the factory', 
so to speak; outside of wage paying labour hours. The social worker's labour is highly 
concentrated on acquiring identity capital as a means of investment into future economic capital. 
The hope is that the forms of capital within identity capital will indeed payoff and covert into 
economic capital in the future. 
24 There is certainly more that could be said about Bourdieu's forms of capital and their conversion; however, with 
the limited scope of this thesis I hope this brief explanation will be enough to explicate the point at hand. 
25 Perhaps we might see this focus on social knowledges within the total subsumption manifesting itself in my 
desire to always be an informed citizen. 
I , 
, 
63 
Here we might be able to begin to see how post-Marxist alienation takes on a deeper form 
in late-stage capitalism. If leisure time is now just as exploitable as labour time, we can start to 
see how the constituent (our creative productive forces) can be easily conflated with the 
constituted (production captured by capital). Furthermore, because social labour is concentrated 
on capital that only might become tangible (economic) in the future, we can see how one's 
productive identity might be placed in deferral, and therefore be perceived as lack. Because the 
affirmation of productivity (in capital's terms) is placed in the future, one can become alienated 
from their present constituent production; in essence, their immediate reality and the desires that 
are present in it. 
Basically, the social worker's production revolves around the consumption of capital, 
instead of the creation of it. This consumption-as-production can be seen in a number of ways; 
attaining more and more seemingly arbitrary educational qualifications (and acquiring massive 
amounts of debt in the process) being a poignant example. If capital is relying on a mode of 
production in which leisure time consumption is the labour, the need for labour-time production 
decreases. This, as Casarino (2003) calls it, is the "impossible dream" of capital: production time 
reduced to zero time so that the utmost amount of profit is generated. The glaring problem here 
that renders this dream impossible is that without productive labour time we do not have the 
means to consume. And yet this is what appears to be happening in late-stage capitalism. In terms 
of traditional Marxist class divisions, what we now have is a small sector of people employed to 
produce ideas and identities for consumption (the upper class or 'old' bourgeois26), and a large 
reserve of part-time or contract worker in the service industry, or otherwise 'floundering' workers 
(working class or 'old' proletariat) (Cote and Allahar, 2006).As long as identities are based on 
26 By 'old' preceding bourgeois (and later proletariat) - I mean to make the distinction that I am referring to a 
traditional Marxist understanding of the word, based on a traditional and dialectical Marxist class struggle. 
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lack consumption-as-production is sustainable to certain degree. However, with the division of 
labour the way it is currently assembled, sustainability of such an economy is clearly 
problematic. Although the old proletariat have the potential to eventually join the small upper 
class (or old bourgeois), with the disparity between the rich and the poor growing it seems more 
likely for the old proletariat to remain stuck for a relatively long time concentrating on social 
labour as their main means of consumption-as-production trying to accumulate as much identity 
capital as possible, all the while reducing their economic capital. 
Here we might see the emerging adult as an intensification of the social worker27• Many 
young people in Canada are under the assumption that higher ed,lJcation credentials are needed in 
order to compete in the job market; however, the number of highly skilled jobs available in 
comparison to the proportion of young people graduating with university degrees is rather low 
(Cote & Allahar, 2006). This disparate proportion is only likely to increase, as more and more 
young people graduate. On the other hand, the demand for low-skill service industry workers has 
increased, and many young people resort to taking on these lower-level jobs as it appears to be 
better than nothing. This disappointment in the failure to secure a high quality job, however, 
often leads young people to seek out further qualifications in order to gain an advantage. 
Inadvertently, this has led to credentials losing m~rket value, which ironically seems to fuel the 
search for higher qualifications even more (Cote & Allahar, 2006). And so only in consumption-
as-production does it seem that adulthood can be attained (eventually). 
One obvious problem is that, while this longer preparation for work roles is fine for those 
with parents who can afford to pay for a postsecondary education, the bulk of the 
population cannot afford it and therefore face a continuing struggle in terms of their 
27 In fact, we could look at Arnett's theory as being one that fits a Marxist idea of historical tendency: Arnett (2007)1 
argues that the more industrialized a society becomes the more widespread emerging adulthood becomes. The 
same might be said about the social worker in terms of its hegemony. 
65 
standard of living. (Cote & Allahar, 2006, p. 45) 
Thus, many emerging adults are accumulating more and more financial debt, while 
simultaneously increasing identity capital that doesn't seem to be as lucrative an investment as 
was promised. 
Although the emerging adult may be seen in some ways as an intensification of the new 
proletariat or social worker, social labour is certainly not confined to this stage of life. In fact, if 
labour is now associated and conflated with leisure time, as mentioned previously, this has some 
major implications for class struggle as a dialectic, or a binary made up of oppositions. The upper 
class itself has the most leisure time and economic capital at its 9isposal, thus implicating it 
within social labour as welL Although in terms of economic capital they can be perceived as the 
old bourgeois class in traditional Marxist terms, they are now taking on identity consumption-as-
production along with the new proletariat class2s• Similarly, the old proletariat class, as based on 
economic capital, becomes complicated by this new social and economic order. Although the old 
proletariat may have less economic capital, the amount and type of identity capital can vary from 
person to person. This might be illustrated with an example of some emerging adults who make 
up the proletariat: one may have been raised with distinctively bourgeois cultural and social 
capital, but in facing the new economy, might find themselves financially deprived. Other such 
antagonisms might be found within the proletariat class29• Overall, however, both the old 
bourgeois and old proletariat classes make' up the new proletariat class. Moreover, the abstracted 
nature of social labour complicates the status of the new bourgeois. Although, we might have 
certain individuals or entities who might have a high amount of influence over the directions of 
28 Although most likely with greater ease and perhaps even more alienation than the proletariat class. 
29 As has been illustrated to some degree traditional class lines and other forms of social inequality still exist. 
Because capital is based upon a history of accumulation which was premised on inequality to begin with, barriers 
certainly exist, and are even intensified. However, just as the separation between humans and zombies are 
blurred, so too is the separation between class, gender, and race lines. 
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social labour (e.g., marketing companies or popular self-help gurus like Oprah), can anyone 
really 'own' someone else's social labour? The only ownership of social labour we might find is 
embodied in the social worker herself, making the new bourgeois and new proletariat one and the 
same. 
The above illustrates to some degree why the binaries of the dialectic become 
problematic: the bourgeois and proletariat statuses are conflated within the total subsumption 
where social labour dominates. It is no longer as simple as the proletariat being exploited by the 
capitalist bourgeois other: the total subsumption of capital makes it possible for individuals to 
subjectively be both the proletariat, and the capitalist bourgeois,ID any given moment. In this 
sense, we might see how an us vs. them mentality alienates one even further from reality, because 
one is both us and them. 
Within the total subsumption, because identity consumption-as-production within leisure 
time allows everyone to be a part of it, literally every moment can be for capital. Every 
interaction with any body might be used towards capital, for the sake of a future profit. Because 
our desires have been mutated into lack, our very identities are premised on lack, thus our 
collisions with other bodies are not for the sake of producing ourselves, but are often in order to 
consume each other. Because pleasure based on c~nsumption within capitalism is in infinite 
deferral, the constituent and constitutive get left behind. Thus we are often alienated from our 
bodies and other bodies in the living moment of now. Because we are so hyper focused on the 
constituted social, we become suspicious of our bodies and constituent desires. Reality becomes 
an intrusion that must be harnessed. 
I am alienated from my own reality 
I often dismiss the experiences of my body. In particular I tend to really dismiss the experiences 
of my body that do not serve capital and rationality. Earlier when I said I was going to do 
nothing is fairly indicative of this alienation. 
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It seems that what I understand in language is different from what I do in my body. Doing nothing 
is simply not possible, but the word 'nothing' hides this from me. I often forget my actual 
experiences, and instead code them with a language of lack. Thus far I have even positioned 
myself into identities based on lack: I have seen myself as a zombie, instead of a human and 
found the lack of arrested adulthood more relatable than the possibilities of emerging adulthood. 
And based on my feelings I would scry I trust these interpretations of events more than the events 
themselves. I sort and organize events into binaries - productive and unproductive, even though 
upon further speculation my categories don't really make that much sense. 
But this lack often comes after the fact, not necessarily during many of my experiences. I'm not 
rationalizing my experiences in every moment. Being rational requires time - time to think about 
it. 
{ 
In a zombie infested world there is no time. All of a sudden the world is this context of 
chaos - you need to live in the moment in order to survive. But without awareness of the body, 
one can only have an extremely inadequate understanding of time (Spinoza, 2000, II, Prop. 
31). The characters that do stupid stuff seem to be unaware of the present time they are in - they 
do not recontextualize their actions within the conditions that surround their bodies (ie, there are 
hungry zombies around looking to feast on flesh). In other words, they are alienated from reality. 
As an audience member, I often find these scenes excruciatingly frustrating to watch. I yell, 
scream and laugh at the scene unfolding. In some movies, these scenes become funny because the 
zombie moves so slowly that time seems to stretch out - you watch in horror and humor as the 
character runs out of (what seems like so much!) time that could be used to create a rational plan 
of defence. As the zombie inches closer chances of action based on rationality decrease. 
I don't have time for that 
Similarly, lfind that I never have the time to get involved "politically" with things, because I 
often feel that I need to be informed in order to do something of value. 
But do I really not have time? Well ... I think the answer is yes and no. I don't have time for that 
particular activity: getting informed about governmental politics. 
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The reason I don't have time is because I am busy doing something else. When I truly look at how 
much I do in a day, there are tons of tiny things I do. I get distracted and end up watching a video 
on YouTube, I chat with someone on Facebook; I watch a talk on TED.com; I talk with afriend 
about why I don't want to vote. 
I actually am being informed about several things in my day. Maybe the way that I'm getting 
informed is just not the way that is deemed rational, and hence not worthy to be a part of 'time'. 
The way that characters do end up surviving, is not primarily thinking and planning, but 
by paying attention to all of their immediate surroundings, using whatever they can in order to 
stay alive. It is not rationality, but rather an undeniable physicaLawareness of immediate danger 
that initiates one into action. Within zombie culture, there is a common joke about using what 
you have to fight zombies: when you enter a room you find the best 'weapon' to kill a zombie 
with, maybe a broom, or the shower curtain pole. This idea has actually spawned a zombie video 
game called Dead Rising (Kawano & Inafime, 2006) in which the player can kill zombies with 
various weapons and everyday objects. This sentiment is also reflected in the movie Zombieland 
(Fleischer, 2009). The main character and narrator of the film tells us about his list of rules to 
surviving the zombie apocalypse, or Zombieland as he calls it. Most of these rules have a lot to 
do with being obsessively vigilant of your immediate surroundings. 
Spinoza outlines three levels of reasoning: the first is 'imagination', the second is 'reason' 
and the third is 'intuitive knowledge'. "Knowledge of the second and third kind, and not of the 
first, teaches us to distinguish the true from false" (Spinoza, 2000, II, Prop. 42, p.149). 
Imagination, however, is "knowledge of the first kind [and] is the sole cause of falsity" (Spinoza, 
2000, II, Prop. 41, p.149). Imagination here is the knowledge we perceive through the senses and 
through signs; in other words, language. Spinoza explains its inadequacy: "for example, from the 
fact that on hearing or reading certain words we recollect things and form of them certain ideas 
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which are similar to those through which we imagine things" (Spinoza, 2000, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 
2, p.148). These ideas of things, however, are only 'similar' to the recollection of these things; 
not only are they not the same, but they are only compared to memories which allows for 
distortion, and thus falsity. 
I would argue that rationality is encompassed solely within the realm of Spinoza's 
'imagination'. Because rationality places the mind above the body, rationality is primarily based 
on the abstract use of signs which are recollected30. Imagination and recollection are often 
flawed, and it is precisely these realms of the mind that encompass the past and future. Only with 
the consciousness of the past, can the future exist31. In other wprds, the mind's falsities can lead 
away from the constituent fulfilment of desire now and towards the constituted past and future 
that creates desire as lack. 
This is not to say that the use of imagination, or rationality, is all bad. In line with the 
plane of immanence, Spinoza holds no actually hierarchy of knowledge. Although the types of 
knowledge hold different levels of importance to a certain degree, these knowledges are 
organized in a different way than a hierarchy. A hierarchy can be seen as organized in a linear 
formation, with each type of knowledge successively gaining importance (or viewed the other 
way around, losing importance). Spinoza's types ~fknowledges can be seen to be composed in an 
assemblage instead. Visually, I would propose this assemblage be viewed as circles overlapping 
each other: the smallest circle, imagination, is placed in the center; a larger circle placed over top 
is reason; finally, the largest circle, intuitive knowledge, is placed over top the first two circles, 
encompassing them both. All three types of knowledge are necessary and inform each other; even 
30 Although, Descartes condemns the senses, a part of Spinoza's 'imagination', what he deems as most important is 
basically the other half of imagination - the mind and its abstractions, leaving the rest of what Spinoza deems as 
reasoning untouched. 
31 Spinoza explains that only the affirmative exists. Thus, the future is only re-compositions of things that already 
exist in some form in our experiences. For a fuller explanation please refer to (Spinoza, 2000, II, Prop. 49, Schol.) 
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imagination can inform reason. For example, we can imagine things or ideas that are false (we 
cannot help it) but through reason we can at least be aware ofthese falsities, which frees us from 
such errors. Imagination therefore is necessary in order for us to make sense of things and be able 
to communicate ideas. Imagination allows us to access reason and aids us in discriminating 
inadequate ideas from adequate ones32. It is imagination on its own, with no mediation from 
reason or intuition, that is erroneous and dangerous: the smallest, circle in the center of the 
assemblage of Spinoza's reason is inadequate on its own. Spinoza's assemblage of reason 
basically points to the use of the mind and body together as political. Combined together the 
types of knowledge do not exclude the body and its emotions an,d senses, as the Cartesian model 
of rationality does. The body is essential to engaging with the reality of now, whereas the mind 
must interpret reality and stay aware of its movements, collisions, and desires at all times in order 
to achieve the most adequate interpretation. The body must then act on the mind's interpretation, 
which sets in motion the process all over again33• 
In the zombie apocalypse, the characters who survive are essentially the ones who use the 
full assemblage of reason. In Zombieland (Fleischer, 2009), the protagonist's list of rules can be 
seen as such a use of both the mind and body. The rules themselves can be seen as a use of 
imagination and recollection; however, the rules ,!!e not rigid, but rather open to interpretation 
given what the actual circumstances are, and thus interpreted by reason and intuition. 
Unfortunately, reason will not always save you; especially during a zombie apocalypse. 
You pretty much have one shot. And zombie movies don't really sugarcoat anything. Some 
characters will fail in that one shot. Despite their best efforts some do die. Reason does not 
guarantee survival - but neither does rationality. 
32 An adequate idea is a true idea; an inadequate one is false (Spinoza, 2000). However, adequate and inadequate 
ideas for Spinoza lay within a continuum, instead of a binary much like the assemblage of reason. 
33 The section entitled "My Feelings" in chapter 3, might be useful here. 
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However tragic death may be, death may not always be a permanent and constituted 
closing. For an individual, it may be; however, it must be remembered that the constituent is 
never individual, but collective. It is decontextualizing the individual from the collective that 
renders the closing of death a permanent closing. Here we see that individualism constitutes yet 
another closing in the crisis of power, and thus an inadequate understanding of the political in 
immanent terms. 
( 
Chapter 6: The Independent One 
:From individualism to the complex self 
"Fucky'all." -Dawn of the Dead (2004) 
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In Zombieland (Fleischer, 2009) the characters refer to each other not by their own names, 
but rather by the places they are going to, as an act of depersonalization. One of the protagonists, 
as well as the narrator of the movie, Columbus, Ohio, attributes his survival to the fact that he is a 
loner. 
COLUMBUS (narrating) 
I may seem like an unlikely survivor with all my phobias and 
irritable bowel syndrome. But I had the advantage of never 
having any friends or close family ... I've always been kind 
of a loner, I avoided other people lik~ they were zombies, 
even before they were zombies.' 
During a zombie apocalypse it is pertinent to "cut all emotional ties" in order to survive 
(Fleischer, 2009). Because anyone can become a zombie at any time you must not get too close 
to someone as you are most likely going to have to kill them sometime down the line. One of the 
underlying messages is that creating openings of vulnerability with others during a zombie 
apocalypse is seen as foolish. 
Sometimes I can't stand being myself 
My pursuit of relationships and intimacy can feel so alienating and embarrassing. I try to be 
myself (or more specifically, I try to reveal a bit of my vulnerable self) when I'm with people. And 
I often feel inadequate for it. 
When I TA at school sometimes I know the words coming out of my mouth don't make sense and I 
sound stupid and confused. I don't speak perfectly, but that's the way I am. I could try to change 
this, but I purposely don't. I want to talk like a normal everyday person, not in some professional 
lingo that obscures my humanity. I want to relate to my students on a personal level. I think I do 
this .... yet I still often feel like an inadequate TA. Maybe they don't think I'm smart enough and 
make fun of that 'dumb blonde' TA behind my back. Although I strongly believe in opening up 
lines of communication in this way I often feel exhausted, embarrassed and like a failure on many 
levels. Am I actually accomplishing anything? Am I making a difference? Isn't this an example of 
beingpolitical?? !fit is, why do Ifee/like crap so much of the time? 
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.. . But is it always about feeling good? 
When I think about what it means to be political, sometimes the idea of 'empowerment' 
comes to mind. My understanding of the political often falls back into conflation with the civic: 
the good, loyal citizen, is also a happy citizen. The idea of being empowered, to me, has very 
positive connotations. Even more importantly though, is that empowerment is often 
conceptualized within an individual framework. I often conflate being "empowered" with feeling 
good about myself; an individual fulfilment of pleasure. Individual pleasure, however, becomes a 
problematic indicator of power. Pursuing empowerment can potentially lead to a harmful 
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hedonism in which pleasure and power are not mutually shared with other bodies. As was 
discussed earlier, pleasure, or joy, is the fulfilment of constituent desire, and desire can only ever 
be discovered in collision with other bodies. So pleasure or joy - the fulfilment of conatus is 
always with other bodies. Or as Bignall (2010) phrases it: "properly conceived, joy is the basis 
for an ethical attitude of desire because it is necessarily mutual" (p. 17). Thus individual 
empowerment is a diminished form of power. 
Rationality can mislead one into thinking that individualism is more powerful than a 
collectivity, or, in the case of characters in zombie movies, safer. With rationality alienating one 
from the reality outside of themselves, one begins to look inward and can begin to ignore not 
only their own body but the bodies of others. In this sense one might see themselves as solely 
political without the aid of other bodies they are in collision with. In this way characters 
rationalize being alone. Other times people do challenge this individualism by sticking with only 
certain people. Although this is an expansion of the individual, I would argue this is also 
individualism in a broader form, as a group of people can form an entity that can be opposed to 
another individual or group of people. 
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In fact, the prevailing discourse of independence is often intensified when we see people 
challenging it in the zombie genre. We often see characters forging tight bonds with their closest 
loved ones, but this usually ends disastrously. Very often there is someone within the group of 
survivors who gets infected, but this is usually not revealed to the whole group. Usually, there is a 
loved one who knows about the bite, but protects the infected individual. In Snyder's (2004) 
Dawn of the Dead, this situation is exemplified by the character, Randall, whose pregnant 
girlfriend gets bitten. Randall hides his girlfriend away as her infection becomes more visible. 
His love and protection are no use against the infection as we see that he has strapped her down 
to a bed to restrain her. What becomes apparent is that those whOfYou can trust in one moment 
may not be trustworthy in the next moment. Because of this lack of reliability and stability in 
individuals, the struggle between self and other is intensified. Why trust anyone when even 'your 
own' can tum on you? 
Both rigid trust and distrust between bodies, however, is often flawed within the 
immanent framework. As Bignall (2010) clarifies "while individuals are constituted by their 
relations with others, these are not simply one-on-one encounters between entire entities" (p.12). 
Although the above connection of bodies between Randall and his pregnant girlfriend challenge 
the discourse of independence, this interaction of }lodies is still marked by individualism as it is 
an all or nothing interaction between 'entire entities'. 
Such an individualistic conceptualization of bodies can make one apt to not trust at all. 
Yet this lack of trust, that is so often encouraged in dialogue, is often contradicted in zombie 
movies. Even some of the most individualistic characters often give into cooperation. It soon 
becomes evident that individualism creates a closing. Those who carry their individualism to the 
end often die a lonely death - even a seemingly insignificant death - sometimes it's humorous or 
as an audience member you feel like "Good, he deserved to die". On the other hand, many 
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individualistic characters cannot help but eventually succumb to the force of the multitude. 
It is often revealed that the strength of independence alluded to (talked about) in zombie 
movies is revealed to be a flawed perception of survival. As Spinoza points out, "The human 
body needs for its conservation very many other bodies" (2000, II, Post.4). 
Survival lies in the many, not the one - surviving to be on your own often seems 
meaningless. As Zombieland's Columbus concludes at the end of the movie "Without other 
people, you might as well be a zombie". But the question becomes, which bodies do you trust? 
Spinoza (2000) also reveals that some bodies are toxic to each other. 
Trust and cooperation often come in unexpected places, ~ays and people. Your 'own' may 
not be the best to trust at 'all' times. Which bodies to trust is always shifting and changing, 
configuring in new ways. Bodies are not singular but complex. As Bignall (2010) describes, 
"complex bodies are thus affected not wholly or in entirety, but by a vast number of internal and 
external relations at anyone time, which impact upon and transform them in partial and selective 
ways according to the nature of the elemental connections and disjunctions" (p.13). 
The way to survive the crisis of trust in a zombie apocalypse is to flatten all bodies and 
ascriptions you have upon those bodies into a plane of immanence, and rely on only the 
information in front you - the reality that your i~ediate surroundings create for you. All 
assumptions must be put away, and bodies must be assessed as they are in any moment in relation 
to one's own body. Each body in each moment must be viewed for the unique possibilities it 
holds right now. Although history should not be forgotten, it should be looked at with suspicion. 
From the plane of immanence, the view is always one of an unanswered question - a question 
asked over and over again. The same question can have a different answer every time. A body 
may be an enemy in one moment, but a friend the next or vice versa. But no matter the answer, 
the question must be asked again, the relations between bodies constantly assessed and 
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reassessed. 
Thus far this chapter has theorized the relations between bodies primarily within a zombie 
apocalypse. Similar relations between bodies are applicable, however, within the total 
subsumption of capital. Just as the 'infection' creates rifts between characters and their loved 
ones, so too does capital at this heightened stage. 
As was discussed previously, within the total subsumption of capital, the social worker 
takes a hegemonic form. With schedules becoming more flexible and individualized, the 
organization ofthe social worker's time can create barriers between family, loved ones and 
friends. We are increasingly disconnected from the people we w~t to be with or feel we should 
be with. The organization of time within the total subsumption of capital can be compared to the 
infection within the zombie apocalypse. This organization of time can conflict with the 
individualistic discourses of family, belonging, and loyalty which are all very powerful in 
organizing the relation of our bodies to one another. 
So much freedom, but no one to share it with 
1 often find it hard to find people who have "time" to be in relationships with me, because we all 
have our own individual schedules and when 1 get to see certain people is dictated by schedules 
which often conflict with my own. People don't reglly have 9-5 jobs anymore; my own school 
schedule is very sporadic. 
On the one hand this is great. 1 have lots of free time, and can work and play whenever 1 want to 
- everything is on MY time. But my freedom, which on the outside seems wonderful and full of 
flexibility, remains in an individual realm and often becomes lonely. This time and flexibility can 
limit my interaction with others, because lots of other people have this same flexibility and have 
already planned something that they are going to do and so there is no mutual free time between 
us. It seems like 1 have infinite time for myself sometimes, and yet there is no time for others that 1 
want to be with. 
Sometimes 1 feel like 1 have so much freedom, but no one to share it with. 
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But at the same time the way that time is organized creates the opportunity for collision 
with other bodies. These bodies, however, may not fit our discourses of belonging. In fact, the 
bodies this organization of time offers us are often bodies that have invisible walls that separate 
us although we are physically together; ascriptions and expectations dictated by the language of 
our (collective) imaginations - in other words the intersectionality of identities which we judge as 
either better or worse than ourselves. 
Just as in zombie movies characters are reluctant to trust others who are strangers to 
them, we also are reluctant to put trust in bodies that are ascribed as the 'other' to us. What 
ascribes the other, however, is language and expectations. This tpeans that the ascriptions that I 
give to my own and other bodies come from my imagination. Without the aid of the other two 
levels of knowledge, my own imagination can reproduce and produce the other. That's why the 
people around me appear like potential zombies - it is actually my own zombification spreading, 
seemingly spreading the infection, making the other the zombie - my own otherness creates the 
other in others. 
Spreading the infection of alienation 
Even when there are times and places when peoplg can come together in big groups I find 
invisible walls separating us. Last year I joined the Graduate Student Association (GSA) as a 
representative for my program. This was one of my attempts to consciously become 'more 
political' and 'iriformed'in my life on what I saw as a more local level. 
I hated the GSA. 
I went there and I felt so stupid. I felt like everyone knew what was going on except for me. As 
some time passed and I started to get a sense of things I finally had the guts to start asking some 
questions so that I could figure out what was going on. To my utter dismay, the most common 
answer to most of my questions was "I/we don't really know. " Here I thought, I was the only 
stupid one in the bunch, but it turned out no one really knew what the hell was going on. And so 
what I had interpreted as knowledge and decisiveness was really just a big act. People were just 
pretending to know what was going on, but no one actually knew a thing and no one would really 
say it. Even I had a hard time saying it. We were pretending to be zombies amongst the people. Or 
-I 
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is it people among the zombies? 
When I look back on this situation I now see that my own otherness contributed to this alienation. 
It's possible that I could have taken a more productive approach in this situation. Maybe actually 
pointed out ihe fact that no one really knows anything and brought that into the open. Not in a 
hostile accusatory way, but rather from a place of vulnerability. I could have tried to create an 
opening and thus a possibility for a new configuration of bodies. Obviously this is hypothetical 
and in fact could have resulted in more alienation. But there are unknown possibilities in these 
situations and I could have searched for an opening instead of succumbing to the closure and just 
writing off the GSA. 
Discourses of individuality and rationality can at times make me limit my interactions with 
others. As in the above example, I thought I was the only one who didn't know what was going 
on. Furthermore, rationality might be seen to influence why everyone pretended to know what 
was going on: we played into assumptions about our knowledge as opposed to the reality of our 
knowledge. I was afraid to admit that I didn't know what was going on, and this was probably the 
case for other members as well. But we were too alienated from each other to share this with each 
other, and to collide in any sort of mutual joy. 
When I look back on this situation, as a whole I see it as a failure or a lack. But what such 
dismissals render invisible is the vast amount of time and energy that I had simultaneously spent 
in other random places becoming political and how often I have random collisions with people I 
don't consider myselfto be in "relationship" with-1students, professors, strangers) that result in 
joy - the great amount of times that I myself am swept away by the multitude. This is not to say 
that my 'official' relationships are not part of the multitude. They are of course - but this focus on 
certain individuals or entities (like the GSA) can close up or cover up the opportunities for 
engagement of the multitude with other bodies which are ascribed as 'other', and the fact that the 
multitude can include any body at any time in partial relations. 
Partial relations create the possibility for more relationships, or at least the recognition of 
all the relationships that exist in our lives that we take for granted. It's not as simple as good 
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relationships, bad relationships with certain people; but rather good moments and bad moments 
between bodies at different times. 
In Zombieland in the end Columbus realizes that he has a new family - four strangers 
from different parts of the country come together to form a new assemblage. Obviously this is a 
simplification of partial relations as here we see the assemblage of entire entities once again - but 
despite this simplicity, the overall message is that we now have the opportunity to create new 
families based on difference, families that constantly shift and move. Here we see the possibility 
of a complex self, rather than self based on individualism. A self that acknowledges that it is 
made up of a vast amount of collisions between bodies, the self ~nstantly forming an 
assemblage with the other, no matter where the other comes from. Similarly, we might be able to 
link this to the opportunities that the anomie of society creates for emerging adults: with a lack of 
structures to guide young people in their identity formation, an opportunity exists to create 
identities and communities based on difference. 
However, recognizing the self in the other, and vice versa, is challenging when this 
recognition needs to be mutual. And this is most difficult when so many of us are socialized into 
separating the self and the other on a constant basis34. As Spinoza points out, reasonable people 
are most beneficial to other reasonable people (S.e,inoza, 2000, p.249) - but it is most likely that 
we often come across people who are not reasonable; and we ourselves are not always reasonable 
either. The challenge to recognize the openings that exist when encountering others while 
maintaining our own sense of reason and encouraging reason in others is a complex one. From 
this perspective we can see how the the 'personal is political'. But this famous phrase from 2nd 
wave feminism takes on a different meaning in our times today, and in my life. The original 
34 This sort of socialization is most clearly exemplified with the separation of the sexes. As early as birth as most 
children are immediately categorized into sex and gender. 
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meaning is buried beneath a time increasingly marked by explicit individualism and 
consumensm. 
( 
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7. The Kickass Woman 
From feminism to becoming-woman 
In Jay Lee's (2008) Zombie Strippers - an over the top, satirical porn-meets-zombie flick 
- central to the plot is an intensified and caricatured form of female empowerment. In this movie, 
a virus is scientifically engineered by the US government as a military weapon. As a scientist 
explains: 
It's a chemo virus designed to reanimate dead tissue and 
jump-start the brain's motor function. This would allow, 
say, a soldier to continue fighting after death. After one 
experiences death, fear is more or less gone. It enhances 
the combat mindset ... the brain functions of one fearless, 
uninhibited ... the drive of a take-no-yrisoners soldier of 
raw survival instincts. It more or leis turns a soldier into 
a super soldier. (Lee, 2008) 
The downside to the virus is that the host deteriorates quickly and losses all control: "The 
zombified dead after that are but mindless monsters, with a voracious appetite for living flesh" 
(Lee, 2008). However, due to the virus' molecular structure, the virus remains more pure in 
females. As the film soon reveals, this means that female zombies actually retain their sense of 
control and become quite powerfuL Taking a jab at patriarchy, the scientist points out that "once 
you get a man in there, like everything else - it all goes to shit." 
As one might predict, based on the film's title, the virus gets out into an underground strip 
club and the strippers become infected, essentially turning them into super strippers. The women 
in the movie are depicted as highly sexualized and feminine, but also as strong and courageous. 
As the lead stripper Kat describes, "You have to be a warrior, a soldier. Fearless, uninhibited. A 
stripper with a take-no-prisoners, raw survival instinct" (Lee, 2008). The women are 
conventionally gorgeous, the lead played by porn super star, Jenna Jameson: they have perfect 
skin, hair, slim bodies, full breasts. And they kick ass. Especially when they become zombies. 
Not only do the zombie strippers gain super strength, but suddenly the men desire the zombie 
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strippers more than the human strippers, showering the zombie strippers with more tips than ever. 
On the one hand, these women may be viewed as highly commodified and exploited. The 
strip club is owned and run by men, for men. It may appear that the zombie strippers derive their 
power from the acceptance and objectification of men. The tables begin to tum, however, as the 
strippers not just give in to, but relish their zombie powers and instincts: they invite eager men 
into the private backrooms who are expecting a lap dance and maybe something a little more, and 
end up being eaten alive; their manhood the first thing to be devoured. And so on the other hand, 
the strippers can be seen as strong, independent women who appear to be in control of their 
bodies as well as the men's bodies. They enjoy stripping and furthermore we are informed at the 
beginning of the film that public nudity has been outlawed, making them rebels to the status quo 
- freedom fighters of sorts; freedom over the right to their own bodies. Not only that, but also 
women smart enough to exploit the law for their own benefit. 
At first glance this depiction appealed to me very much. They looked powerful - I 
enjoyed watching them be utterly fearless and at times felt a sense of power. However, in the end 
the movie ends up undermining female power as the strippers become highly competitive with 
each other and destroy each other and themselves. This is problematic as it might be seen as 
dismissing feminism altogether: it all goes to shit_once you get a man in there, but women don't 
do much better either. However, it can also be seen as dismissing a certain type of liberal 
feminism - one that is wrapped tightly within the confines of patriarchy and capitalism: female 
power based on the oppression and exploitation of others. 
I found myself relating to this movie on several levels. The satire in the movie, in 
particular the feminist satire, highlights my own understanding of feminism and does not cover 
up, but rather reveals several problems in my understandings. The particular types of 
"feminisms" that I encounter in my life I often interpret in a manner that ultimately depoliticize 
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me, even if they make me feel good. Within the total sUbsumption of capital, meanings, histories 
and linearity are confused as they all happen at once, and feminism can be wrought with closures. 
Just as the movie can be interpreted to dismiss feminism altogether, I too started my 
understanding of feminism here. What I would call my first 'official' interaction with feminism 
was deeply situated within the ideology ofpost-feminism35. Post-feminism refers to 
an active process by which feminist gains of the 1970s and 80s come to be undermined. It 
proposes that through an array of machinations, elements of contemporary popular culture 
are perniciously effective in regard to this undoing of feminism, while simultaneously 
appearing to be engaging in a well-informed and even w~.1-intended response to feminism 
(McRobbie, 2004, p. 255). 
Simply put, post-feminism perpetuates the idea that the work of feminism is complete, equality 
has been attained and feminism is no longer needed (Kinser, 2004). The way that this view 
manifested itself in my life was even more intensive than this: not only did I feel that feminism 
was not needed, but I felt that feminism itself was what was perpetuating inequality. I can recall, 
when I was in high school, writing a paper about how feminism had killed chivalry, and that the 
idea of women's equality allowed men to treat women even worse than before, Not having any 
knowledge of any other type of feminism, my unqerstandings of post-feminism made me dismiss 
all of feminism. Looking back, however, it seems that my views were ironically actually a form 
offeminism, challenging the idea that feminism had brought and completed equality. I was·in fact 
pointing out new inequalities; however, I mistakenly blamed my narrow view of feminism for 
this instead of patriarchy, capitalism and my post-feminist (non)sensibilities. 
35 As Kinser (2004) and others point out, the term 'post-feminism' is highly contested and debatable, at times being 
confused and used interchangeably with third-wave feminism. For the purposes of this writing, I will be using 
the term 'post-feminism' to refer to a sort of anti-feminism, rather than more productive forms of feminism which 
are at times labelled with post-feminism. 
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As I continued on into niy university education I came to see that feminism was indeed 
still needed. However, my new understandings of feminism faced new challenges. My 
understandings often got swept under commodity feminism and even now it is often within 
commodity feminism that I struggle. 
The term commodity feminism refers specifically to post-feminism within the capitalist 
market, where "disparate systems of femininity and feminism have been juxtaposed and spliced 
together" (Papps, 2010, p. 2).What's interesting about commodity feminism is that it is a mish-
mash of real 'constituent' feminism spliced with femininity and consumerism, and certainly 
collides with post-feminism in several manners. Although highlytproblematic, I would argue it 
certainly has its roots within constituent forms of feminism - particularly second wave36 
feminism. In particular, the phrase the "personal is political" echoes in my understandings of 
feminism today; however, it gets filtered through the lenses of individuality, rationality and 
consumerism. 
The idea that the personal is political when I hear it can be easily interpreted as 'the 
individual is political'. The personal being about all about 'me': what I like and don't like, what I 
do or don't do. The original meaning of the phrase is largely rooted in the radical feminist 
movement of the 1960s. This phrase expresses t4.at there is no distinction between public 
"political" realms and private "personal" realms; the personal is political because men are seen to 
"systematically dominate women in every area oflife" (Jagger, 1983, p. 101). This phrase has 
36 Because of the limited scope of this chapter I will not be discussing the different waves offeminism in detail. For 
a brief yet poignant overview please refer to Kinser (2004). It should also be noted that the use of 'waves' is also 
problematic, as it mostly limits feminism to the struggle of white, middle-class women and leaves out the 
struggles ofthe majority of other women in the world, as well as throughout history. For the purposes ofthesis, 
since I am trying to discuss particular assemblages of feminism most vivid in my understanding of the political I 
will place much focus on second wave feminism. I would argue that the idea of second wave feminism as I 
understand it (which is inaccurate and incomplete) is a powerful dark assemblage that has come together in my 
life, ordering the political. 
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been interpreted differently by different feminists., but in essence refers to how all relationships 
between men and women are seen as institutionalized relationships of power (Hanisch, 2009; 
Jagger, 1983). But when I hear this phrase, naturally as part of the "me generation" I easily 
interpret this as meaning that the political is all about me. Ironically, however, at first I did not 
understand the oppression of women to be about me. As I became more aware of the gender 
inequalities that exist, I tended to see this inequality as affecting other women, instead of myself. 
And so where the personal became political for me was in trying to help these other women: I 
donated to charitable causes focused on girls and women, and tried to shop more ethically since 
most cheap labour around the world is largely done by women. Vnfortunately, my reaction to this 
inequality was to tum to changing the way I consume instead of other actions. The inequalities 
between men and women from my view were largely economic and global and I couldn't see how 
these same inequalities were actually in my own life at a local and micro leveL And so these 
micro relations remained unchallenged as I tried to make donations and consume more fairly, 
which ironically was very expensive, especially when you're a student who doesn't have much 
money to begin with (which in itself could be situated within gender inequality). Here we can 
see how my entrenchment in individualism might influence me to appropriate feminism in a 
depoliticizing way. 
Further, this intensive individualism also encouraged me to be a rational feminist, in other 
words, to be alienated from myself and my immediate reality.- Challenging the ideas of gender 
inequalities is difficult. People (especially men) tend not to take you very seriously: you'll hear 
that people deserve what they get and that women do it to themselves. And when I'm not taken 
seriously - I get upset. And this is the worst. Because if I get upset I'm taken even less seriously. 
If I want to talk to a man about inequality I need to be calm and rational and I certainly cannot 
cry about it, as crying will undermine my whole argument. Challenging inequalities on a 
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personal level in my own life. seemed pointless; all it did was make me feel stupid and most of the 
time ended with me fiercely holding back tears. So I stopped doing it. Not really realizing that in 
trying to challenge the inequality of other women, I was experiencing my own inequality, which I 
dismissed. Instead I stuck to the things that made me feel good. No one's going to make me cry 
for trying to shop more ethically. 
Here we see a culmination of the closures of individuality and rationality attempting to 
organize the chaos and "hysteria" of feminism into a neat package of 'female empowerment'. And 
usually the easiest way for me attain this sort of empowerment when all else failed was to buy it 
through the 'correct' and 'ethical' consumer choices. Essentially,phis means being the good 
bourgeois citizen/consumer, and not causing any trouble or disturbances (stop your crying and go 
buy yourself something nice). 
Capital will always capture me 
So here I am again. Nothing but a docile zombie. NOaa! How the hell is it that I always end up 
here!? Why does capital always catch me - why do I let it? 
That's it. I've had enough of this. 
So I rejected commodity feminism - but ia a really extreme way. And here is where I got 
utterly lost. In order to reject commodity feminism, I felt I had to reject capitalism. Completely. I 
tried to go outside of capitalism - outside of myself. And where did I end up? Well, in the total 
subsumption of capital there is nowhere else to go. The only place to go is nowhere. So that's 
where I went. Straight into the black wlhole oflack. Yes, that's right. I did the impossible. 
The thing about doing the impossible ... well, it's not possible. So you end up doing 
nothing. Okay, this might once again be a bit of an exaggeration. I didn't actually do nothing all 
87 
the time. But it/elt like nothing all the time. And this is not the same kind of nothing that I was 
talking about in chapter two. Because even the things that I did do, I didn't really feel like doing 
them. Sometimes I didn't see the point in doing anything. This time of nothing was a closure, not 
an opening. And all the while I was desperately seeking a way out. But I just couldn't find it. I 
couldn't remember what I was looking for. I became a hamster in wheel; running, but always in 
the same spot. The pit of lack is deep. 
In this time I did, however, explore feminism in more depth; the history ofthe different 
types of feminisms and I searched for the feminisms of real people, now. I read books and blogs; 
and I began to see the world through the eyes of feminist critiqu~. In my pit of lack I began to 
-I 
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relate very deeply to feminism; I could see where inequality was playing out in my own life. 
What I didn't see was that I was colliding with only certain types of feminism: I was primarily 
coming across strands of liberal feminism, some forms of Marxist feminism, but mostly, radical 
feminism. 
Very briefly, liberal feminism refers to a feminism that aligns with capitalism in many 
ways. It is premised on equal liberty, or opportunity for ownership, for both men and women as 
individuals. In many ways liberal feminism proposes that women should have the same rights as 
men do. Amain focus for liberal feminism is the ~qual redistribution of wealth (Jagger, 1983). 
Marxist feminism extends class relations to theorize inequalities between the genders and 
posits that the institution of the family makes the women subservient to the man, since she must 
rely on him for economic security. Furthermore, the woman is seen to be alienated from public 
life as she often remains in the home. A main focus of Marxist feminism is not necessarily the 
equal redistribution of wealth, but rather to bring all women into the public realm of social 
production (Jagger, 1983). 
Radical feminism places the root of women's oppression within patriarchal society, in 
88 
which men dominate over women in every area oflife. Generally, most radical feminists see the 
institutions of male domination to form an almost impenetrable grid. "This gridis a male 
construction that enables men to control women's bodies and that traps women as forced mothers 
and as sexual slaves" (Jagger, 1983, p. 270). A main goal of radical feminism is for women to 
regain control of their bodies and to build a womanculture based on values of trust, nurturance 
and sensuality (Jagger, 1983). 
What the above types of feminism have in common, is their placement of men and women 
in opposition to each other. A dialectical formation that can easily result in a sense of lack, on 
either side of the opposition. This feminist lack only deepened tQ,e lack I was already 
experiencing. All this critique of patriarchy (and capital as they cannot really be separated) only 
made me try to step further outside of it. I hated it. I hated living in a world where everything 
seemed to be set up against me. I started to understand the personal as political more accurately; 
however, I found this to be a hopeless struggle with no solutions offered. The personal started to 
seem like my own political hell. 
Fucking men! 
Sometimes Ifucking hate them! why the hell does he get to win everything? why do i always have 
to be the more understanding one! why do i always have to be the bigger person and give in to 
what HE wants? why cant i be more powerful, why does he have to have all of it. and why do i 
give it to him? why doesnt he give it to me? Ifucking hate this world! how am i not supposed to 
feel lack when men are such pretentious fucking assholes- and then they just turn it around and 
blame everything on you. they dont take any responsibility for the fact that they are assholes. they 
just act like they're better than everyone. I don't know how to deal with this. no one ever teaches 
you how. they only ever teach you how to be a bitch back - no one ever teaches you how to be 
productive. i hate feeling this way. im so tired. im just so fucking tired. im tired of giving. im tired 
of this stupid lack. im so tired. the world will never get better. how am i supposed to be productive 
when im so angry. im so angry. fucking men!!! they always want everything their way. if they get 
their way its because theyre so mature and rational and if i ever want something my way- im just 
a selfish, immature bitch. 
fuck woman can't win. 
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only men can win. cuz even when a women wins then she's just considered a selfish bitch. she 
cant celebrate winning. men not only can win, but they can feel good about winning. they have no 
guilt. Because its like somehow they think they deserve to win. 
how can we both win? how can it be productive? i don Y know how to solve this problem. i dont 
know how to be productive. and i dont want to be god fucking damn it! ! 
The day I wrote the above was not a good day for me. I spent most of it crying and angry. Feeling 
this way was not an isolated incident for some time. I essentially found myself inhabiting what 
Spinoza calls the sad passions. 
By emotion I understand the affections of the body by which the body's power of acting is 
increased or diminished, helped or hindered, and at the s;rlne time the ideas of these 
affections. If, therefore, we can be the adequate cause of one of these affections, then I 
understand by the emotion an action; otherwise, I understand it to be a passion. (Spinoza, 
2000, III, Def. 3, p. 164) 
In other words, any emotion that makes you stop acting and renders you passive is a passion. 
It seems like all the critiques that feminism allowed me to make in my life were accurate. 
Yes, the world is indeed set up in an unequal manner. I was right to feel angry - this was a 
reasonable reaction to the inequality I am embedded in. However, where I lost it and became 
unreasonable was when I lost sight of the causes of things. 37 As discussed earlier, Spinoza (2000) 
argues that we confuse and don't understand the proper causes of things and attribute causes to 
inadequate ideas. These inadequate ideas often lead us into the sad passions. 
The cause of inequality within capitalism and patriarchy cannot be attributed to anyone 
individual, as inequality is the structure all bodies are embedded in and uphold, rather than any 
37 Note the use of the word 'unreasonable' here, not 'irrational'. One could have deemed me as irrational at the point 
where I expressed anger at inequality. The observance of inequality can be deemed as rational, but becomes 
undermined by my body expressing the emotion of anger. It makes me wonder if a female feminist can ever be 
rational, as that would entail separating her thoughts from the way her body is positioned in society; the rational 
female feminist would be alienated from her very self and hence although rational, unreasonable. 
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one body. My rage and hatred was aimed towards men in my life,as it is with them that I can 
often experience these unequal power relations. Spinoza (2000) explains this error I have made 
(with my observations bracketed within): 
From the mere fact that we imagine a thing [in my case, men in my life] to have 
something that is similar to an object which is accustomed to affect our mind with 
pleasure or pain [patriarchy], we shall love or hate the thing, even though that in respect 
of which it is similar to the object is not the efficient cause of these emotions. (III, Prop. 
16,p.177) 
So, a) I was solely blaming the men in my life for patriar¢ly and sexism and b) because 
all bodies are embedded and uphold patriarchy and sexism, I failed to see myself as complicit to 
this dark assemblage. 
I am sexist. 
When 1 feel lack because of a perceived sexist injustice ... 1 am sexist. And 1 don't mean some sort 
of 'reverse' sexism against men. 1 mean that 1 am sexist against myself. 1 look down on all women 
when 1 accept myself in that subordinate position. 
1 am reinforcing lack, and sexism. Through feminist critique 1 see men as the other, and by doing 
that 1 also other myself. Although feminism can reveal certain power relations in my life to me, 
like other political experiences in my life these insights often end up swept away under extremely 
negative feelings (anger, guilt, sadness, shame). _ 
It turns out that my 'feeling compass' is totally fucked up! !! My own feelings work to discipline 
and de politicize me. The other is always within me, putting me down. 1 am self and other. The 
other is myself. At times 1 am so alienated from true constituent desire and pleasure, that 1 don't 
even allow myself to experience it. Or 1 ignore my constitutive pleasure and instead engage in 
my consumptive pleasures as the idea of 'empowerment' is surrounded by these fake feel-good 
feelings that cover up its emptiness and placebo effect. Or my constituent desires are so intense 
that they frighten me and 1 hide from them, 1 try to avoid them. As if they are not going to catch 
up to me ... or more like 1 will eventually catch up to them, but it will be too late. 
The anger in my life is real and constituent, as it is based on my collision with other 
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bodies within the dark assemblage of patriarchy. What gets confusing though is although you 
must deal with things at a micro level of relationship you must still keep the macro relations in 
mind that came to structure the very micro relations you are part of. Being angry at individuals 
who are deemed as male is not productive - being angry at male as a category is fine - as long as 
this anger is not aimed at a body that is inscribed as male. 
I would like to propose to look at the category of male (not the actual male body) as the 
majoritarian. The majoritarian refers to a category of being that holds a state of majority: adult, 
male, white, bourgeois, etc. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) describe the concept of the majoritarian: 
" ... we are referring not to a greater relative quantity but to the d~ermination of a state or standard 
in relation to which larger quantities, as well as the smallest can be said to be minoritarian: white-
man, adult-male, etc." (p. 291). Elsewhere, they add, "Majority assumes a state of power and 
domination, not the other way around ... For the majority, insofar as it is analytically included in 
the abstract standard, is never anybody, it is always Nobody (1987, p. 105). 
The majoritarian only exists as an abstract concept, it is not an actual person. The concept 
of the maj oritarian itself indeed affects and can structure our realities, but the beauty of a concept 
is that in can be challenged. Ifwe challenge the concept of the majoritarian in our own lives, 
eventually the structures may too change, little by little in small pieces. This we can apply not 
only to the male majoritarian, but to the adult majoritarian as well, with emerging adulthood 
challenging this state with its very existence. 
I have found that engaging with binarized forms of feminism, particularly radical 
feminism, can create a deep closure for me. The opposition to patriarchy seems to only be 
possible within this same patriarchal framework. Further; this opposition can easily be interpreted 
as an opposition towards men themselves and was not productive for me. This sort ofbinarized 
opposition only led to passive anger which depoliticized me. However, anger should not be 
dismissed nor should inequality. They need only be looked at from a more productive and 
immanent lens, one of partial relations. Feminism does have openings, and brings much insight 
into my life when I view it through partial relations. Even commodity feminism may have 
something to add in a partial way. 
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Anger I would argue can also take an active form. Anger is a good indicator that our 
desires are not being enacted (as are other sad passions). But in order for this anger to be active 
and productive, it needs to be based on desire and love. Spinoza (2000) says there are many 
different configurations of emotions; only those which are related to joy (pleasure) or desire are 
active (Prop. 59, p. 211). And so anger based on desire and love ,has the potential to create a 
productive feminist force. In other words, in order for feminism to retain its political openness 
feminism needs to be based on the desire of women in and of themselves. Not compared to men. 
Or really not compared to anyone, but rather seen to be in conjunction with all others, as an 
assemblage. Such views are found in many contemporary and socialist feminisms (Jagger, 1983). 
Skott-Myhre (2009) and Kinser (2004) both point to keeping one foot in feminist critiques based 
on dialectics and one foot out; standing somewhere in the middle. A feminism in which we see 
that "women are both subject to power as a form of dominance but also transmit power as they 
produce their lives in ways that escape domination's full effect" (Skott-Myhre, 2009, p. 6). 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) speak of such an assemblage when they introduce the 
concept of the becoming-woman. The becoming-woman is a subset of the becoming-
minoritarian. The minoritarian here is the counterpart of the majoritarian, not in quantity as 
described above, but in that in that it is the becoming of everybody; the minoritarian is not the 
abstract, 'Nobody', but rather the lived and concrete everylbody. In essence the majoritarian is 
related to the closure of the constituted force, while the minoritarian is itself the constituent 
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force38. The becoming-woman is a set of movements that explode the crisis of the constituent 
from within, from the middle. 
There is no becoming-majoritarian; majority is never becoming. All becoming is 
minoritarian. Women, regardless of their numbers, are a minority, definable as a state or 
subset; but they create only by making possible a becoming over which they do not have 
ownership into which they themselves must enter; this is a becoming-woman affecting all 
of humankind, men and women both (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 106) 
The type of feminism seen in the zombie movie, Fido (Currie, 2006), may be on the right 
track to merging with the becoming-woman, especially when compared to the feminism found in 
Zombie Strippers (Lee, 2008). In Zombie Strippers what we see in the transformation of the 
strippers into zombie strippers is the impossible becoming of the majoritarian. The women in 
their new found individual power negate themselves as they fail to create a zombie horde. The 
individualistic and competitive spirit of the zombie strippers is based on lack (in themselves and 
each other) and leads them to destroy each other and themselves, a total annihilation. In contrast, 
in Fido we see the main female character form an interesting assemblage with the male characters 
by the end of the film. 
In short, Fido is a humorous zombie-meet~-Lassie film. Set somewhere around the 1950s 
in a nuclear family centred suburbia, the film reveals that radiation from space caused the dead to 
come back to life and that humanity fought in the "Zombie wars". Humanity prevailed; however, 
the radiation still turns those who die into zombies. As a result, the corporation Zorn Com has 
created a security system to keep the zombies at check. This is done in two primary ways: 
38 We might be able to compare the majoritarian and minoritarian to the bourgeois and proletariat. As Marx (1978) 
explains, the bourgeois and proletariat form a sort of whole, as do the the majoritarian and minoritarian. 
However, the majoritarian and minoritarian go beyond class inequalties, and rather represent all forms of 
inequality: gender, race, age, sexuality, etc. 
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securing cities with high voltage fences and through the use of electric collars which subdue the 
zombies' urge to eat flesh. With the collars in place, the zombies are harmless and used as 
people's servants, as well as in the place of other low-skill labourers. 
The film centres around the Robinson family. Helen is married to Bill Robinson, who is 
zombie-phobic after being traumatized in the zombie wars39. When the new chief of security at 
ZomCom moves in across the street Helen buys a zombie, against Bill's wishes, in order to keep 
up with appearances as they are the only ones on the street who don't own a zombie. The 
Robinsons' son, Timmy, befriends the zombie and calls him Fido, beginning the boy-zombie 
relationship based off of the Lassie inspired boy-dog relationship: At one point, Fido's collar 
malfunctions and he ends up eating the neighbour; he does not, however, hurt Timmy, or as seen 
later in the movie, Timmy's mother, Helen. Drama unfolds in the movie, and at the end Bill ends 
up dying and is decapitated and buried according to his wishes. Helen, as we see throughout the 
movie forms a relationship with Fido. Helen's romantic relationship with Fido might be seen as 
becoming-woman that is based on men and women transforming together. Throughout the movie 
we often see Helen taking advantage of her position as a woman to enact her desires. She 
subverts what one might deem as her exploitation as a woman into her power, using it to rise up 
as minoritarian. In particular we see her turning tQ. Fido, when her husband ignores her. And here 
we see a particular transformation come from the man as well, a departure from his state of 
majoritarian as Fido's zombification here might be seen as the man taking part in becoming-
woman, both man and women meeting in the middle of gendered power relations. 
The feminist undertone in Fido is a step in the right direction towards becoming, but is 
39 As a side note, Bill also takes no interest in his wife or family in the present moment. It is obvious that she is 
pregnant and he fails to notice this. Bill, in his extreme zombie-phobia, is only concerned with saving money for 
his family members' future funerals - as one can choose to be decapitated and buried instead of being a zombie 
after their death. 
still somewhat incomplete. Becoming-minoritarian goes beyond simply gender relations, 
challenging all other majoritiarian states. Fido would have come closer to the becoming-
minoritarian if it had interrogated other majoritarian lines of identity, especially race, as the 
movie is quintessentially a story about white suburbia. 
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8. The Zombie Child 
From Majoritarian to Becoming-minoritarian 
Out of all the chapters I had planned for this thesis, this is the one that remained virtually 
empty for the longest amount of time. I had created notes for chapters nine and ten long before I 
had put any real notes in for this chapter. This hesitation is significant, as I will soon explain. 
A common feature in zombie movies is the zombie child. Many zombie movies face us 
with this problem; just to name a few: Dawn of the Dead (both Snyder, 2004 and Romero, 1978), 
Fido (Currie, 2006), Survival of the Dead (Romero, 2009) and the original, Night of the Living 
Dead (Romero, 1968). The little girl in the cellar who has been hurt in the Night of the Living 
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Dead is a crucial climax in what is often deemed as the first "official" zombie horror. As all hell 
starts to break loose the little girl turns into a zombie and then proceeds to kill her parents and 
then devour them. 
The little girl in Night of the Living Dead is not only feminized, but I would argue 
racialized as well. The little girl herself is white, but her transformation into one of 'those things' 
renders her as the zombie other4o• The racialization of the zombie other becomes more apparent 
when we recall the history of the zombie and the colonial fears it embodies in the Haitian voodoo 
tradition. 
-Within the zombie apocalypse the zombie child is the epitome of horror. This horror can 
be seen to arise from the juxtaposition of her absolute innocence with a monstrous force of 
destruction; the mutation of the constituent. The zombie child can be likened to the epitome of 
horror within the total subsumption of capital: the child of poverty, especially the child of 
40 The juxtaposition of the zombie other with the racialized other is apparent in Night of the Living Dead, as well as 
some of Romero's other films, and can certainly be applied to the racialized other in general, not just the child. In 
Night of the Living Dead, the final scenes reflect a haunting realism: Ben, the protagonist, a black man, survives 
the whole ordeal only to be shot in the end by the (what could be called white and 'redneck') rescue team as he is 
mistaken for a zombie. The end credits role as we see a pile of bodies, with Ben's being thrown in, and then set 
on fire. The prominence of the black man in the pile of bodies being burned can easily be viewed as not a scene 
from some imaginary zombie apocalypse, but rather a not so distant memory of racialized massacres. 
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absolute poverty. The child of absolute poverty is obviously implicated within class relations but 
is also feminized and above all, racialized. 
It is because of the latter that I have hesitated in writing this chapter. The fact is, I have 
been scared to death to write this chapter. In Canada, to even talk about race is the equivalent of 
being racist. Race does not exist in Canada, we are 'multicultural' and 'colourblind'. Race situates 
itself as yet another closure of the political in my life, a closure so intensive that it is difficult for 
me to even face it. For this reason I fear that out of all my chapters, this will be my most 
inadequate one. I am quite certain that I will not be able to penetrate this issue to the depth that it 
deserves. But I am also certain that you have to start somewhereI' So I will start here. 
It has become clear to me now, that I am racist. Race and racism certainly exist in Canada, 
but multiculturalism muddles this up, like a small child mixing all her paints together to create 
something that really isn't a colour at all. The child then gets praised for this beautiful piece of 
artwork that doesn't really resemble anything. This is Canada. And figuratively speaking the 
colour that Canada has mixed together is 'white'. This is the colour that I live in - or more 
correctly, the lack of colour that I live in. I cannot help but white-wash everything, even when I 
think that I am doing the opposite. 
A prime example of this is the child that I sponsor. A few years ago, after a lifetime of 
watching sponsorship ads on television I finally decided to sponsor a child. I picked a little, six 
year old girl from Kenya. How typical of my racist self. I picked as young, dark, and poor as I 
could. I picked the epitome of lack. What this epitome of lack covers up, however, is the epitome 
of my white privilege and condescension. 
Duped again 
What really scares me is how might sponsorship be yet another form of colonization? White 
people going in trying to make things 'better' even though our lifestyles perpetuate the inequality 
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that creates the "problems" we are trying to solve. How much of sponsoring a child is really 
about making someone's life better, and how much ofit is about making myselffeel better? Am I 
just trying to be the hero in the zombie rnovie? Oh, great. I'm back here again. I'm yet again 
trying to be the 'good bourgeois citizen'. 
I haven't really engaged with my sponsor child for a long time now. Some of this is for practical 
reasons: I seriously don't know what to say to her. .. or whoever. .. I've never really received a 
letter from her, but instead her mother or her uncle; which has made it difficult to establish a 
coherent sense of rapport. Who am I writing to anyways? But I have also been ignoring this issue 
for months now, because it's filled me with guilt and shame. I feel so dumb for letting myself be 
duped. The anger that I feel towards the injustices of something like residential schooling in 
Canada becomes flipped back upon me. Am I any different from those who tried to "civilize" 
young Aboriginal children? How can I really know that the organization I'm giving money to is 
making positive change, or are they just perpetuating lack? Am I perpetuating lack? As they say, 
the road to hell is always paved with good intentions. 
" Child sponsorship, in a way, can be viewed as a solution to the problem of social-
economic inequality that is to be consumed. Every month my bank account tells me, "your work 
here is done". In this way my own poverty is hidden from me. My own poverty in fact being my 
privilege. My white privilege creates a closure of the political for me, as this privilege is based on 
someone else lacking, which creates a lack in myself. 
Accepting a state of lack is a very selfish thing, and a very condescending thing when you 
really examine it. Even if you're feeling guilt and shame, which is what I've really been feeling 
for a while: guilt that I have so much and that other people don't. Basically, that my life is better 
than others'. 
Just that statement says a lot. My life is better than others'. It might be coming from a 
place of guilt and shame, but it still implicates the other as worse than me. It still places me above 
someone. You cannot have guilt without implicating the other in a negative and condescending 
way, and hence implicating yourself. "Humility41 is not virtue, or, it does not arise from reason" 
41 I use Spinoza's proposition on humility here to discuss guilt, as I believe that based on his definition given 
(coming up shortly in the text) this might be an appropriate interpretation. Where Spinoza's work is notoriously 
deemed as full of confusion, is in his awkward use of terminology which often contradicts contemporary 
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(Spinoza, 2000, IV, Prop. 53, p. 265). In the demonstration that follows the aforementioned 
proposition, Spinoza explains that 
humility is a pain which arises from the fact that a man contemplates his lack of power. 
[ ... ] Therefore, if a man, whilst he contemplates himself, this is not a virtue of the fact that 
he understands himself, but it is by virtue of the fact that his power of acting is hindered. 
White privilege creates another closure of the political for me. My privilege allows me to 
other someone which in fact means othering myself in the process. By othering myself into being 
white, I erase myself by accepting the state of the majoritarian. Because the majoritarian is 
premised on the lack of the other, I cannot help but implicate my,$elf in this lack. 
On the one hand, by being majoritarian I alienate myself from reality. Because this is an 
abstract positioning, the intensive rationality of subsumption alienates me from my body and 
immediate surroundings. The positioning of rna jori tar ian makes it appear that 'my work is done' 
and allows me to ignore all the things that I could be doing in my day to day life that might 
challenge racism. I am not sure what these things might be, but this in fact only points out my 
alienation because if I did know what these things were it would point to the awareness of the 
micropolitics of my life when it comes to race. 
On the other hand, because the majoritari£!-!l is Nobody, I cannot actually be the 
majoritarian. Being white is not just about having a certain skin colour. In fact if you trace the 
history many ethnicities that are deemed as "white" today one will find that many have not 
always been deemed so (Kivel, 2002; Skott-Myhre; 2008). White is more than a skin color it is a 
status, a certain type of dark assemblage that we all work to construct. In other words to view 
whiteness as an individual characteristic, such as skin colour, hides a history of struggle. In fact it 
definitions we now adhere to. Because here Spinoza explains humility in terms of pain, I feel guilt could be a 
reasonable comparison. I will address humility as a positive attribute, one based on an appreciate of one's 
knowledge and its limits, later in the chapter when I discuss pride, qualities of a 'free man, and humbling myself. 
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can hide my own struggles. 
Growing up in an Polish immigrant home, the status of white has never fit so neatly. Yes, 
we have white skin, but other characteristics 'give us away': accents, mannerisms, preferences. 
This is not to say that my own struggles are equal to or even comparable to those of people of 
colour, but they do exist and my own whiteness can cover them up at times. My point here is that 
the multitude cannot benefit from racism - I undoubtedly benefit in some ways, but overall my 
racism disadvantages not only others but myself as well. If I place myself within the assemblage 
of the multitude and strip away the illusion of individualism, it becomes clear that although there 
may be immediate and concrete benefits to racism the end result,£an only be more alienation and 
a decrease in capacities. Alternatively, the benefits to struggling as part of the multitude may be 
the expansion of capacities that is possibly eternal. 
But what do I do now? This question is not easy to answer. I don't feel that changing my 
lifestyle will fix anything or change anything. But it is here where maybe I am wrong again ... 
forgetting partial relations again. Maybe the changes in my lifestyle do make a difference. And 
maybe the key to avoiding guilt here, or any condescension is acknowledging that I am only 
doing a small part. I cannot change everything. But I can change something. And by changing 
something, maybe I allow others to change somet~ing too - and together maybe our small 
changes create a force of change? Feeling guilty and not doing anything doesn't accomplish 
anything. I just have to do something and move on, and hope I do enough somethings to add up, 
with my own, as well as other people's somethings into something much bigger beyond my/our 
perception. I need to accept that I will never be a hero. 
Why do I want to be a hero? 
Ever since I was a little kid I always wanted to be a hero. I wanted to be good. And not just kind 
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of good - I wantled to be the epitome of good. I want to be the good person. I want to prove that 
I'm better than everyone (who is 'everyone'?) thinks that I am; I want to prove my moral and 
rational superiority. The problem with being good is that it is predicated on there being a bad, an 
epitome of bad. Can I be good without my sponsor child being 'bad'? 
The hero is in fact, the "good bourgeois citizen". The hero is the colonizer; the hero is the one 
who knows what's right; the hero makes the judgements; the hero is better than everyone else, 
including those she is trying to save. 
The hero is the exaltation of individual empowerment. The hero is not seen to be part of 
an assemblage, s/he is outside the assemblage. The hero gets all the credit for all the force of the 
multitude instead of being seen as part of the multitude. The hero is transcendent not immanent. 
The hero sees herself as the sole cause of good, as opposed to a}J'artial cause. Spinoza (2000) 
calls this the passion of pride. "Pride is to be defined as the pleasure that arises from a false 
opinion whereby a man thinks he is above all others" (IV, Prop. 57, Sch., p. 267). The greatest of 
pride is seen to be as the greatest ignorance of oneself, and hence the greatest impotence of mind 
(Spinoza, 2000, IV, Props. 55 and 56). It is the depoliticization of the multitude. 
In Zombieland (Fleischer, 2009), one of Columbus Ohio's rules for survival is "Don't be a 
hero". I always giggle at the presentation of this rule in the movie. Columbus would really like to 
impress a girl, but instead lets Tallahassee face the upcoming zombie as he tells us about the 
aforementioned rule. This is funny because the un..dedying assumption behind the joke is that you 
should be a hero; you are a coward if you're not. Columbus, however, is a scrawny guy who has 
many phobias, whereas Tallahassee is a bigger, macho man: "he was in the ass kicking business, 
and business is good" (Fleischer, 2009). Columbus' rule in this scenario shows that he is not 
ignorant of himself and of his relation to Tallahassee; he understands that Tallahassee is far more 
capable in facing the zombie and hence keeping everyone alive. For Columbus to be a hero in 
this situation can be seen as unreasonable, as it could just result in his death. Here we can see 
how the 'hero' is a figure that tries to transcend the multitude, and is thus unreasonable. Spinoza 
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tells us that "the virtue of a free man" in other words, one led by reason, " is seen to be equally 
great in avoiding as in overcoming dangers" (IV, Prop. 69, p. 277). Based on this we can see that 
in this way Columbus harbours qualities of a "free man". Throughout the movie, Columbus does 
not always back down. He is not a coward as he does fight when the situation warrants it, 
showing that "in a free man, therefore, timely flight is held to show as much courage as is 
fighting; or, a free man chooses flight with the same courage, i.e., presence of mind, as he 
chooses battle42" (Spinoza, 2000, IV, Prop. 69, Cor., p. 277). 
The 'hero' is really just the death ofthe constituent in disguise. 
And so maybe by giving up on the idea of being a hero, i,S' how I might become part of 
something much bigger than a hero. Recognizing that perhaps I will never see the change that I 
am a part of, and humbling myself enough to accept I will never know the outcome may create an 
opening in the political. This opening brings me back into the multitude. 
I am part of an assemblage. And I am part of many dark assemblages. When I am part of 
an assemblage, I have some power within it. What are things I can do to make sure that the 
assemblages I'm part of are interrupted? How can I playa part in making sure these assemblages 
get reorganized in more productive ways? I do not know the answers to these questions. But I 
know these are the questions I should be asking it I want to be part of the multitude. 
Maybe sponsoring a child doesn't mean that much. But that small part of my life with all 
the other small parts of my life may be making a difference. I was mad at myself for sponsoring a 
child, because it seemed like putting money towards something like this doesn't challenge 
capitalism, but perhaps enforces it and perhaps enforces colonialism. And maybe it does to some 
42 In this sense, we might posit Tallahassee as a hero and as reasonable in the previous scenario discussed. However, 
I would argue that in the way that I am using the term hero (as one who transcends the multitude) Tallahassee 
would not warrant this title as his actions are not idolized, but rather are an expansion of his and the whole 
group's capacities. 
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degree, and it certainly would ifthat's as far as I went. If that's where I stopped. But I don't stop 
there. I challenge capital with so many parts of my being. 
Undoubtedly, many of my reasons for child sponsorship came from problematic places. 
But there is some hope in sponsorship, as there is a reason that I sponsored a child that came 
from a place of abundance and desire. I sponsored a child as a student. I didn't have much money 
- in fact I myself could be considered to be living beneath the poverty line in Canada. I had 
always wanted to sponsor a child but did not feel that I could. And even as a student I felt that 
couldn't. I kept telling myself, "One day when I have more money I'll sponsor a child". Until one 
day it dawned on me: actually, I can sponsor a child now. I don'Vleed to wait until I "have more 
money" (M-C-M"). I have money now. Not a lot of money. But I can certainly sponsor a child. 
One of the reasons I sponsored a child was because I wanted to and felt I could. Where 
this might be viewed as a sacrifice because I didn't have much money, I never felt it that way nor 
do I now. I never miss that money. I never think to myself, I wish I didn't sponsor that child so I 
could have all that money. I say this not to depict myself as some sort of 'good person' or hero, 
but as an indicator of the abundance we possess. The problems of inequality in the world do not 
exist because we do not have enough for everyone. These problems exist because a few of us 
have far too much, and are not sharing. If I am sO!peone who does not have very much, but still 
has enough to spare, think of how much many others have to spare. There is no lack, we only 
perceive that there is. 
My very desire to give challenges capital, and indirectly racism. I challenge capital by 
refusing to speak in certain ways. And I challenge capital by taking a stand against racism, as 
insufficient as that stand may be: I don't always keep my mouth shut when I hear racist 
comments; I refute emails that spread racist propaganda, and when someone says Canada is such 
a great country I tell them about residential schooling. And doing these things certainly never 
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make me feel like a hero. Things get awkward. Sometimes there's crying, sometimes there's anger 
and screaming; tantrums. If anything; these things make me feel like a monster. 
I become the zombie child. 
This becoming implies "two simultaneous movements, one by which a term (the subject) 
is withdrawn from the majority, and another by which a term (the medium or agent) rises up from 
the minority" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 291). When I become the zombie child'!' suddenly 
becomes 'we'. I withdraw from the white-majoritarian and rise up from zombie-minoritarian. 
Seemingly raising from the dead, together we become the zombie child. 
In fact, becoming the zombie child may encompass mor~A:han just two simultaneous 
movements. The becoming zombie child may be the becoming of everybody, the universal 
becoming-minoritarian, as the zombie child implicates race, gender, as well as age. Making these 
movements encompass infinities within infinities. In fact, we might see emerging adulthood as a 
a central space for these infinities to be encompassed. 
Becoming-minoritarian does not transcend, but instead transforms the majoritarian, just as 
emerging adulthood transforms adulthood into something new and different. It's not about 
eluding the majoritarian, but instead about eluding "the death sentence it envelopes, how to 
develop its power of escape, how to prevent escae,e from veering into the imaginary or falling 
into a black hole, how to maintain or draw out the revolutionary potential" of the majoritarian 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p.llO). 
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9. The Escape 
There comes a point in most zombi~ movies, that no matter how good the quarantine, the 
characters eventually always want to leave. This is especially exemplified in Romero's (1978) 
and Snyder's (2004) Dawn of the Dead. What's interesting is that in both versions of Dawn of the 
Dead, we see the ideal quarantine. The characters take refuge in a mall and barricade themselves 
in order to keep the zombies out. In both movies the mall is enormous and stocked with 
everything they would need to survive for a very long time, considering there is only a few of 
them staying there. Moreover, the mall doesn't just cater to the characters' basic needs, but most 
other material wants. Despite this the characters desperately wa~ to leave. 
Here we see, as argued by Negri and Hardt (2004), Skott-Myhre (2008) and others, that 
the constituent always comes before not after the oppressive power of the constituted. The desire 
to leave the mall is a constituent one not born out of lack, but out of the sheer force of 
counterpower. The constituent is already moving instead towards a different opening within time 
and space to express itself without the quarantine really creating a closure first (Negri, 1999). 
The desire for life and freedom in the quarantine creates cooperation no matter how much the 
people dislike each other. They desire something more, they refuse to lack - and several 
simultaneous movements begin. 
This thesis began with me trying to understand the political in my life. According to my 
understanding at the beginning ofthis project, I thought that I was apathetic and disengaged. 
This narrow understanding was my quarantine. Apathy was part of my escape. However, this 
perceived apathy was always there. I came into this project not knowing that I had already 
escaped. We desire the escape before we even perceive it; this thesis itself has always been a 
movement of counterpower. What seemed like barriers to my understanding of the political, were 
also the actual springboards of the political; the constituent. When I look back to the beginning of 
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thesis, I can see that I did it all wrong - but this was actually the key to my escape. It's almost as 
if the escape had been planned all along even when I was wrong: I created the very quarantine 
from which I would escape. I will attempt to retrace this journey of escape for you now. 
In the first chapter, I addressed my desires for a political subjectivity, but found that these 
desires were based on a constituted form of power: I desired an adult bourgeois citizenship, 
which did not seem attainable to me. I was clearly aware that there was a problem with such a 
conceptualization of the political and in chapter two, I located this problem within the crisis of 
power: the conflation between the constituent and constituted force. If the constituent and 
constituted are conflated, how do you tell them apart? At this po~nt, it seems that in my confusion I 
" 
here I gave up my desire for the constituted, as I questioned the legitimacy of adulthood 
citizenship, and I accepted myself as a zombie. Essentially, I rejected the constituted and 
embraced the constituent. I embraced my zombie self and escaped into the constituent. 
However, within the total subsumption of capital the escape is not that easy. As was 
discussed, because of the intensity of the opposition that the constituent and constituted are 
assembled in within capital, coupled with the infinite deferral ofthe constitutive, capitalism is 
fraught with explosive violence and mutations. We are brought back to Deleuze and Guattari's 
problem of how to accomplish an escape without death, or mutation. 
In many zombie movies we see escapes faiL In Dawn of the Dead (Snyder, 2004) several 
characters die during the escape. Despite much planning, the sheer number of zombies 
overwhelms the group as they try to escape the mall. Characters die while trying to fight zombies 
but instead kill themselves and each other: a man loses control of a chainsaw and kills several of 
his allies; while yet another gets bitten and stays behind so as to not infect the rest of the group. 
Despite high amounts of cooperation escapes faiL Eventually, my own escape failed, and I found 
myself in a black hole of nothing. Death. 
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In this thesis I experienced two different, but interrelated escapes. I referred to them as 
. . 
'doing nothing'. The first 'doing nothing' did not start out as death, it was a flight into the 
constituent. It is this escape, however, that led to my death in the second escape of 'doing 
nothing'. In the total subsumption, the mutations of capital affect the constituent as much as they 
do the constituted. 
Viewed on its own, the constituent can become a pervasive force of lack, because in the 
total subsumption it is incomplete without the constituted. I had separated the constituent and 
constituted. That being said, I cannot see how I could have explored this crisis in any other way. 
If the constituent and constituted are conflated, how can you learn and understand the difference 
between the two without, at least temporarily, separating them? Nonetheless, with this separation 
I, in essence, set the stage for my own alienation from my immediate reality. 
The manifestations of this alienation are revealed as I continually place myself into 
positions of lack: I place myself into a position of apathy; as a zombie; as uninformed; within 
arrested adulthood; as inferior to men; as not making a difference, and on the other extreme, as 
being better than others, among other such binarized positions. 
We can see the culmination of this alienation in chapter seven, in my second attempt at 
escape. If I already escaped the constituted, where does an escape from the constituent lead? Or 
put in another way, what happens to a zombie that has nothing left to eat? In my case, I think I 
started to consume myself; I began erasing myself. The constituent left to its own devises will 
mutate into a constituted force, an infinite closure of its own. My second attempt at escape 
literally brought me into the center of the crisis within the total subsumption. An identity crisis. I 
found my self in an anomic void: nothing seemed possible. 
My identity was already on shaky ground at the start ofthis thesis. As I embraced my 
constituent zombie self I had already began searching for an identity, but nothing seemed to fit 
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quite right. This brought me to my fIrst 'doing nothing' and this was satisfying for a while, as I 
followed my immediate desires. But then this started to unravel into a different sort of identity 
crisis, one based on lack as I continuously examined and de constructed myself for the purposes· 
of this thesis. 
I wanted a brand new identity. But I couldn't buy that identity, consumption wasn't 
enough, I could see through it, and yet I didn't really know what else to do without buying it. 
How can you have a new identity without new stuff? But ironically, I didn't really want anything 
either. It's not like I had this image of this shiny, brand new identity in my mind. I had nothing. 
But you can't live without consuming to some degree. It's not possible, so I got lost. I just gave 
up, and stopped caring. Since its impossible to not consume at all I, I just stopped being 
conscious of what I bought. To be fair, I didn't go on some sort of shopping spree instead either. 
But I also rejected what I had come to know as my identity, because I looked at myself and all I 
saw was shallowness - even the good things about my identity, I saw how even noble things were 
linked to consumption, and felt like they were pointless. I didn't want what I already had, and I 
really couldn't think of anything new I wanted either. I was just in this floaty desire-less place. 
Life still went on, I didn't let upon my life responsibilities. But I just felt empty a lot of the time. 
I didn't see the point in life. Or my work. I slept a}ot. I had this vague memory of being really 
passionate and excited about life... but I just couldn't remember where that passion came from. 
My only desire was to get that feeling back, but I didn't know how; I couldn't remember 
what I did before that was different. Before just a walk on a sunny day made me happy. Now, the 
sun seemed meaningless. I became a bit of a shut-in. I didn't feel like being with people, and 
working on this thesis got very stressful. I felt like I had so much work to do on it; and that I 
never had enough time to do it. There was always still so much writing to do. And this became a 
good excuse to avoid other people. I didn't visit my family at home very much and overall I 
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avoided outings by saying I needed to work. This was true, although I can't say I really 
accomplished much in this time. I mostly read, as I found it almost impossible to write from such 
an empty place. 
There were a few people close to me that I did spend some time with and confided in. 
Both men and women close to me in my life tried to reason with me, but it just didn't work. I 
could always find a counterpoint to bring myself back into lack. I was whiny, angry, and started 
lots of pointless arguments. 
Although reasoning didn't quite work at first, I'm not one to quickly dismiss the words of 
people I love and respect. Many of my loved ones' words stuck with me. I was also aware that 
something was just not right with me. A memory of my joyful self lingered and I had to find a 
sense of self again. I was quite aware that I had erased my sense of self, de constructed to a point 
of oblivion and I knew I had to reconstruct a new self, but I still didn't know where to start, 
nothing really interested me. 
Somewhere along the line, I started reaching out to other people in my life and as I 
opened up and began living life again: I stopped being a shut-in, I went out, I tried really hard to 
be happy - some of this was fake, but just the act of it opened me up to some new, and 
desperately needed collisions. I also sought out sQme support from others who had been through 
the process of auto ethnography. In a few weeks certain things started to come together in my 
mind, words and interactions with people as well as a few poignant pieces of literature helped me 
see my mistake, and the inadequacies of my understandings. Simone Bignall's (2010) article, 
"Desire, apathy and activism", was especially helpful in combination with the other collisions in 
my life. 
In Bignall, I came across the concept of "partial relations". I have discussed this concept 
previously in this thesis, and it was quite pivotal in my overall understandings. Although before 
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reading Bignall I had a sense of partial relations in terms of the way assemblages worked - it 
wasn't until I read Bignall's article and she phrased it in this particular way that it clicked with 
me. Suddenly, I could see where I went wrong. It seemed so simple and obvious. I was thinking 
in entire entities instead of partial relations. I was thinking about myself as a whole and closed 
'self' instead of a complex self. I lost sight of an infinite self. 
Escape gone wrong 
I've been throwing EVERYTHING away. Everything that had something wrong with it I threw it 
away. Every part of my self that had something wrong with it - I threw it away. I deconstructed 
and threw it all away. And I was trying to create a new more pro.Juctive identity out of something 
new- something outside myself No wonder I felt like shit. I was irying to do something 
impossible. 
It s not about throwing everything away. I forgot that I need to scavenge through the old stuff, 
and use some of it to create new stuff. I am my starting point. I need to take old pieces of me to 
create a new me. Not all the pieces. But pieces of the pieces. 
Just like the zombie apocalypse creates barriers for people and their freedom, so too does the 
crisis of power within total subsumption of capital. In both cases, these closures themselves, 
however, are part of the openings. This was my greatest misunderstanding of the political. I did 
not understand that the openings and closures together form an adequate understanding of the 
political. I finally understand what Negri meant when he said that the political has been 
inadequately theorized. When closely examining how my thesis has developed, it is clear that my 
focus was on finding the openings, following the constituent. I misunderstood the inadequacy of 
the political as being solely its conflation and confusion with the constituted force. This is 
certainly part of the inadequacy, but it is not the whole picture. From this understanding, it 
appeared to me that the an adequate understanding of the political was to see it as the constituent 
force. 
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But it turns out that what I was looking for was more than just the political. And true to 
the way that desire functions it is only now that I found it that I realize what I was looking for. 
All along I was looking for the political and the social, together. I was searching for a political 
subjectivity that could not lack, a sUbjectivity that could be abundant in every moment, everyone, 
and every part of myself. A subjectivity that was not limited by majoritarian states I could never 
attain without negating myself: male, bourgeious, white, and adult. It was not the political that I 
was looking for, but the multitude, with my own complex self is at the centre of this infinite 
assemblage that is always following the never-ending flow of desire. Ironically, I was searching 
for something that was there all along. ( 
But without my escape going wrong I wouldn't be where I am now. I wouldn't be able to 
write what I am writing. It took losing my identity to find it. Sometimes the escape is the zombie 
and death is not always the end. 
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10. Happily Never After 
In the typical zombie movie there is nev~r a happy ending. Some end in complete despair 
(e.g., Dawn a/Dead; Snyder, 2004), where it is insinuated that we have reached the end of 
humanity. Others may have a glimmer of hope, but there is always a struggle that accompanies 
this hope. The search for safety continues, as characters continue to search for places with more 
humans, or just a place with no zombies. Or ifthe zombies have been destroyed, there's always 
the one that got away. Most zombie movies end in a state of disutopia, with no definitive ending. 
In many ways the endings can be seen as beginnings, to a new cumbersome beginning of 
humanity, or merely the beginning to another movie sequel... ( 
And so it seems with this thesis. At the end I feel like I have come back to the beginning, 
but this is a new beginning. In the previous chapter I discussed the unravelling of my identity; my 
identity crisis. And yet I did so without ever telling you what my identity was in the first place; 
what exactly was it that unravelled? 
This is because it seems that it took losing my identity to find it, so to speak. When I 
realized my mistake of throwing everything away, I suddenly began to view my identity in terms 
of partial relations and saw things from a new perspective. I saw that the idea I had of myself 
before (my previous perceived identity as an indiyidual self) was no longer adequate, but I also 
saw how pieces of that identity were based on infinite desire. I suddenly saw myself as pieces, a 
collage, an assemblage, changing and shifting. There was something coherent about these pieces 
and yet simultaneously completely incoherent - I myself am put together through infinite 
closings and openings. I saw myself as a complex self made up of more than just me; I (we) am 
(are) literally infinite. I am infinite through history in so many ways: parts of me come from my 
ancestors, from my family, my class background, the actual environments that I have lived and 
live in, and these parts of me will expand into the infinity of the future as they continue to collide 
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and express themselves in mutual collisions of joy. 
My individual self as a whole was inadequate; however, pieces of that self could create an 
infinite and complex self. But since I had thrown everything out, I realized that I needed to search 
for all those pieces I was previously made up of so that I could construct a new and complex self 
in order to become more aware of my current desires. This new awareness of an infinite identity 
suddenly brought me back to life. This awareness suddenly sparked a desire in me to understand, 
rather than know, where I had come from. 
Before I had started writing this thesis, I did indeed have a sense of myself. But this self 
was organized into generic, rigid categories: I come from a Pol~S'h, immigrant working class 
family; I live in small somewhat impoverished city, I have a strong Christian background, I'm 
female and heterosexual, I'm white, etc. 
There's more and more things that I could have written about how I 'knew' who I was, but 
these were just descriptors, over-generalizations, that didn't really say anything about me, because 
I was not aware of my desires in relation to these descriptors. Writing about those things and 
positioning myself at the beginning would have only created a quarantine around myself - not 
only separating myself from you, but giving you more reason to separate yourself from me. 
Furthermore, at the time, I took those things for granted because they were just 'who I was': a 
static body with several ascriptions, as opposed to a body moving in and out of assemblages, with 
different capacities and desires depending on the assemblage. 
Writing this thesis, as well as engaging in the thought process of this thesis, undid most of 
the things I 'knew' about myself. It's not that they had no meaning or significance at all, but rather 
that I only started to understand these things more clearly as I started to lose them (or let go of 
them?). On the one hand, I had to let go of them, they were the closures, the barriers that kept me 
from moving forward. But I let go a little too much, deconstructed too much and seemed to have 
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lost it all. It was the perception of this loss that threw me into my pit of lack. 
. . 
Now I see how the above descriptors, although not untrue, cannot define me or really say 
anything complete about me. But these descriptors do come to form pieces of assemblages 
refiguring in each moment in different ways depending on what kind of moment of collision I am 
experiencing. 
For instance, I now see some ways in which my family and class background might playa 
role in how I understand myself as a political subject. My parents grew up in communist Poland 
and left the country before it had formed a democracy. In fact, one of the main reasons my father 
left Poland was because of his dissatisfaction with the communi~ state; economic opportunity 
was very low, and faith in the government even lower. Governmental politics were never really 
discussed in my home, with the exception of some Polish politics that I did not understand and 
felt were largely irrelevant to my life here in Canada. I do not recall my mother ever talking about 
any sorts of politics. My mother's lack of engagement in politics, combined with my father's lack 
of confidence in government certainly might have seeped into my consciousness, with the 
political appearing in more subtle, constituent ways in my life instead. 
Poland has a a great history of struggle: war, poverty and, of course, much resistance. In 
this history I can begin to see myself and my fam!Jy. Despite often struggling financially there 
was always much abundance in my home. There is a common stereotype that Polish people are 
cheap. There is certainly a kernel of truth here, however, I resent the lack that this statement 
suggests. How can one not be cheap, if they don't have much money to begin with? Coming 
from a history of poverty, it isn't so much that some Polish people are cheap, but perhaps it is 
rather that they have learned out of necessity how to live within their means as abundantly as 
possible; to persevere despite barriers. In fact, I am reminded of a history lesson, from when I 
attended Polish school on Saturdays as a child, about the repeated reconstruction of the royal 
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castle in the city centre in Warsaw. Despite being plundered and destroyed several times 
throughout history, the castle was always rebuilt; many times according to the original 
architectural plans. I can see the castle as representative of a people who have a history of 
poverty and suffering juxtaposed with great pride and will to persevere. Here I find another 
connection as to why my leanings towards the constituent might be so strong, why despite all 
obstacles and set backs I cannot help but to creatively produce myself from what at times might 
seem like rubble. 
Moreover, I am struck by the strength of women in my family. Here I suddenly see myself 
as a woman in an assemblage of women, seeing an infinite histopY of resistance and 
counterpower 43. I can see this in myself, my mother, my sisters, my aunts, my grandmother and 
see that if this exists now, then it did before with all my ancestors. The women in my closest 
family are all fairly dominant: in general, in the home, the men do what the women tell them to 
do, not the other way around. Further, despite her poor English, I have always seen my mother 
stand up for herself, and for her children as well. Even now, I constantly see small, yet significant 
resistances from my mother, my sisters, and myself. This assemblage of women in my life may 
explain to some degree why my desire for resistance might be so strong, all my life I've been 
surrounded and socialized into it at home. Perhap~ this is also why feminisms based on lack 
sparked such a violent reaction in me - I've always seen and been told how strong, intelligent and 
self-sufficient women are no matter what odds are set against them. 
Even pieces of my environment come to form how might I understand myself. St 
Catharines is where I have spent the majority of my (emerging) adult life. This much like 
emerging adulthood, is a transient space full of hidden possibility as well as an infinite deferral of 
43 In this regard, I am heavily indebted to Kathy Skott-Myhre's (2009) article, "Of families, mothers, gardens and 
alchemy: Rethinking relations between women in youth work." 
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dead ends. St Catharines is a small to mid-sized (population 132,000), post-industrial city. The 
city might be seen as.somewhat depressed, with the once strong manufacturing sector 
disassembling leaving many who once made up the secure working and middle classes 
unemployed. The small bulk ofthe city's wealth lies in retired seniors and perhaps some 
commuters who work in Toronto. The rest of the population is made up of students that go to the 
university and the college nearby, as well as other working-class people, and many other people 
who live in poverty. In essence, St Catharines might be the perfect space for arrested adulthood 
to fester. I live in a very nice (i.e., middle-class) neighbourhood that is split between student 
housing and middle to upper-class houses. I have walked by sev@1"allovelyhomes, perfect for 
raising a family in, with 'For sale' signs that have stood for ridiculous periods of time for such a 
desirable neighbourhood. In other words, adulthood appears hard to come by in St Catharines; 
other than the service industry, there is not much opportunity here, and very high competition 
even for lower level work. I, nor several young people I know living in St Catharines, don't have 
very high expectations of having careers and raising children in St Catharines (we certainly have 
some hopes though). 
Just being at Brock University gives me a sense of this lack of possibility, this infinite 
deferral. It seems impossible to get anyone to c01p.e out to anything, much less something 
political: the one "protest" I ever attended at Brock had about three people there. My experiences 
in such a space of low engagement, have certainly played a role in my antagonistic view of youth 
and more typical forms of political engagement. The lack of engagement at Brock, ironically, 
made me feel unengaged at/with Brock, and most of my engagement over the years turned 
instead to a Christian church community, where my own engagement was met with a mutual high 
engagement. 
In this fairly contemporary Christian community high amounts of attention were paid to 
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relationships and social justice, and there was a strikingly large youth population for a church 
(i.e., there seemed like there was more young people here than old - which seemed odd to me 
coming previously from more conservative churches like the Christian Reformed Church and the 
Roman Catholic church). There was a huge focus at this church on poverty, which along with my 
previous Christian engagement might have come to shape my some of my binarized views 
between the poor and the rich, as the church seemed to position itself and the congregation, and 
moreover, the Western world, as the bearers of privilege, compared to the rest ofthe world. We 
might see my desire for child sponsorship arising out of this space. 
The church did, however, also challenge such binarized yiews of the global economic 
disparity, by having its own homeless shelter, thus serving the local community and 
acknowledging local economic disparities. Service at the shelter encouraged relationships 
between the volunteers and patrons of the shelter. Here I find the roots of some of my 
engagement with social justice at a level of micro relations. Mutual love and respect was 
encouraged in these relationship, however, the unspoken Christian binary between those who are 
saved and those who are not might certainly complicate these relationships. This could 
potentially result in a binarized view of the good Christian hero, and the one who needs to be 
saved44. Further, the homeless shelter itself could -!>e seen as a polarization of poverty in the local 
area, with other more subtle class lines being ignored, in some ways intensifying a self vs other 
approach. Although a fair amount of critical thought was applied to the examination of global 
capitalism, there was little to no engagement with class, race, gender, and other social inequalities 
that might come to make up the congregation itself. In some ways I felt this church offered fairly 
44 I would like to point out that this binary is actually complicated within Christianity itself, as the figure of Christ 
might be seen as an immanent figure, challenging this binary. Nonetheless, often Christ is turned into a 
transcendent figure, which has more to it than it seems on the surface, but for the purposes of this discussion I 
will leave it there. 
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bourgeois, or majoritarian, solutions to the problems of the world that often made me feel 
somewhat inadequate in relation. That being said, I am heavily indebted to my engagement with 
Christianity for my focus on everyday relationships as a place to locate social justice, in essence 
it provided me with an opening into the multitude as I now understand it. 
The above all played roles in how I came to my understanding ofthe political. However, 
the above reflections are quite inadequate. I am very wary that in constructing these reflections I 
am only creating fictions - fictions that might enable me to act in more reasonable manners (in 
terms of Spinoza's 'reasonable man'), but fictions nonetheless that I am ready to reassess as 
different pieces of information and clues about myself, other people and situations arise, 
depending on how my desires respond. I now (try to) pay more attention to the shifting 
assemblage that I am taking part of in each moment. 
The above is evidence that my awareness of myself in relation to my reality and desires 
has grown; but this awareness must keep growing and expanding to meet the demands of each 
new moment. However, even if you don't have this awareness you are forced to act on the 
information that you do have, even if it is inadequate information. It is in this sense that even now 
my positioning is blurred. For it is clear that I often act based on assumptions and fictions created 
about myself and others (i.e., the majoritarian) and will most likely continue to do so, although 
my new assumptions and fictions might be more adequate than the old (hopefully). 
The above reflections can only ever be based on partial realities, because as soon as I have 
acknowledged them I have already begun the process of changing in relation to them. The above 
reflections may help me begin to understand, but they can never lead to a complete 
understanding. To adhere to any of these understandings in any permanent way runs the risk of 
limiting my capacities. My new found understandings do not allow me to position myself even 
now, because as Skott-Myhre (2008) phrases it, "as soon as we think we know who we are, we 
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can immediately see the possibility of who we might become" (p.7). And so my understandings 
of where I've come from shift and change as soon as J become aware of them, as suddenly they 
are pointing to all the places that I might go - and I've already left the building. 
It is in this sense that I have formed, (and am constantly forming and reforming) my own 
understanding of myself as part of the multitude, This new political (and social) identity is based 
upon the complex self - an identity that changes and shifts according to its context, an ever 
becoming of the zombie child. Perhaps a similar process might be seen in how other emerging 
adults are forming new adult (or political) identities in this time of total subsumption. 
It has been found that many young people are increasing)or relying more on subjective 
markers of adulthood to self-define what adulthood means to them instead of allowing social 
markers to dictate this transition (Luyckx, De Witte & Goossens, 2011; Cote and Bynner; 2008). 
In a study about work engagement and burn-out among emerging adults, Luyckx et al. (2011) 
revealed that a sense of adulthood moderated the negative affects of one's perceived instability in 
life. In other words, those who subjectively defmed themselves as adults had a protective factor, 
those who did not define themselves as adults were more prone to depression and burnout. At 
what age one defined themselves as an adult varied. In this sense, emerging adults are finding 
ways of understanding themselves in relation to t~eir lives. 
The questions I had at the beginning of this thesis, have not given me answers but have 
rather reaffirmed the questions, and the questions themselves have shifted, transformed and 
collided. It seems that my question 'what does it mean to be political?' is intricately connected to 
the question of 'what does it mean to be an adult?'. It seems that I am ending where I started. An 
obscure quote from Deleuzeand Guattari (1987) comes to mind here: "Who will answer this 
answer? Actually, there is no question, answers are all one ever answers. To the answer already 
contained in a question one should respond with questions from another answer" (p. 110). 
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The true escape is always into the infinite unknown. The question. The unknown is full of 
infinite possibility. This possibility may be infinitely good, or, infinitely bad; but the point is, it is 
infinite, and that we each make up a part of that infinity. The answer to the answer is the question. 
The answer to the riddle of the crisis of power is to question it; being political is to ask the 
question, what is the political? And to never stop asking the question. It is in asking the questions 
that assemblages are built into our lives. It is in asking the questions that we become aware of our 
desires. 
Awareness 45 is the key to bringing the social and political together, the constituent and 
constituted, the rejoining of the proletariat to the bourgeious. O~W awareness can conquer 
alienation, can open the closings from within, and bring one into the multitude. It is perhaps with 
this same awareness that emerging adults are asking themselves the question, what does it mean 
to be an adult in my own reality? If the traditional pathways to the political affirmation of 
adulthood are slowly disappearing, young people might be forced to ask the questions that will 
create their own pathways into adulthood based on their own desires. Perhaps in asking the 
question 'what does it mean to be adult in my own reality?" they are finding the answer to the 
answer as also being the question: what does it mean to be political in my own reality?; what 
does it mean to join the multitude around me? 
However, as I think about this I get scared. At the end of his Ethics, Spinoza (2000) 
reveals how rare it is for one to come upon awareness. Only a certain configuration of material 
and social conditions creates the possibility for awareness; a certain configuration of collisions. 
This awareness might be especially rare in capitalism, because we are basically trained to be 
unaware. What if we succumb to this unawareness? What if we all settle for the despair of the 
45 I would like to clarify that when speaking of awareness I am not referring to the psychology-based concepts of 
consciousness or self-awareness, but instead to an awareness of the immediate reality around one's self, in the 
moment. A state of zen might be a useful way to view the type of awareness I am referring to. 
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majoritarian? The majoritarian that is unaware of his lack? Isn't it in fact, the zombie's lack of 
awareness that makes it justifiable to kill without remorse? 
In the preface to this thesis, I posited that emerging adulthood is both a space of great 
possibility, yet great emptiness and alienation. What if is the latter part of this space that prevails? 
What if we turn to an apathy that is not a constituent force, but rather the mutated constituted 
force of death; the young people who are so hopeless that the only place to turn is to depression, 
drugs and suicide? What if it is this infection that spreads completely and destroys humanity 
itself? As Deleuze and Guattari (1987) have explained before, the majoritarian is Nobody; the 
majoritarian negates himself. What they46 leave out though is thf1i we all try to achieve this 
impossible becoming - and to succeed in this becoming means the non-existence of humanity. 
Annihilism. What if it ends like in Dawn of the Dead (Snyder, 2004)? Here the characters escape 
the mall and those who make it out alive manage to sail away on a boat. They sail in search of an 
island, in hopes that they find a place untouched by the infection. As the credits role, we see that 
they get to an island only to be devoured. There is no hope. 
46 The works of both Deleuze and Guattari are vast, so it is possible they did not leave this out, but rather I have yet 
to come across it... or perhaps it is not there as it is absurd within the immanent framework (as will be explained 
in the next chapter). 
Alternate ending/beginning - Final/first thoughts 
- I guess I mean the middle 
The above seems hopeless .... but this is only an illusion. To fear this sort of 'ending' is 
absurd. As Spinoza (2000) reveals to us, a free man does not fear death. One's own death is 
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always in the abstract future. And the future does not ever really exist until it is the present. The 
future can only exist as a movie in our minds. It is so easy to get lost in the hope or despair of a 
movie, to get lost in the screen and forget the reality facing us. 
We must not get caught up in the currently non-existent end, we need to go back to the 
middle. The middle is always now and here. If you are reading this right now, then the end has 
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obviously not come. We are still here in middle. 
This is not to say that the future should be completely disregarded, but rather that the 
future need be regarded under a "species of etemity"(III, Prop. 62, Dem., p. 272): not as 
something on its own, separate from now, but always in assemblage with the current and past 
conditions. Further, this future needs to focus on how we can now create more life, as opposed to 
prevent death. "A free man thinks nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation, not 
on death, but on life" (Spinoza, 2000, III, Prop. 67, p. 276). 
It is also easy to forget that the characters in the movies are really just actors. Just like the 
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characters, the majoritarian is a fiction, a fiction that can be re-written and already is always in 
the process of being re-written. My life does not need to be a fiction, I have the power to write 
my part in reality. This power lies in my awareness. I don't know exactly how I got here, but I 
cannot help but to desire awareness. Collisions with other bodies of awareness have brought to 
light this desire in me. The more awareness I experience, the more awareness I desire. It's a 
domino affect of desire that started long before I wrote this thesis. Much like alienation spreads 
like the zombie infection, so too does awareness. In fact, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) suggest 
that this is the way all ideas are spread, all life is spread: through contagion, the simple 
interaction, or collision, between bodies. 
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Where exactly my awareness came from is impossible to pinpoint - it has come from 
everywhere in pieces. These pieces have come together within a unique configuration of social 
and material conditions. As such, I am not responsible for my own awareness. Only my desires in 
collision with the desires of other bodies creates this awareness. Awareness is an assemblage that 
I desire to be a part of. Once you are part of the assemblage of awareness, there is only one 
responsibility: I am responsible for following my (our) desires in each moment, and to create as 
best as I can a collision of mutual joy to the best of my abilities/~pacities in that moment. This 
responsibility is as profoundly difficult, as it is simple. This requires high amounts of awareness 
of self and other and the relation of the two to each other in each moment. Because awareness is 
not a choice, when you experience awareness you want to follow it as much as possible so that 
you can create an assemblage for others to have the opportunity to become aware. But all you can 
ever provide is this opportunity: you cannot force awareness onto someone else, they can only 
engage with it themselves. This is why Spinoza says that awareness is rare: it takes a unique 
constellation of accidental collisions to bring it about. But it seems that perhaps we are now in a 
time and space in which the conditions for collidi!1g with this sort of awareness is heightened 
(Negri, 1996). 
Within the total subsumption, capital creates more openings because it needs to dominate 
more and hence more openings need to be made for the production that is to be dominated. But 
what capital cannot control is that the openings are two-sided. The more holes capital creates in 
order to dominate more of the constituent force, the more spaces the constituent has to escape 
through. You cannot have infinite capital because the moment capital becomes infinite is the 
moment it ceases to be capital; surplus without value (Casarino & Negri, 2008, p. 31). Ironically 
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capital may very well be its own demise: the more it tries to control us, the more we search for 
freedom. 
As was discussed at the beginning of this thesis, Marx tells us that the mode of production 
holds its own limitations, as well as potential solutions; in other words, it functions as tool-and-
result. Although social labour seems to hold precarious outcomes for the majority of people, 
particularly young people, it might also hold the seeds of its own demise. Although emerging 
adulthood can indeed be a space of great alienation, as a large portion of my auto ethnography has 
revealed, it is also in emerging adulthood, that I see a potential space for where the seeds of 
awareness may thrive. ( 
Something that has not been discussed at length is that emerging adulthood is not a stage 
oflife that is available to all young people in this age group. One of the major critiques of 
Arnett's theory is its lack of substantial engagement with class and other forms of social 
inequality. It has been suggested that emerging adulthood is a stage of life that occurs primarily 
for those who pursue post-secondary education (Hendry & Kloep, 2010). 
Concerns have been raised about the "forgotten half' of emerging adults who do not 
attend college. For the forgotten half, incomes have dropped some 20% to 30% in the 
past 2 decades [Halperin, 2001], and the l~_ck of advanced credentials can constitute a 
serious career obstacle. (Schwartz et aI., 2005, p. 205). 
It is unclear if those who do not attend post-secondary institutions have the opportunity to 
experience the sort of prolonged transition to adulthood proposed in emerging adulthood (i.e., a 
time of prolonged identity exploration), or if this prolonged transition does occur but manifests 
itself in different ways (Schwartz et aI., 2005). In other words, it is argued by some that emerging 
adulthood is a space occupied primarily by middle-class (old bourgeois) youth, those who can 
afford (or more accurately, whose parents can afford) to pursue the accumulation of identity 
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capital, particularly in the form of educational qualifications (Hendry & Kloep, 2010; Cote & 
Allahar, 2006). Although I agree that the forgotten half is to a large degree denied access to many 
of the luxuries of emerging adulthood, I myself challenge the notion that this is a population 
made up solely of youth coming from middle-class (old bourgeois) families. I come from a 
working class family, and afford post secondary education through a combination of loans and 
scholarships47. In this sense, as others have revealed (Schwartz et aI., 2005) emerging adulthood 
is still a heterogeneous space, although the forgotten half may remain largely forgotten. 
For the purposes of this thesis, however, I would like to engage with emerging adulthood 
precisely in the classed space it appears to be occupying48. Cote..and Bynner (2008) explain the 
'30/30/40 society' into which late-stage capitalist economies are moving towards: 
The '30/30/40 society' [Hutton 1995] refers to a labour market in which there is, at the top 
(educated) end (40%), enhanced opportunity, career prospects and stable earnings, 
compared with, at the bottom end, labour market experience characterized mainly by 
unemployment or those 'out of the labour market' engaged in childcare (30%). In the 
middle are 'patchwork careers'(30%), mixing casual work, or jobs without progression, 
interspersed with spells of unemployment [Bertram 2000]. (p. 255) 
Emerging adulthood could be largely placed in th~ middle 30 section (and perhaps to some 
degree in the bottom 30 with the 'forgotten half), which I think puts these emerging adults in a 
very unique and interesting position, In this position, we have individuals who have relatively 
low amounts of economic capital, yet growing amounts of identity capital combined with high 
expectations. One of Arnett's (2007) key findings in interviews with emerging adults is that they 
47 Although I clearly compensate for my lack of economic capital with some sort of identity capital which 
predispositions me for success in post-secondary education, which converts into economic capital in the form of 
scholarships. 
48 Although I am choosing not to engage with the 'forgotten half, this does not mean I do not see this as a space 
with a high potential for awareness as well. However, not being able to relate to the 'forgotten half I do not think 
this autoethnography is the place to engage with this population at great length. 
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are they very hopeful and optimistic about their futures, despite the obstacles. Such a 
combination of qualities might create a space for an inten.sification of the new post-Marxist class 
struggle, but also a space of potential escapes. 
On the one hand, there is an escape that could be based on bourgeois pride. Pride, 
according to Spinoza (2000) is one of the more difficult passions to correct because it is derived 
from pleasure (IV, Prop. 56, Sch.). As was discussed earlier, to Spinoza, pride is the greatest 
impotence of the mind and hence the greatest depoliticization of the multitude. 
But it is within the pleasure of pride that I suddenly see a potential for awareness to arise. 
Pride and privilege are indeed difficult to give up, but I would ~gue that capital is physically 
forcing many out of their privileged positions. As mentioned previously many emerging adults 
come from the middle-class (old bourgeois) but as they enter the work force they are not gaining 
the success expected, the old bourgeois is more and more becoming the old proletariat in 
disguise. Suddenly, the subjectivity of pride and privilege of the bourgeois becomes juxtaposed 
with the concrete deprivation of the proletariat. 
In this thesis, I have talked a lot about "doing nothing" and how this language covers up 
many aspects of my reality_ Perhaps some of this language can be seen as a result of the lack 
created by the consumption-as-production within J:he total subsumption. Social labour makes it 
seem like I'm doing nothing because capital is not making a return on my investments (M-C-M'): 
my labour is not producing the profit that is supposed to come at the end. The formula is not 
working for me - it might be working for some people - but it's possible other young people feel 
the way that I do. We are now more educated than previous generations, and yet despite all this 
excess of social work we are not benefiting from capital49• It is easy to get discouraged when, as 
49 For example, previous generations could fmd employment, with little to none post-secondary education (Cote & 
Allahar, 2006). 
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Cote and Allahar (2006) point out, it takes about 15 months for half of university graduates to 
find full-time employment, which results in many settling for employment in unskilled and low-
paying positions. We are not getting much in return for our years of efforts and capital has 
promised a lot more than we are getting. 
In many ways capital has promised the American dream to those within late-stage 
capitalism. With the ideology of meritocracy running rampant perhaps I could go as far as to say 
that the American dream has become the American 'promise'. The dominant image that we live by 
is abundance: we are constantly fed images of the rich and famous, and even around us we might 
try to uphold these images in our lives if only in appearance. It'S,flOt enough to just get by, capital 
suggests that we should thrive. This is perhaps in some cases more than a desire, but now an 
expectation. This is an expectation that capital (and the corporate media) itself has created in us. 
Furthermore, I would argue that such expectations and sense of entitlement are what might 
differentiate emerging adults from adolescents: emerging adults are legally defined as adults and 
yet do not have the power or capital to enact adulthood as capital promises it. In the context of 
the dual subjectivity created in the total subsumption, arrested adulthood is none other than 
arrested "bourgeois-hood" and the American promise appears to be broken. "Deprivation, in other 
words, may breed anger, indignation and antagoni§m, but revolt arises only on the basis of 
wealth, that is a surplus of intelligence, experience, knowledge, and desire" (Negri & Hardt, 
2004, p. 212). Capital itself maybe revealing the fiction of the majoritarian with the very 
conditions it creates. This I would argue may create a new potential for pride, a pride that is based 
on a surplus of identity capital, not a lack, because capital itself has taught us that we are worth 
more than capital is making us worth now. 
The above reveals several potential movements of a forced withdrawal of the bourgeois, a 
withdrawal ofthe majoritarian. On the other hand, I would argue that emerging adulthood also 
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holds the possibility for a different escape, an escape into the constituent: the simultaneous rising 
of the proletariat, or min~ritarian, based on desire. 
Emerging adulthood may be a unique space in which the potential for awareness is 
intensified. Emerging adults live in an increasingly anomic, or nonnless, society in which there is 
more freedom, however, social inequality has also increased (Cote & Allahar, 2006). With 
emerging adults being on the more disadvantaged end, this is not only an intensified space of the 
new proletariat, but based on economic means a space of the old proletariat as well. With less 
and less structural guidance, Schwartz et aI., (2005) suggest that identity fonnation in emerging 
adulthood might be seen as based more on self-socialization, or ~ndividualization. Here we might 
see where capital tries to take advantage of the anomie of society and the precarious state of 
young people's identities by offering prepackaged identities based on lack (Cote & Allahar, 
2006). However, since emerging adults are increasingly losing economic capital, consumption-as-
production becomes more and more burdensome. Perhaps, if you don't have the economic means 
to consume your identity, you might start to creatively produce your identity instead: arrested 
bourgeois-hood can also become perpetual proletariat-hood. I would like to propose that 
emerging adulthood might be seen as a space in which one needs to rely more than ever on their 
desires in order to creatively produce an identity. Ihis creative production of the self requires 
awareness. However, I would argue that social labour may be in fact creating the opportunity for 
awareness, particularly for emerging adults, as at the heart of the accumulation of identity capital 
is the interaction of bodies: the more identity capital one seeks to acquire the more collisions with 
diverse bodies one must have. The glaring problem here is that the increase of collisions can 
actually result in more collisions of consumption, as one may be unaware and consume bodies in 
these collisions as opposed to engaging in an awareness of now, self and other, in order to create 
and expand oneself in collision with the other. But this is where you and I as part of the 
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multitude, have the opportunity to come in. By endeavouring to live in awareness we create the 
opportunity for someone to collide with that awareness. The more one collides with awareness 
the more likely that contagion will occur. 
We can see this contagion already occurring. One common misconception about youth, 
and emerging adults in particular, is that they are self-focused and individualistic (Arnett, 2007). 
But there is some research to suggest that such claims are over-stated (Arnett, 2007; Arnett, 
Ramos & Jensen, 2001). In a study examining the ideological view of emerging adults, Arnett et 
al. (2001) found that emerging adults were split almost equally between valuing ideologies of 
autonomy and ideologies of community. Furthermore it was fouud that some young people in the 
study found that individualism and community were reconcilable. Certainly some people 
displayed more individualistic tendencies than others. I myself am an example; however, as this 
autoethnography has revealed I am also often struggling against this individualism and would not 
be surprised if others are as well. 
Furthermore, we can see young people using consumption against itself in order to 
creatively produce and challenging consumption-as-production as the only way left to produce 
within the total subsumption. For instance, we might be able to see a sense of ethical awareness 
arising in the reactions to the inadequacies of con~umption based movements (i.e., fair trade, 
consumption based green movements, etc.). From young (and old) people pledging to "Shop 
second-hand first,,50 or to not shopping a1l5I ; as well as young people starting their own ethical 
business models (i.e., See Save the Children, Me to We). We can even see a transformation of 
consumption into a full-out sense of giving and receiving; for instance, if we look at the couch 
surfing movement. Couchsurfing is hospitality network that goes so far as to eliminate the idea of 
50 See http://www.thecitizenrosebud.coml20 11/04/shop-second-hand -first.html 
51 See http://www.thegreatamericanappareldiet.coml 
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direct exchange: young people all over the world offer up their homes and 'couches' for free 
without the favour ever needing to be returned52. The above are only a few examples of such 
spaces of awareness and creative production based on what is already there. 
Although I have focused on the unique potentials for emerging adulthood to create an 
opening into the multitude, I do not think these potentials are limited to this space53 . As explained 
above, I see a potential intensification in which the majoritarian might withdraw, while the 
minoritarian rise up and produce itself. However, if this intensification does indeed lie in this 
space, it should be interesting to take note that there is evidence that this space may be growing. 
Part of Arnett's (2000) theory fits quite nicely with the historical;~ndencies of capital: Arnett 
predicts that the more industrialized a country becomes the more widespread emerging adulthood 
becomes. There is some evidence to support Arnett's claim. The transition from youth to 
adulthood has been increasingly prolonging since the 1960s, with a "continual decade-by-decade 
elongation of the transition" occurring (Cote & Bynner, 2008, p. 254). Following these trends it 
is possible that this transition will continue to prolong, ironically pushing adulthood further away, 
creating more and more opportunity for arrested bourgeois-hood to become perpetual proletariat-
hood; to become the becoming zombie child: the ultimate force of death combined with the 
ultimate life force. But only time can tell if zomb~es will be brought back to life. 
Only in time will we be able to see how the social and material conditions play 
themselves out and what the multitude can do with these conditions. And only in time can we see 
how we might be a part of this multitude. This time is of course, now. Pieces of the multitude are 
everywhere - we only need to start piecing them together, and to do this is a matter of noticing 
what is already there. We need to notice our surplus desires spilling over into each other. Which is 
52 See http://www.couchsurfing.org 
53 In fact, some of the above movements may point to movements that have been happening all along in the 
'forgotten half based out of pure necessity. 
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why the questions I have explored in this thesis need to become your questions; our questions. 
How do your own understandings of the political make you become a zombie? What 
drains you and makes you feel lifeless? How do you infect others with this lifelessness? And yet 
despite feeling lifeless, why are you still here? What keeps you fighting the zombie? And what's 
keeping you from bringing that zombie back to life instead? Are you fighting one zombie 
forgetting there are other zombies in the horde, other zombies that desire what you desire? Other 
zombies that have come back to life and don't want to devour you, but join you? 
I hope that in this thesis you may have found an opening to insert yourself into, as I leave 
you with my fmal question: What can you do in your multitude,; now? 
, 
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